Learning from Medication Errors in Healthcare : How to Make Medication Error Reporting Systems Work? by Holmström, Anna-Riia
  
Clinical Pharmacy Group 
Division of Pharmacology and Pharmacotherapy 
Faculty of Pharmacy 
University of Helsinki 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Learning from Medication Errors in Healthcare – 
How to Make Medication Error Reporting Systems 
Work? 
 
 
 
Anna-Riia Holmström 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACADEMIC DISSERTATION 
 
To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Pharmacy of the University of 
Helsinki, for public examination in Auditorium XIV, University main building,  
on Friday 28th April 2017, at 12 noon. 
 
Helsinki 2017 
  
Supervisors:  Professor Marja Airaksinen, Ph.D. 
  Clinical Pharmacy Group 
  Division of Pharmacology and Pharmacotherapy 
  Faculty of Pharmacy 
  University of Helsinki 
  Helsinki, Finland 
 
  Docent Raisa Laaksonen, Ph.D. 
Clinical Pharmacy Group 
  Division of Pharmacology and Pharmacotherapy 
  Faculty of Pharmacy 
  University of Helsinki 
  Helsinki, Finland 
   
 
Reviewers:  Director Edward Kelley, M.D., Ph.D. 
  WHO Patient Safety Programme 
  World Health Organization 
  Geneva, Switzerland 
 
  Director Gordon Schiff, M.D., Ph.D. 
  Center for Patient Safety Research and Practice 
  Brigham and Women’s Hospital 
  and 
  Associate Professor of Medicine 
  Harvard Medical School 
  Boston, USA 
 
Opponent:  Kenneth M. Shermock, Pharm.D., Ph.D. 
Director, Center for Medication Quality and Outcomes 
The Johns Hopkins Hospital 
Baltimore, MD, USA 
 
 
 
 
© Anna-Riia Holmström 2017 
ISBN 978-951-51-3086-0 (paperback) 
ISBN 978-951-51-3087-7 (PDF) 
Dissertationes Scholae Doctoralis Ad Sanitatem Investigandam Universitatis Helsinkiensis 
ISSN 2342-3161 (print) 
ISSN 2342-317X (online) 
Helsinki University Printing House 
Helsinki, Finland 2017
 3 
Abstract  
Medication errors are one of the most common incidents leading to adverse events in 
healthcare worldwide. Tackling these major problems requires the implementation of a 
systems approach to healthcare, stating that risks should be managed proactively by 
improving the healthcare system. One of the recommended key strategies for learning from 
medication errors and risk prone processes is the establishment of local and national 
medication error reporting (MER) systems in healthcare.  
This study explored national and local MER systems in different countries and what 
makes them work in learning from medication errors. The study also explored how 
continuing education in medication safety could be organised for practicing healthcare 
professionals. The study applied both qualitative and quantitative research methods and 
utilized various data sources. The study was based on the theory of Human Error and the 
systems approach to risk management.  
The study comprised of three phases. Phase I explored the existing MER systems in 
different countries and their development and implementation. 16 medication safety experts 
from different countries responded to an online-survey. A national or local MER system 
existed in 11 of the countries. Blaming for errors, and a lack of time, training and 
coordination of reporting continue to be the major barriers to reporting. Learning from errors 
and a non-punitive approach are essential features of a MER system. There is also a need 
for promoting international networking of medication safety experts and bodies for sharing 
information and learning from others. Several factors associated with the successful 
development and implementation of MER systems were also identified.  
Phase II assessed the inter-rater reliability of medication error classifications in a 
voluntary Reporting System for Safety Incidents in Health Care Organizations (HaiPro) 
widely used in Finland. Also medication errors (n=32 592) reported in 2007-2009 and their 
contributing factors were explored. The inter-rater reliability was found acceptable (κ ≥0.41) 
in 11 out of 42 (26%) variables (e.g., near miss or actual error) describing the reported 
medication errors. Thus, the medication errors reaching the acceptable level of inter-rater 
reliability could be pooled from different healthcare units for the exploration of medication 
errors at the level of all reporting organisations. The most frequently reported medication 
errors were: dispensing errors (33%, n=10 906); administration errors (24%, n=7 972); and 
documentation errors (17%, n=5 641). The most commonly reported contributing factor was 
deficiencies in communication and course of information related to patients’ medications.  
In Phase III educational approaches were developed for introducing medication safety 
for healthcare professionals as a three-day interdisciplinary course. International higher 
education experts in pharmacy (n=19) brainstormed four syllabi with teaching and 
assessment methods. Following this, a combined syllabus was developed. All four syllabi 
were based on constructive, problem-based learning methods and focused on understanding 
a systems approach in managing medication safety. Learning linked to learners’ practice 
through assignments at the workplace appeared to be the key. 
The study suggests that MER systems need to be improved in many countries together 
with their operational environments. Moreover, the operational environments of MER 
systems must support the functionality of these systems. The key factor for successful MER 
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systems and learning from medication errors is having a systems approach as a theoretical 
context in all reporting and learning processes throughout the operational environments of 
MER systems. The current work also suggests that constructive problem-based learning 
linked to learners’ practice through assignments is the key when developing a course for 
continuing education in medication safety for healthcare professionals.  
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Definitions of the key concepts 
Adverse drug reaction 
A response to a medicinal product which is noxious and unintended and which occurs at 
doses normally used in man for the prophylaxis, diagnosis or therapy of disease or for the 
restoration, correction or modification of physiological function (Council of Europe 2006a). 
Adverse event 
An incident that results in harm to a patient (e.g., the wrong unit of blood was infused and 
the patient died from a haemolytic reaction) (World Health Organization 2009). An adverse 
event is caused by medical management, in contrast to process or complication of a disease 
(World Health Organization 2005; Council of Europe 2006a).  
Adverse drug event 
A medication related adverse event resulting either because of a pharmacological reaction 
to a normal dose, or because of a medication error (World Health Organization 2005; Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 2006).   
Blame culture 
A culture in which the person is assumed to be able to perform without error (Larson & 
Saine 2013). Perfect performance is expected and believed to be achieved through 
education, professionalism, vigilance and care (Cohen 2007). Latent failures are not 
considered. Errors are attributed to laziness, negligence, or incompetence, resulting in 
blaming the person that made the error (Larson & Saine 2013). 
Contributing factor 
A circumstance, action or influence that is thought to have played a part in the origin or 
development of an incident or to increase the risk of an incident (World Health Organization 
2009). Examples are human factors such as behaviour, performance or communication; 
system factors such as work environment; and external factors beyond the control of the 
organisation, such as the natural environment or legislative policy. More than one 
contributing factor is typically involved in a single patient safety incident.  
Hazard 
A circumstance, agent or action with the potential to cause harm (World Health 
Organization 2009). Example of hazards are unsafe practices, conduct, equipment, labels or 
names (World Health Organization 2005). 
Human error 
A failure of planned actions to achieve their desired ends, without the intervention of some 
unforeseeable event (Reason 1990; Larson & Saine 2013). Errors may be errors of 
commission or omission, and usually reflect deficiencies in the systems of care (World 
Health Organization 2005). Human errors can be further divided into slips, lapses, and 
mistakes (Reason 1990; Larson & Saine 2013). 
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Incident 
An event or circumstance that could have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a 
patient (World Health Organization 2009). Incidents arise from either unintended or 
intended acts, and therefore include errors, violations, patient abuse and deliberately unsafe 
acts that occur in healthcare. Errors are unintentional, whereas violations are usually 
intentional acts, though rarely malicious. 
Incident reporting 
Central notification and recording of incidents that led to patient harm, or could have caused 
harm (Woodward et al. 2010).  
Medical error 
An unintentional act (either of omission or commission) or one that does not achieve its 
intended outcome; the failure of planned action to be completed as intended (an error of 
execution), the use of the wrong plan to achieve an aim (an error of planning), or deviation 
from the process of care that may or may not cause harm to the patient (Makary & Daniel 
2016). Examples of medical errors are misdiagnosis or delayed diagnosis, administration of 
the wrong drug to the wrong patient, or surgery on an incorrect site. 
Medication error 
A medication error is any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate 
medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the control of the healthcare 
professional, patient, or consumer (National Coordinating Council for Medication Error 
Reporting and Prevention 2015). Such events may be related to professional practice, 
healthcare products, procedures, and systems, including prescribing, order communication, 
product labelling, packaging, and nomenclature, compounding, dispensing, distribution, 
administration, education, monitoring, and use.  
Medication error reporting system 
An electronic or paper based system that is used for systematically collecting information 
on medication errors, with the aim of identifying medication safety risks and thus enabling 
healthcare providers to improve quality of care (Hoffmann et al. 2008). A medication error 
reporting system can be a standalone-system in which only medication errors are reported, 
or as part of a wider patient safety incident reporting system where medication errors are 
reported among other patient safety incidents. A medication error reporting system can 
operate locally as an internal system in healthcare organisations or as an external or national 
system (e.g., reports submitted to a safety agency not affiliated with the organisation) 
(Cohen 2007).  
Near miss (or close call) 
An incident that has the potential to cause an adverse event but did not reach the patient 
(e.g., a medication being connected to the wrong patient’s intravenous line, but the error 
was detected before the infusion started) (World Health Organization 2005; World Health 
Organization 2009). 
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Patient safety 
Freedom for a patient from unnecessary harm or potential harm associated with healthcare 
(Council of the European Union 2009). Patient safety can be viewed in a practical way as 
the mechanisms, tools, resources and required actions to reduce and ultimately avoid 
unintentional harm to patients (World Health Organization 2010). These can cover any 
aspect of care including organisational factors, health-care personnel, the systems and 
environment that can contribute to a safety breach (e.g., health-care associated infections or 
medication errors).  
Risk management 
Activities or measures taken by an individual or a healthcare organisation to prevent, remedy 
or mitigate the occurrence or reoccurrence of a real or potential (patient) safety event 
(Dückers et al. 2009). 
Safety 
Freedom from accidental injuries and reduction of risk of unnecessary patient harm 
associated with healthcare (Kohn et al. 2000; World Health Organization 2009).  
Safety culture 
An integrated pattern of individual and organisational behaviour, based upon shared beliefs 
and values, that continuously seeks to minimise patient harm which may result from the 
processes of care delivery (Council of Europe 2006a). Safety culture reflects the 
organisation’s attitude toward safety, including a blame-free environment applying the 
systems approach and commitment of resources to improve safety (Woodward et al. 2010). 
System 
A set of independent elements (e.g., people, processes, equipment) that interact to achieve 
a common aim (European Commission 2014). In healthcare, a system can be e.g., an 
integrated delivery system, a centrally owned multi-hospital system, an operating room or 
an obstetric unit (Kohn et al. 2000).  
Systems approach 
An approach to safety stating that errors are mostly consequences of systematic factors, e.g., 
weaknesses in organisational processes (Reason 2000; Woodward et al. 2010). Building 
system defences to reduce and prevent errors is the main method of safety improvement in 
systems approach. Please see Section 3.3. of the Thesis. 
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1 Introduction 
Awareness of deficiencies in patient safety has arisen internationally (Jha et al. 2010; 
Schreiber et al. 2016). Patient safety is considered to be a global public health issue 
imposing a substantial burden on the world’s population. It has been estimated that one in 
ten hospitalised patients is harmed when receiving healthcare in industrialised countries, 
and half of these may be preventable (Kohn et al. 2000; Vincent et al. 2001; Vries et al. 
2008).   The international landmark report To Err is Human by the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) suggested that approximately 44 000-98 000 patients die and over a million are 
injured as a result of adverse events in hospitals in the United States annually (Kohn et al. 
2000). The subsequent studies in the United States have shown even higher incidence of 
medical error, ranging from 0.38 to 1.13% of admissions with a preventable lethal adverse 
event (Landrigan et al. 2010; Classen et al. 2011; Makary & Daniel 2016). The studies on 
primary care suggest approximately 2-3 incidents per 100 consultations per patient (Panesar 
et al. 2015). About 4% of these incidents are associated with severe harm. Epidemiological 
studies on adverse events, including medication errors, have not yet taken place in Finland 
(Järvelin 2012). If the earlier international evidence is extrapolated to Finnish healthcare 
and population of 5.5 million, adverse events cause annually the death of 700–1700 hospital 
patients in Finland (Pasternack 2006). 
Medication errors are one of the most common incidents leading to adverse events in 
patient care (Kohn et al. 2000; Vries et al. 2008; Panesar et al. 2015). Medication errors are 
defined as any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or 
patient harm while the medication is under the control of a healthcare professional, patient, 
or consumer (National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention 2015). Medication errors can occur during various stages of the medication use 
process, e.g. while prescribing, dispensing or administering a medicine (Lisby et al. 2010). 
 The incidence of medication errors vary between studies depending on numerous 
factors, such as the definition used for medication error and methods used for their detection 
(Lisby et al. 2010; Wittich et al. 2014; Olaniyan et al. 2015). The IOM has estimated that 
medication errors cause 1 out of 131 outpatient and 1 out of 854 inpatient deaths (Kohn et 
al. 2000). The IOM later summarised the incidence of medication errors in their report 
Preventing Medication Errors (2007). Other studies on medication errors have shown 
varying incidence rates from 8.1 to 2344 per 1000 patient-days in intensive care settings 
(Wilmer et al. 2010). In their recent systematic review of medication errors in primary care, 
Olaynian et al (2015) demonstrated that medication errors are common, with the prescribing 
stage being the most susceptible to medication errors.  
Besides the human suffering, medication errors and other adverse events cost tens of 
billions of dollars for healthcare systems around the world each year (Institute of Medicine 
2007). The majority of these errors are preventable and caused by system factors (e.g., 
problems in transferring information on patient’s up to date medicines when the patient 
moves from one healthcare unit to another) (Vries et al. 2008; Leape 2009). Tackling these 
major problems requires the implementation of a systems approach to healthcare, stating 
that risks should be managed proactively by improving the healthcare system and its 
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processes rather than blaming and shaming individual healthcare professionals for 
committing errors (Senge 1990; Reason 2000; Spath 2011). 
Although these issues have become internationally and nationally recognised, an 
academic research and evidence base to support improving medication safety in Finnish 
healthcare is currently lacking and is urgently needed (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
2009). One of the recommended strategies to learn from medication errors and risk prone 
processes is the establishment of a local (e.g. hospital or unit-based) and national medication 
error reporting (MER) systems (Council of Europe 2006a). MER systems are typically 
databases where healthcare professionals are able to file reports on medication errors in their 
daily practice.  This data can be further analysed and used for improving the detected 
processes producing errors in healthcare units (e.g., by introducing alert systems to iv-drug 
administration at hospitals). There are, however, certain limitation to error reporting systems 
that need to be acknowledged, such as their inability to be used for measuring safety in error 
rates (Pham et al. 2013). In addition to promoting the reporting of and learning from 
medication errors, interdisciplinary education of healthcare professionals is needed for 
implementing the systems approach to healthcare (World Health Organization 2011). 
This study is based on the work of the Council of Europe (CoE) expert groups on 
medication (Council of Europe 2006a) and patient safety (Council of Europe 2006b) in 
2003-2006. As an outcome of their work the expert group on medication safety published 
the report “Creation of a better medication safety culture in Europe: building up safe 
medication practices” (Council of Europe 2006a). At the national stage, this study is based 
on the Finnish Patient Safety Strategy 2009-2013 (an up-date of the Strategy will be released 
soon) (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2009) and the Finnish Medicines Policy 2020 
which have promotion of medication safety as one of their primary goals (Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health 2011). The key objective of the CoE reports (2006 a and b) and the 
national policy initiatives is that safety should be regarded as a system issue, managed 
proactively and through learning from errors. Another key objective is that patient safety 
incidents, including medication errors, should be reported through reporting systems, 
analysed and used for organisational learning from errors to avoid their reoccurrence. 
Furthermore, the need for reporting and learning from errors in Finnish healthcare settings 
has been covered by the new Healthcare Act (1326/2010, 8 §) and its Statute by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health (341/2011). 
This thesis aims to respond to these national and international needs for enhancing 
medication safety through the use of MER systems. The thesis consists of two parts: a 
literature review and an empirical section. The literature review starts with a description of 
national patient and medication safety work in Finland to provide a contextual framework 
for MER activities and healthcare system improvement in Finland (Chapter 2). Secondly, 
the theoretical context of the study (Chapter 3) is introduced together with a summary of 
MER systems as tools to improve medication safety (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 concludes the 
literature review by a systematic literature search of the published research in MER systems. 
The empirical part of the thesis investigates MER systems in different countries, how to 
make these systems work for learning from medication errors, and how education on 
medication safety could be organised for practicing healthcare professionals to improve 
safety (Chapters 7-11). This study is a part of a larger collection of medication safety related 
studies of the Clinical Pharmacy Group at the Faculty of Pharmacy, University of Helsinki. 
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2 Medication safety as a part of patient safety in Finland 
Patient and medication safety has been actively promoted in Finland over the past 13 years. 
The work has been inspired by the international patient safety activities in which Finland 
has been actively involved. Examples of such activities are the Council of Europe expert 
groups on medication (Council of Europe 2006a) and patient safety (Council of Europe 
2006b) in 2003-2006. Since then, the national patient safety promotion has involved several 
key milestones and actors in developing systems based approach to patient and medication 
safety in the Finnish healthcare. The active involvement of the study group members in the 
national patient and medication safety work has also impacted the initiation and contents of 
the present study.  
2.1 Patient safety initiatives in Finland 
The commence of national patient safety work in Finland goes back to 2005 when the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH) established the national patient safety 
network (Vuorenkoski 2009). The network comprised of approximately 200 members 
representing healthcare professionals, healthcare providers, patients, non-governmental 
organisations and authorities. These national activities were preceded by local actions in 
some pioneering primary healthcare settings in Finland.  
In 2006, the MSAH established the Patient Safety Steering Group to promote patient 
safety and to coordinate its development at the national level (Figure 1). One of the key 
targets of the Steering Group was to establish national patient safety strategy and guidelines 
for reporting adverse events in Finnish healthcare. 
2.1.1 Strategies leading the national patient safety work 
The core effort of the MSAH Patient Safety Steering Group was the development of the first 
National Patient Safety Strategy for 2009-2013 (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2009; 
Figure 1). The main objective of the strategy was that patient safety will be embedded in the 
structures and methods of operations in healthcare. The strategy outlined, e.g., that all 
healthcare organisations should have explicit procedures for internal reporting, monitoring 
and handling patient safety incidents, including medication errors (Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health 2009; Vuorenkoski 2009). 
The new national Patient Safety and Customer Safety Programme (2017-2020) will be 
released shortly. The programme is developed as a collaborative project with the MSAH 
and the Finnish Society for Patient Safety (Holmström et al. 2015). The new Patient and 
Customer Safety Programme will also include the social care settings, e.g., elderly care, and 
emphasises the role of a patient/customer and his or her close contacts in patient and 
customer safety promotion. The main aspects covered in the new Programme will be: safety 
culture enabling e.g., open sharing and learning from occurred adverse events in social care 
and healthcare settings; patient and customer safety management; statutes related to patient 
and customer safety, and responsibilities of different stakeholders in patient and customer 
safety promotion.
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National guidelines for safe pharmacotherapy (MSAH) (updated in 2015 by THL) 
Patient Safety Steering 
Group 
(MSAH, 2006-2009) 
Patient Safety Strategy 
2009-2013 (MSAH) 
Patient and 
Customer safety 
Programme  
2017-2020 
(MSAH) 
New Healthcare Act and Statute on quality  
and patient safety 
National Patient Safety 
Programme  
2011-2014 (THL) 
National Society for Patient Safety (established in 2010) 
Medicines Policy 2020 (MSAH 2011) 
Patient and Medication 
Safety Glossary 
(Stakes & ROHTO 2006) 
National Patient Safety Network  
(established by MSAH in 2005) 
Development of the Finnish 
Reporting System for Safety 
Incidents in Health Care 
Organizations (HaiPro) 
Rational Medication 
Therapy Programme  
(MSAH 2016) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Figure 1.   Governmental and other national actions to initiate systems based patient and medication safety work in Finland. MSAH = 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health; THL= National Institute for Health and Welfare; ROHTO = (former) National Centre for 
Pharmacotherapy Development; Stakes = (former) National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health. 
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2.1.2 Legislation supporting patient safety 
The first Patient Safety Strategy (2009-2013) served as a base for the inclusion of healthcare 
quality and patient safety Section as a part of the new Healthcare Act enacted in 2011 
(1326/2010, 8 §) (Airaksinen et al. 2012; Figure 1). The Healthcare Act requires all Finnish 
healthcare institutions (hospitals and primary healthcare centres) to develop a plan for 
patient safety enhancement based on a systems approach. The plan is to describe the system, 
processes, resources and persons in charge for patient safety within the institution. A Statute 
by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (341/2011) complements the Act and gives 
detailed instructions on the minimum contents of a patient safety plan. 
In practice, the Act and Statute have appeared to be powerful instruments: they have 
forced all healthcare organisations to evaluate their patient care practices and to develop a 
coordinated plan to make their system safer (Airaksinen et al.  2012). In many healthcare 
organisations this has resulted in nominating patient safety coordinators and establishing 
patient safety steering groups. Many organisations also use an electronic Reporting System 
for Safety Incidents in Health Care Organizations (HaiPro) which has been available in 
Finland since 2007 (Keistinen & Kinnunen 2008; Ruuhilehto et al. 2011). The HaiPro 
reporting system is described in more detail in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Implementation of patient safety initiatives 
2.2.1 National Patient Safety Programme (2011-2014) 
The National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) was mandated by the MSAH to 
coordinate the implementation of the patient safety initiatives, such as the first Patient Safety 
Strategy (2009-2013) in Finland (Airaksinen et al. 2012). For that purpose, THL launched 
a four-year patient safety programme in 2011 (Figure 1). The programme targeted the 
hospital districts, public healthcare institutions and their personnel, including directors and 
management staff. Collaboration for promoting implementation was facilitated through 
networking and joint actions between national and local stakeholders, professional 
organisations, hospital districts, patient safety coordinators, patient organisations, research 
and education institutions. The Programme consisted of several actions aimed at influencing 
attitudes and traditional norms within healthcare institutions.  
2.2.2 The Finnish Society for Patient Safety 
The Finnish Society for Patient Safety is a non-governmental organisation established in 
2010 to promote patient safety and patient safety research in Finland (Holmström et al. 
2015). The Society has been very actively involved in national patient and medication safety 
promotion. The society uses a multidisciplinary approach involving voluntary 
representatives from a wide range of stakeholders, including healthcare organisations and 
academic institutions, with a high-level of expertise in patient safety. The Society operates 
three sub-groups, which conduct activities in their own area of specialty. These groups are: 
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safe pharmacotherapy; patient safety experts acting locally in their respective healthcare 
organisations, and experts from organisations for patients and the disabled to give voice to 
patient issues in patient and medication safety promotion. The safe Pharmacotherapy group 
has its special focus on medication safety promotion in hospital and community settings.  
The Finnish Society for Patient Safety promotes patient centeredness in its work, and 
has medication safety as one of its key priorities (Holmström et al. 2015). The Society also 
collaborates with other national stakeholders. One of its latest key initiatives involves the 
previously mentioned working with the MSAH to develop the national Patient and 
Customer Safety Programme (2017-2020). Other key activities of the Society include 
education for social care and healthcare professionals, promotion of research in patient and 
medication safety, informing patients, professionals and other stakeholders on patient 
safety, and publishing material for social care and healthcare organisations for promotion 
of patient safety in their own organisations. 
2.3 Medication safety initiatives as a part of patient safety 
2.3.1 Guidelines for safe medication practices 
Inspired by the work of Council of Europe expert groups on medication (Council of Europe 
2006a) and patient safety (Council of Europe 2006b) in 2003-2006, the former National 
Centre for Pharmacotherapy Development (ROHTO) established a voluntary 
multidisciplinary working group on medication safety in 2004. The first action taken by the 
group was to create a Finnish glossary of terms and concepts related to patient and 
medication safety from systems approach (Stakes & ROHTO 2006; Toivo & Airaksinen 
2006). 
At the same time, MSAH established a working group for developing guidelines for safe 
medication practices in public and private social- and healthcare units (Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health 2006). These guidelines are the primary national medication safety tool 
guiding the safe medication practices in Finnish social care and healthcare. In 2015, the 
guidelines were updated with a stronger focus in social care settings (e.g. elderly care) and 
responsibilities of the patient in ensuring one’s own medication safety (Finnish National 
Institute for Health and Welfare 2015). The key of the guidelines is that the provision of 
pharmacotherapy should be based on a pharmacotherapy plan developed in the unit. The 
plan serves as a tool for defining and managing the key aspects of the medication safety of 
a specific unit.  
According to a follow-up study, the guidelines have led to the evaluation of practices 
and the establishing of a pharmacotherapy plan in Finnish social care and healthcare units 
(Hitonen 2013). Thus, the guidelines are fulfilling their function for clarifying 
responsibilities and competences in safe pharmacotherapy, and defining the minimum 
requirements that must be complied with in all units providing pharmacotherapy in Finland.  
The responsibility for drawing up, carrying out and monitoring pharmacotherapy plans is 
vested in the management of the social and healthcare units (Finnish National Institute for 
Health and Welfare 2015).   
 22 
2.3.2 National Medicines Policy 2020 and other activities 
Systems based patient and medication safety has been strategically highlighted during the 
recent years when developing the National Medicines Policy 2020 (Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health 2011) and related implementation programmes, such as the medicines  
information strategy (Finnish Medicines Agency Fimea 2012) and a collaborative network 
for rational medication management for the aged people (Finnish Medicines Agency 
2015a). Also several other preventive actions and tools, such as collaborative medication 
reviews and automated dose dispensing in hospitals and primary care, have been developed  
to improve medication safety in the Finnish social and healthcare system (Airaksinen et al. 
2012; Leikola et al. 2012; Sinnemäki et al. 2014). Innovative electronic databases assist in 
medication risk assessment and are widely available throughout the healthcare in a health 
portal maintained by the Finnish Medical Society Duodecim (Toivo et al. 2016; Finnish 
Medical Society 2016). Some of the existing tools are specially designed for managing risks 
in the medication of the aged, such as a tool for nurses for assessing the risks of drug related 
problems (Dimitrow et al. 2014), the Database of Medication for the Elderly (Finnish 
Medicines Agency 2015b), and the SALKO and PHARAO databases to assist evaluation of 
medication-related risks among patients (Laine et al. 2013; Leikola et al. 2013). The 
Association of Finnish Pharmacists has also developed a dispensing error reporting system 
for detecting and learning from occurred incidents in community pharmacies. 
Following the National Medicine Policy 2020, the Finnish government has initiated a 
national programme for promoting rational pharmacotherapy to ensure medication safety in 
the new Healthcare Reform taking place in 2019 (Figure 1) (Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health 2017). The programme has several aims, such as promoting rational medication use 
by ensuring that healthcare professionals have comprehensive up-to date medication 
information of their patients, and promoting research related to rational medication use.   
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3 Theoretical context for medication error reporting and 
learning from medication errors 
3.1 Human Error 
The present study is based on the Theory of Human Error (Reason 1990; Armitage 2009). 
The theory states that where there is human action, errors are inevitable. Indeed, human 
error is one of the most remarkable  contributors to accidents in risk industries, such as 
healthcare, with complex systems, processes and technologies  (Kohn et al. 2000). 
The current literature introduces two approaches to human error; the person approach 
and the systems approach (Senge 1990; Reason 2000). Each has its model of error causation 
and provides different insights into error management (Table 1). Errors are a persistent 
threat to patient and medication safety (Armitage 2009). Understanding the differences 
between these two approaches is essential for managing medication errors and other patient 
safety incidents in clinical practice. 
Table 1.   A summary of person approach versus systems approach to human error 
(Reason 2000). 
Area Approach 
 Person approach Systems approach 
Focus 
Errors of individuals. Blaming 
individuals for making errors. 
Errors in conditions under which 
individuals work. Development of 
strategies to prevent errors. 
Premise 
“Errors happen to non-competent 
healthcare professionals.” 
“Humans make mistakes and errors 
occur even in high quality 
organisations.” 
Errors 
Arise primarily from mental 
processes, e.g., forgetfulness or 
negligence. 
Consequences of systematic factors, 
e.g., weaknesses in organisational 
processes. 
Countermeasures 
Attempts to change human 
behaviour. 
Attempt to change conditions under 
humans work, rather than change 
the human behaviour. 
Methods to 
achieve the 
countermeasures 
Appealing to sense of fear: 
blaming, shaming and disciplinary 
actions. 
Building system defences and 
safeguards to reduce and prevent 
errors. 
3.2 Person approach 
The traditional person approach to medication errors in healthcare has been to blame the 
individuals at the sharp end of the patient care, such as physicians, pharmacists and nurses 
(Wachter 2012; Table 1). According to the person approach, only non-competent healthcare 
professionals commit errors because of their forgetfulness, negligence or inattention when 
delivering medication care (Reason 2000). The main countermeasures comprise reducing 
the erroneous human behaviour, e.g., by disciplinary actions. By focusing on the individual 
origins of error, the person approach isolates unsafe acts from their system context. The 
presence of a person approach to medication error management has been one of the main 
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obstacles to functional medication error reporting and learning from errors in healthcare 
systems internationally (Weiner et al. 2008; Mahajan 2010). 
3.3 Systems approach 
While the person approach tends to have no insight into the underlying factors contributing 
to the occurrence of medication errors, the systems approach states that errors occur because 
of the conditions under which the individuals work (Reason 2000; Table 1). Hence, errors 
may be viewed as consequences of systematic failures and organisational weaknesses, for 
example storage of “look-alike” medications on the same shelf on a hospital ward.  
The systems approach acknowledges that errors are an inevitable accompaniment of the 
human condition, even among the most conscientious professionals with high standards 
(Leape 1994). Therefore, error countermeasures in a systems approach are based on the 
assumption that although the human condition cannot be changed, the conditions under 
which humans work can be changed (Reason 2000; Table 1). When an adverse event occurs, 
the important issue is to ask why the event occurred, not who made the error (Cohen 2007). 
Creation of such an organisational culture which embraces these principles is pivotal in 
enabling functional medication error reporting and learning from errors in healthcare 
organisations (Leape 2009). 
Embracing systems approach to medication safety does not imply that there would not 
be accountability for healthcare professionals due to poor adherence to safety practices, e.g. 
using the checklist when inserting central venous catheters (Wachter & Pronovost 2009). 
Indeed, many healthcare organisations have recognised that a unidimensional focus on 
creating a blame-free culture carries its own safety risks and should be tackled by balancing 
“no blame” with meaningful systems for accountability in cases where deliberate patient 
safety violations occur. However, it is notable that majority of errors are slips committed by 
caregivers and require system improvements.    
3.4 The “Swiss cheese” model of system accidents 
As the human nature cannot be changed, a central method for preventing medication errors 
from the systems approach is building system defences into the medication processes, such 
as the use of oral medication administration syringes that do not fit into iv-systems  (Reason 
1990; Reason 2000; Yip & Farmer 2015). However, in healthcare, the defences typically 
rely on individuals, such as doctors and pharmacists who are assumed not to make errors. 
In an ideal situation these defences would be impermeable to errors. In the real world these 
protective defence layers are, however, permeable to errors. This may be visualised by 
James Reason’s Swiss cheese model of system accidents where the slices of cheese present 
the protective defences of the system and the holes failures (Reason 1990; Wachter 2012; 
Stein & Heiss 2015) (Figures 2 & 3). Holes in some slices would not cause damage, unless 
the holes are open in many defences concurrently. This would place the patients or possible 
victims in danger and enable the hazards to become losses. 
The holes in the model may be caused by active failures and/or latent conditions (Reason 
1990). Active failures are usually hard to foresee as they tend to be errors made by individual 
healthcare professionals. Latent conditions, on the contrary, may be detected before they 
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turn to active failures. For example, storage of two look-alike medicines on the same shelf 
at a hospital ward may be prevented in becoming a failure by moving one of the medicines 
to another shelf for storage. Understanding the role of active failures and latent conditions 
in medication error prevention leads to proactive risk management procedures to improve 
medication safety through the systems approach rather than the person approach (Reason 
2000; Dückers et al. 2009). Development and implementation of functional MER systems 
is one of the most widely used methods to enable the organisations to identify the active 
failures and latent conditions in their medication processes and to build the needed defences 
to avoid adverse patient outcomes (Council of Europe 2006a; Cohen 2007; Cheng et al. 
2011; Parmelli et al. 2012; European Commission 2014).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.   James Reason’s Swiss cheese model of system accidents (Reason 2000). 
  
 
Hazards 
Holes in the slices of 
cheese represent 
weaknesses in the 
defences due to active 
failures (e.g., unsafe acts 
by healthcare 
professionals such as 
procedural violations or 
mistakes) or latent 
conditions (e.g., unsafe 
error provoking 
conditions at the 
workplace, such as lack 
of staff training or faulty 
equipment) 
 
Each slice of cheese 
represents a protective 
defence against a failure 
 
 
 
 
 
Losses 
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Figure 3.   Application of the James Reason’s Swiss cheese model (2000) of system 
accidents. The patient case is based on an incident occurred in Päijät-Häme central 
hospital in Finland (Kettunen 2007). 
 
 
  
Case description:  
A 86-year old female patient was admitted to a hospital due to a pulmonary embolism. Medication treatment 
was started immediately. According to a referral, the patient was under rheumatic treatment and was using 
methotrexate 5 mg on Tuesdays. The dosing was, however, transcribed to 5 mg on evenings and recorded to 
the patient’s medication list. The patient started to recover from the pulmonary embolism. After a week of 
hospital admission, the patient’s condition got worse. The doctors suspected for infection, but instead they 
diagnosed anemia and neutoropenia. This finding led to checking the medication list of the patient after 12 days 
of hospital stay. The healthcare staff discovered that 5 mg of methotrexate had been administered to the patient 
every day, although the correct dose would have been 5 mg once a week. Despite of the attempts to save the 
patient, the patient died to sepsis after 20 days of hospital stay.  
 
Resources 
 
The doctor did not 
check the 
medication after 
transcription due 
rush and long que of 
patients waiting for 
treatment. 
Patient transferred to a 
hospital ward were there 
was no experience with 
methotrexate medication 
treatment. 
A substituting doctor did 
the ward rounds on the 
next day. The doctor was 
unfamiliar with the 
patients. The round was 
long and exhausting with 
many patients, and the 
doctor did not notice the 
error. 
The medication error was 
not noticed until 12 days 
later after the patient’s 
condition became worse. 
     Competencies 
Resources 
 
Policies 
Policies etc. other 
defences 
 
Patient dies with sepsis 
 
Hazard: Medication with an unconventional dosing  Methotrexate 5 mg on Tuesdays  
transcribed to Methotrexate 5 mg on evenings at the emergency department. 
  
Next day the ward doctor 
stated that the patient 
had started to recover. 
The ward doctor trusted 
the medication list 
“checked” by the 
substituting doctor, 
because the condition of 
the patient was better. 
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4 Medication error reporting systems as a tool for 
promoting medication safety 
4.1 History of medication error reporting systems 
The development of patient safety incident reporting systems in healthcare can be traced 
back to the late 1970s (Elliott et al. 2014). Before that incident reporting systems had been 
successfully used in other safety-critical industries, such as aviation, chemicals and nuclear 
power (Williamson et al. 1993; Hoffmann et al. 2008). The development of the earliest MER 
system (USP-ISMP Medication Errors Reporting Program, please see 4.4.1) started in the 
United States in 1975 (Cohen 2007). Since then, many countries around the world have 
introduced national and local MER systems, either as stand-alone systems or as a part of 
wider patient safety incident reporting systems (Doupi 2009; Cheng et al. 2011; European 
Commission 2014). 
Countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan  have 
been the pioneering countries providing others with lessons for MER systems development 
and implementation (Elliott et al. 2014). Along with the experiences of these countries, the 
international landmark report To Err is Human by the US Institute of Medicine (2000) has 
been a core incentive for countries to establish MER systems (Kohn et al. 2000). The 
following paragraphs present the role of MER systems in medication risk management and 
international recommendations on MER systems. Also MER systems by some of the 
pioneering countries in MER are presented together with an incident reporting system 
widely used in Finnish social and healthcare. Information on patient safety incident 
reporting systems in other European countries is presented in other sources (Council of 
Europe 2006a; Doupi 2009; European Commission 2014).  
4.2 Role of medication error reporting systems in medication risk 
management 
Incident reporting systems are one of the most widely used healthcare risk management 
tools across countries (France et al. 2004; Levtzion-Korach et al. 2009). Healthcare 
providers use these systems to systematically collect, aggregate and analyse medication 
errors and other patient safety data to learn from the failures of the healthcare system.  
MER systems have several advantages in medication risk management. They have an 
ability to elicit contextual details about contributing factors, human errors and suggested 
corrective measures to promote medication safety (Williamson et al. 1993; Evans et al. 
2006). Many MER systems also enable reporting of near misses and identified patient safety 
risk factors which have not yet caused actual errors to patients. This is important as near 
misses provide valuable information about the contributing factors to errors and lessons in 
recovery mechanisms without the consequences of actual errors (Speroni et al. 2014; Ruddy 
et al. 2015). Reporting of near misses is also attributable to lesser outcome bias as there is 
no adverse outcome in near miss reports (Williamson et al. 1993). As for the reporting of 
risk factors, they provide a good example of pro-active risk management instead of reactive 
actions to improve patient and medication safety.  
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If compared to other medication risk management tools, such as medical record review, 
MER systems are considerable low cost in relation to the amount of information obtained 
(O’Neil et al. 1993; Williamson et al. 1993; Beckmann et al. 2003). Some studies even  
suggest that when actively promoted within the clinical setting, incident reporting can 
capture more efficiently preventable adverse events than medical record reviews (O’Neil et 
al. 1993; Beckmann et al. 2003). When using a MER system to detect medication errors, the 
data are also obtained from many sources, reducing the effect of site-specific bias 
(Williamson et al. 1993). 
Despite their strengths, MER systems suffer from several limitations which should be 
considered when deploying them in medication error risk management. Many studies have 
demonstrated underreporting of medication errors; only a small number of incidents are 
reported through voluntary incident reporting systems (e.g., Flynn et al. 2002; Sari et al. 
2007; Poorolajal et al. 2015; Westbrook et al. 2015). Consequently, the major limitation of 
MER systems is that they cannot assess the incidence of the problem - they do not provide 
accurate numbers of medication error occurrences (Beckmann et al. 1996a; Shojania 2008). 
Other factors hindering the use of MER systems as reliable tools to measure the frequency 
of medication errors are the subjective nature of reports and the lack of consistency and 
validation of error classification in many systems (Johnson 2003; Stavropoulou et al. 2015). 
However, MER systems are not primarily designed to determine medication error rates 
(Hickner et al. 2010; Brunsveld-Reinders et al. 2016). Instead they provide a safety 
improvement method that uses observations of frontline healthcare staff to detect problems 
arising from the healthcare system, policies and procedures. MER systems can never give a 
complete picture of the sources of risk and patient harm (World Health Organization 2005). 
Therefore, it is recommended that MER systems should be used concurrently with other 
methods for medication safety risk management, such as chart audits, safety audits, 
observation of practices, and other prospective methods of analysis (World Health 
Organization 2005; Hoffmann et al. 2008). 
The success or failure of incident reporting systems is highly dependent on leadership, 
organisational culture, and the reporting tool itself (France et al. 2004; Poorolajal et al. 2015; 
Hesselink et al. 2016). Studies which have successfully implemented MER systems have 
invested in intense facilitation e.g., through ward rounds or staff reminders (O’Neil et al. 
1993; Beckmann et al. 2003). The role of efficient feedback for the reporting staff has been 
identified essential for successful reporting (Benn et al. 2009; Reznek & Barton 2014).  
4.3 Recommendations on medication error reporting systems 
Several international recommendations on MER systems have been published to support 
their development and implementation in different countries (World Health Organization 
2005; Council of Europe 2006a; European Commission 2014). The Council of Europe 
report (2006a) represents the first international report concentrating specifically on 
medication error prevention and establishment of MER systems within European countries 
(Table 2). The WHO Draft Guidelines for Adverse Event Reporting and Learning Systems 
(2005) and the European Commission recommendations (2014) which take as its basis the 
WHO Draft Guidelines (2005), provide insights into the establishment of wider patient 
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safety incident reporting systems where medication errors can be reported among other 
patient safety incidents.  
The key message of all three recommendations is that patient safety incident reporting 
systems should have as their main objective the improvement of patient safety through 
identification of errors and hazards which may require further investigation to identify 
underlying system causes (World Health Organization 2005; Council of Europe 2006a; 
European Commission 2014). The entire process of reporting incidents, their analysis and 
dissemination of findings and recommendations for their prevention, as well as the 
implementation of recommendations, should be established and communicated to all 
stakeholders. Incident reporting is recommended for each level of the healthcare system 
emphasising the need for both national and local reporting systems. 
Table 2.   Recommended characteristics of a MER system by the Council of Europe 
(CoE) Expert Group on Safe Medication Practices (Council of Europe 2006a). 
Characteristics 
 non-punitiveness 
 confidentiality 
 independence  
 timeliness 
 system-orientation 
 responsiveness (e.g., provides feedback on reported errors) 
 
MER  system should 
 encourage unrestricted reporting by all professionals working in the healthcare system 
 be based on expert analysis of incidents  
 offer enabling conditions for healthcare professionals to report errors (e.g., voluntarily 
and anonymity of reporting) 
 provide incentives for reporting 
4.4 Examples of medication error reporting systems  
4.4.1 ISMP Medication Errors Reporting Program (MERP) (United States) 
The Medication Errors Reporting Program (MERP) was the first national MER system 
established in the United States in 1975 (Cheung et al. 2011; Table 3). The system is 
provided by the Institute for Safe Medication Practices, which is a national non-
governmental organisation devoted to medication error prevention and safe medication use 
(Institute for Safe Medication Practices 2015).  
Focus of the MERP is on learning from reported medication errors or hazards that could 
lead to errors (Cohen 2007; Table 3). The purpose is to prevent the future errors through 
systems based solutions that can be extrapolated to all healthcare settings. After the report 
has been filed, an interdisciplinary team at ISMP analyses the report and determines the 
system based causes of errors and identifies trends. Based on the error reports the ISMP 
notifies the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and drug manufacturers of needed 
changes in medication products to reduce the risk of serious harm from medication errors 
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(Cohen 2007). The MERP has remarkably contributed to medication safety nationally 
through several actions, such as the ISMP Early warning system (Cohen 2007). When ISMP 
identifies a serious hazard in the MERP database, information on the hazard is immediately 
disseminated by electronic nationwide alerts to healthcare providers. Also the public and 
media are informed about the safety issue and provided with recommendations for error 
reduction strategies. 
4.4.2 MEDMARX (United States) 
The largest adverse drug event (ADE) database in the United States, MEDMARX, was 
developed by the United States Pharmacopeia (USP) in 1998 (Cheng et al. 2011; Table 3). 
In 2008 the USP transferred the ownership of MEDMARX to a private healthcare software 
company, Quantros (Quantros Inc. 2008). The MEDMARX system enables its subscriber 
trusts, including hospitals and other healthcare providers to report medication errors, 
hazards and adverse drug reactions (ADRs) and to analyse the collected data (Savage et al. 
2005). Reporting to MEDMARX is anonymous and standardized allowing data comparison 
with demographically similar facilities (Cohen 2007).  
Some evaluations have been conducted on the utility of and experiences with 
MEDMARX, and the results have revealed a high level of satisfaction with the feasibility 
of the programme among the subscribers as well as barriers to reporting (Santell et al. 2003; 
Hicks et al. 2004; Savage et al. 2005; Coley et al. 2006; Schiff et al. 2015). About 90% of 
respondents in a study on healthcare staff in 550 hospitals and health systems agreed that 
the programme is a significant tool in providing information to prevent errors and in 
identifying deficiencies in medication safety (Savage et al. 2005). The MEDMARX 
reporting system uses the NCC-MERP index (Forrey et al. 2007) of error severity and 
integrates the characteristics of an effective MER system identified by Leape (Leape 2002). 
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Table 3.   Overview of pioneering medication error reporting (MER) systems (Cheng et al. 2011) and the Reporting System for Safety 
Incidents in Health Care Organizations, HaiPro.  
Characteristics of the MER systems 
Country Name 
Date 
started 
Voluntary/ 
mandatory 
Responsible 
organisation(s) 
Aim(s) of the system Coverage 
Incident types 
reported 
Reported information 
United 
States 
(US) 
Medication 
Errors 
Reporting 
Program 
(MERP) 
1975 Voluntary 
Institute for Safe 
Medication 
Practices (ISMP) 
 
To provide expert 
analysis of the systemic 
causes of medication 
errors and to 
disseminate 
recommendations for 
the prevention of 
medication errors. 
National 
Actual 
medication 
errors, near 
misses and 
hazards. 
Name and email of the reporter 
(optional); error type (e.g. 
prescribing, transcribing, 
dispensing, administering or 
monitoring errors); description of 
the error or hazard; nature of the 
error (actual error or near miss); 
patient outcome; type of setting 
(e.g., hospital, pharmacy, long-term 
care facility); causes or contributing 
factors; how the error or hazard 
was discovered; recommendations 
for prevention, and associated 
materials (photographs of products 
etc.). 
US MEDMARX 1998 Voluntary Quantros, inc. 
To track and identify 
trends in adverse drug 
reactions and 
medication errors. 
National 
Adverse drug 
reactions and 
medication 
errors. 
On medication errors: severity of 
the error; description of the error; 
error type (e.g., extra dose, 
omission or wrong patient); causes 
or contributing factors; phase in 
which the error originated (e.g. 
prescribing, dispensing or 
administering); error location (e.g., 
emergency department); staff 
involved in the error and reporting; 
information on the medication 
involved; information on the 
patient; actions taken to avoid 
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future errors, and suggestions for 
system changes to prevent the 
error. 
United 
Kingdom 
(UK) 
National 
Reporting 
and Learning 
System 
(NRLS) 
2003 Voluntary 
National Health 
System (NHS) 
Commissioning 
Board Special 
Health Authority 
To collect, collate and 
store data on patient 
safety incidents, and to 
provide feedback to the 
NHS on how this key 
component of 
healthcare can be 
improved, through a 
range of reports, alerts 
and other guidance. 
NHS 
organi-
sations 
Patient safety 
incidents, 
including 
medication 
errors. 
The service type where the incident 
occurred (e.g., acute, mental health 
or primary care); incident date, 
time and location; contributing 
factors; incident description; 
actions to prevent reoccurrence; 
patient details; degree of patient 
harm; actions to prevent incident 
affecting the patient, and effect of 
the incident on the patient. 
Finland 
Reporting 
System for 
Safety 
Incidents in 
Health Care 
Organizations 
(HaiPro) 
2006 Voluntary Awanic, ltd. 
To report, analyse and 
learn from the occurred 
incidents and patient 
safety risks to improve 
patient care processes  
of the reporting 
organisations from the 
systems approach.  
Social care 
and 
healthcare 
organi-
sations 
Safety 
incidents, 
including 
medication 
errors (HaiPro 
enables also 
reporting of 
occupational 
safety 
incidents). 
Date, time, place (e.g. operating 
room) and occurrence unit of the 
incident; profession and unit of the 
person reporting; nature of the 
incident (actual error, near miss or 
violation directed to personnel); 
incident type (e.g. dispensing error 
of a medicine); description of the 
incident (what happened and how 
the incident occurred); what were 
the consequences for the patient 
and the unit; conditions at the time 
of the incident and other 
contributing factors; suggestions of 
how similar incidents could be 
avoided, and suggestions for action 
to prevent reoccurrence of the 
incident. 
 
 33 
4.4.3 National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) (England and Wales) 
The National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) is a central database of patient safety 
incident reports, including medication errors, launched in 2003 in England and Wales 
(Doupi 2009; Cheng et al. 2011). The system covers National Health System (NHS) 
organisations in England and Wales (Cheng et al. 2011) and received over four million 
incident reports reported by the NHS staff by the year 2016 (National Patient Safety Agency 
2015). Incidents are reported and analysed locally to enable local learning and actions to 
improve patient safety (Doupi 2009). Afterwards, the incident reports are sent automatically 
to the central database where NHS organisations are also able to report directly. Since 2006, 
NRLS has also offered patients and their carers an opportunity to report incidents.  
The NRLS uses several feedback mechanisms to inform the NHS and the public about 
the reported incidents (Doupi 2009). The statistics of incident data are provided to those 
NHS organisations that submit data regularly to the NRLS. Also quarterly data summary 
reports describing patterns and trends of the incidents are publicly available (National 
Health Service 2015). Studies have been conducted on reported medication errors to the 
NRLS (Cousins et al. 2012; Wahr et al. 2014) as well as on the utility of the system 
(Williams & Ashcroft 2009; Phipps et al. 2014). 
4.4.4 The Reporting System for Safety Incidents in Health Care 
Organizations (HaiPro) (Finland) 
In Finland, over 200 health- and social care organisations report medication errors, including 
near misses, in an online Reporting System for Safety Incidents in Health Care 
Organisations, HaiPro (Awanic Ltd 2015c). Since the establishment of the HaiPro system 
in 2007, over one million reports on adverse events have been filed from different social 
care and healthcare organisations. The development of the HaiPro reporting system and 
process was initiated in 2006 in collaboration between the Technical Research Centre of 
Finland (VTT), healthcare units and the former National Agency for Medicines (current 
Finnish Medicines Agency, Fimea). 
 The HaiPro system provides a great amount of information on the reported data, and 
how the organisations have learnt from their incidents and improved their processes of care. 
The HaiPro system is primarily targeted at internal use in healthcare units, e.g., a paediatric 
unit within a larger hospital organisation, and can be accessed online through the 
organisation’s intranet. The reporting process is confidential, voluntary and anonymous. It 
is based on a systems approach (Reason 2000); both error reporting and data analysis are 
confidential and blame-free. In addition to serving as a local patient safety promotion tool, 
HaiPro has the potential to provide information on patient safety incidents at the level of all 
reporting organisations and so gives information on national medication safety promotion 
activities. This aspect has been explored in the current study which also describes the 
reporting and analysis process of the reported incidents in more detail (Manuscript for 
original publication III). 
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5 Research on medication error reporting systems 
This chapter presents the current evidence on MER systems obtained from a systematic 
literature search. The aim of the literature search was to describe international studies 
conducted on functionality, development and implementation of MER systems. 
5.1 Literature review 
Literature searches of several online databases were conducted using the Medline Ovid, 
Scopus, Cinahl, Cochrane and International Pharmaceutical Abstracts (IPA). The search 
algorithms (Appendix 1) included combining search terms from two themes: medication 
errors and related terms, and reporting systems and related terms (Table 4).  
Table 4.   Search terms for the systematic literature search from international scientific 
databases. 
Theme 1: Medication errors and related 
terms (n=9) 
Theme 2: Reporting systems and related 
terms (n=4) 
Medication error Reporting system 
Medicines error Database 
Medication mishap Reporting program/programme 
Medication incident Reporting scheme 
Adverse drug event  
Medication mistake  
Drug error  
Medication event  
Medication safety event  
 
A total of 5667 bibliographic records were identified (Figure 3). All records were entered 
into a bibliographic-management system Refworks, and 2350 duplicate records were 
removed. The records were then screened for relevance to the aims of the literature review. 
The search was limited to the English language. No restrictions were placed for the time of 
publication. 
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Figure 3.   Outline of the systematic literature search from international databases and 
other relevant sources.   
Removal of duplicates 
n=2350 
All records 
n=5667 
Screening for the 
relevance  
based on the title 
n=3317 
Screening for relevance 
based on full-text 
n=97 
Screening for relevance 
based on the abstract 
n=263 
Final included articles 
n=33 
Inclusion based on full-text 
n=25 
 
n=3054 
Excluded  
n=57 
Full-text not available  
n=15 
n=166 
Articles identified  
from other sources 
n=1 
References identified  
from reference lists of the 
included articles 
n=7 
EMB Reviews n=371 
Cochrane Database of 
Systematic Reviews 
(n=253) 
Cochrane Methodology 
Register (n=4) 
Database of Abstracts of 
Reviews of Effects (n=107) 
Health Technology 
Assessment (n=7) 
International 
Pharmaceutical Abstracts 
n=284 
CINAHL 
n=786 
MEDLINE Ovid  
n=1809 
Scopus 
n=2417 
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Articles exploring functionality, development and implementation of MER systems 
were included (Table 5). Examples of excluded topic areas were studies on 
pharmacovigilance reporting systems, and articles with a primary aim to explore reported 
medication errors instead of the functionality of the MER system (Table 5). The major 
challenge was to distinguish whether the studies fell into the main inclusion criteria of 
exploring the functionality of MER systems. Consequently, the aims and objectives of the 
studies were carefully reviewed when deciding on study inclusion. Also records that were 
not published as peer reviewed scientific articles or full-text of the article was not available 
via the University of Helsinki or Google, were excluded. Following the screening, 33 
articles were included into the literature review (Figure 3, See Tables 6-11), and the articles 
are described in the following paragraphs.  
Table 5.   The criteria for inclusion and exclusion of articles in the literature review on 
studies of medication error reporting (MER) systems. 
 Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
Type of the reporting system 
MER systems  
(either stand-alone systems or 
systems integrated into wider 
patient safety incident reporting 
systems). 
Pharmacovigilance reporting 
systems. 
Other reporting systems not 
enabling MER. 
Focus of the study 
Explores functionality, or 
development and 
implementation of MER systems 
(e.g., system user satisfaction or 
reliability of the produced data).  
 
Studies describing primarily the 
medication errors reported to 
the system.  
Studies exploring barriers or 
attitudes to reporting of 
medication errors generally 
instead of exploring the 
functionality of some certain 
MER system.  
Outcomes 
Studies using various research 
methods and outcome measures 
are included. 
- 
Time No time restrictions. - 
Study design 
All methods and study designs 
are included. 
Peer reviewed journal articles. 
Review articles. 
Non-scientific publications. 
Articles published in professional 
publications or other non-
scientific publications.  
Other 
English language. 
Full-text available via University 
of Helsinki or Google. 
Full-text is not available via 
University of Helsinki or Google. 
5.2 Overview of studies on medication error reporting systems 
The identified studies (n=33) represented a blend of approaches to examine functionality, 
development and implementation of MER systems in different countries and healthcare 
domains. The studies are summarised in Tables 6-11. The characteristics of MER systems 
studied are described in Appendices 2 a and b. 
Based on their contents, the studies were divided into six categories: (1) studies 
exploring the functionality of MER systems by investigating the reported medication error 
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data (n=6); (2) studies comparing MER systems to other methods for medication error 
detection and learning (n=3); (3) studies describing the development and implementation of 
MER systems (n=9); (4) studies on the utility of MER systems (n=11); (5) studies on MER 
system innovations (n=3); and (6) reviews on MER systems (n=1). Because of the 
overlapping findings between the studies in different categories, the synthesis of the key 
findings of the literature review comprised studies in all the categories instead of 
summarizing findings within each category separately (see 5.2.3). 
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Table 6.   Studies exploring the functionality of medication error reporting (MER) systems by investigating the reported medication error 
data (n=6). ME=medication error. Studies are presented in alphabetical order. 
Reference Country & 
setting 
Objectives Design Materials and methods Key findings* 
Armitage 
et al. 
2010) 
United 
Kingdom 
(UK),  
an acute 
hospital. 
To improve reporting 
and learning from 
medication errors 
through investigating 
the contributory 
factors in medication 
errors and quality of 
reporting. 
A two-staged study 
employing qualitative 
and quantitative 
methods.  
Data analysis informed 
by the Human Error 
theory (Reason 1990). 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis of a 
retrospective, random sample of 
medication error reports (n=911) from 
1999-2003. 
Qualitative interviews (n=40) of 
healthcare professionals on how the 
current reporting system could be 
improved. 
The quality of reports varied greatly. 
27% of reports lacked any contributory 
factors. 
The error reports focused on individuals. 
Communication difficulties, high 
workload and interruptions were the 
leading contributory factors in the 
interview data. 
Reporters rarely received feedback on 
reporting. 
Haw & 
Cahill 2011 
UK, a 
specialist 
psychiatric 
hospital. 
To describe the first 
two years of 
operation of an 
electronic system for 
reporting MEs in 
psychiatry (Medi-
Event system). 
Descriptive analysis of 
MEs reported by the 
hospital staff between 
March 2008 and 
February 2010. 
Descriptive statistics to describe the 
reported MEs (n=488). 
Expert review of the reported data: 
whether the reported incidents were 
MEs, severity ratings reported, and 
correct error type reported (actual error 
or a near miss). 
 
Use of the Medi-Event system increased 
the reporting of MEs in comparison to a 
previously used paper based system.  
Staff did not always correctly classify 
MEs, and their severity ratings did not 
frequently agree with those made by the 
expert raters. 
Evans et 
al. 2007 
Australia, 
four major 
cities and 
two 
regional 
hospitals 
in South 
Australia. 
To assess the 
effectiveness of an 
intervention package 
comprising intense 
education, a range of 
reporting options, 
changes in report 
management and 
enhanced feedback, 
in order to improve 
Non-equivalent group 
controlled clinical trial 
involving medical and 
nursing staff working in 
10 intervention and 10 
control units in four 
major cities and two 
regional hospitals in 
South Australia. 
Comparison of incident reporting rates 
and types of reports between  
baseline and study period, and 
control and intervention units.  
Interventions: education on reporting; 
reducing fear and burden of reporting 
(changes to the reporting process and 
forms), and improved feedback on 
reporting for the reporting staff.  
A greater variety and number of 
incidents were reported by the 
intervention units during the study, with 
improved reporting by doctors from a 
low baseline. These findings suggest it is 
possible to improve reporting rates and 
diversify the types of incidents. 
However, there was considerable 
heterogeneity between reporting rates in 
different types of units. 
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incident (incl. MEs) 
reporting rates and 
change the types of 
incidents reported. 
A range of statistical tests employed for 
data analysis. 
Levtzion-
Korach et 
al. 2009 
United 
States 
(US), a 
tertiary 
care 
academic 
medical 
centre 
affiliated 
with 
Harvard 
Medical 
School. 
To evaluate the rate, 
content, ease of use, 
reporters’ profile, 
and the follow-up 
and actions resulting 
from reports 
submitted to a Web- 
based electronic 
reporting system. 
A prospective cross-
sectional analysis of 
reported incidents (incl. 
MEs). 
Analysis of the ease of use of the system 
and the submitted reports (n=14 179) to 
a commercial Web-based reporting 
system at a tertiary care academic 
hospital for 31 months between May 
2004 and November 2006.  
Analysis of incidents by descriptive 
statistics and statistical tests.   
The reporting system effectively 
captured incidents, actions, and follow-
up on reporting (e.g., change of 
equipment or policy, education of staff, 
changes in staffing levels). It was 
concluded that the main strengths of an 
electronic reporting approach are the 
ability to use branching logic, the ways in 
which it enables analysis, and the 
feasibility of incorporating collection of 
information about action and follow-up 
steps in the database.  
Miller et 
al. 2006 
US, the 
Johns 
Hopkins 
Children’s 
Center. 
To assess the 
accuracy and to 
define the 
epidemiology of MEs 
reports. 
A retrospective cohort 
study of 581 error 
reports containing 1010 
MEs reported between 
July 2001 and January 
2003 at a large academic 
children’s institution.  
Evaluation of all MEs (n=1010) in error 
reports (n=581) reported between July 
2001 and January 2003. 
Three clinician experts in patient safety 
independently reviewed all error reports 
classified by the reporter and recorded 
any corrections to the error type based 
on the information provided by the 
reporter in the free text field of the 
reporting form.  
Summary data on how often the error 
type was altered by the clinicians. 
The percentage agreement between the 
original classifier and the clinician was 
measured. 
Descriptive statistics of reconciled 
errors. 
The analysis of the accuracy of error 
reports showed that most of the reports 
were accurate.  
Following expert review, 208 errors 
(21%) were deleted because they had 
been inappropriately coded as errors and 
97 (10%) were added as they were not 
initially coded despite having occurred. 
352 ME reports needed to have the 
subtype of error reclassified. 
The overall distribution of error type 
categories did not change significantly 
with expert review. 
Despite clear imperfections in the data 
captured, MER tools were concluded to 
be effective as a means of collecting 
reliable information on errors rapidly and 
in real time. 
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Ricci et al. 
2004 
US, 
paediatric 
cardiac 
intensive 
care unit 
(CICU). 
To investigate the 
influence of two key  
factors, anonymity 
and profession 
(doctors versus 
nurses), on incident 
(incl. MEs) reporting 
by comparing two 
different reporting 
databases. 
Retrospective study 
analysing incidents 
(n=211) reported via two 
adverse event reporting 
systems in a CICU. 
Two adverse event reporting databases 
were compared: database A (DA) which 
is the hospital’s official reporting 
database (non-anonymous, reports are 
predominantly made by nurses), and 
database B (DB) (anonymous and 
reports are submitted by a CICU 
consultant who collects data from daily 
ward rounds).  
Descriptive statistics to describe the 
incidents. 
A total of 112 incidents were reported in 
DA, 143 in DB, and 44 in both, indicating 
that both databases gave an 
unrepresentative picture of the true 
frequency and severity of adverse 
events. Underreporting was especially 
notable for less severe events, including 
near misses. 
Incident reporting is heavily influenced 
by profession of the reporters as well as 
anonymity. When adverse event 
reporting is based predominantly on the 
observations of a single professional 
group, the data are grossly inaccurate. 
*The key findings in the Table are selected from the presented studies in relation to the focus of the systematic literature search.   
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Table 7.   Studies comparing medication error reporting (MER) systems to other methods for medication error detection and learning 
(n=3). ME=medication error. Studies are presented in alphabetical order. 
Reference Country & 
setting 
Objectives Design Materials and methods Key findings* 
Olsen et al. 
2007 
United 
Kingdom 
(UK), 
district 
general 
hospital, 
NHS. 
To examine the value 
of methods for 
detecting and 
describing adverse 
events (AEs) (incl. 
MEs) in hospital 
practice. 
Prospective data 
collection on the same 
patient cohort using 
incident reporting, 
pharmacist surveillance 
and patient record 
review as sources of 
information. 
Data on AEs were collected on 288 
patients discharged from adult acute 
medical and surgical units using incident 
reports, active surveillance of 
prescription charts by pharmacists and 
record review at time of discharge.  
Descriptive statistics to describe and 
compare the incidents detected by 
different methods. 
No data source detected all AEs in the 
same patient group.  
Record review detected 26 AEs and 40 
potential adverse events (PAEs).  
Incident reporting detected 11 PAEs and 
no AEs.  
Pharmacy surveillance found 10 MEs all 
of which were PAEs.  
There was little overlap in the nature of 
events detected by the three methods.  
The findings suggest that incident 
reporting does not provide an adequate 
assessment of clinical AEs and that this 
method needs to be supplemented with 
other more systematic forms of data 
collection.  
O’Neil et 
al. 1993 
United 
States 
(US), 
medical 
service of 
a 
university-
affiliated 
teaching 
hospital, 
Brigham 
and 
To assess the 
effectiveness of 
physician reporting 
as a method for 
identifying adverse 
events (incl.  MEs), 
and to compare the 
reporting mechanism 
with a retrospective 
medical record 
review. 
Physician reporting 
system using the 
hospital e-mail 
compared with a 
retrospective record 
review using a screening 
mechanism followed by 
structured, implicit 
physician review of the 
record. 
Patient admissions (n=3146) to medical 
service during a four-month period were 
studied. 
Initial screening of patients’ medical 
records for adverse events, followed by 
physician-conducted analysis of records 
possibly involving an adverse event. 
Testing the inter-rater reliability of 
physician reviewers by using a 10% 
sample of medical records. Confidential 
e-mail reporting of adverse events by 
medical staff and analysis of reports. 
Assessment of costs for both methods 
The physician reporting system identified 
nearly the same number of adverse 
events as the record review method. 
The two methods identified the same 
patients with adverse events in only half 
of the cases.  
The physicians reporting system detected 
more preventable errors than the 
medical record review and was also less 
costly. The reporting system also actively 
integrates physicians into quality-
improvement efforts which is the 
advantage of the system. 
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Women’s 
Hospital.  
and error preventability. Statistical tests 
to compare the two methods.  
Sari et al. 
2007 
UK, a large 
NHS 
hospital in 
England. 
To evaluate the 
performance of a 
local incident 
reporting system in 
identifying patient 
safety incidents.  
Two stage retrospective 
review of patients’ case 
notes and analysis of 
data submitted to the 
routine incident 
reporting system on the 
same patients. 
A random sample of patient admissions 
(n=1006) during a three-month period 
was studied. 
Initial screening of patients’ medical 
records for adverse events, followed by 
physician conducted analysis of records 
possibly involving an adverse event. 
Testing the inter-rater reliability of both 
reviews by using a 10% sample of 
medical records.  
Analysis of the data on incident 
reporting system for the sample 
admissions (n=1006) to see if the events 
had been reported. 
The routine reporting system as 
implemented in the large 
hospital missed most patient safety 
incidents that were identified by case 
note review and detected only 5% of 
those incidents that resulted in patient 
harm.  
Only one third of the adverse events 
were detected by both methods. 
Findings suggest that the routine 
reporting system considerably 
underreports the scale and severity of 
patient safety incidents. 
Structured case note review may have a 
useful role in surveillance of routine 
incident reporting and associated quality 
improvement programmes. 
*The key findings in the Table are selected from the presented studies in relation to the focus of the systematic literature search.   
  
  
4
3
 
Table 8.   Studies describing the development and implementation of medication error reporting (MER) systems (n=8). ME=medication 
error. Studies are presented in alphabetical order. 
Reference Country & 
setting 
Objectives Design Materials and methods Key findings* 
Beckmann 
et al. 
1996b 
Australia, three 
intensive care 
units (ICUs). 
To develop and 
implement an 
incident reporting 
system for MEs and 
other patient safety 
incidents. 
A descriptive two-
month evaluation 
study employing 
both qualitative and 
quantitative 
methods. 
Healthcare staff at three ICUs 
participated in the study. 
Development of incident report form 
based on: 
- staff (n=29) group interviews (n=6) to 
define the key areas of the reporting 
form; 
- workplace observation by five project 
coordinators to observe incident 
occurrence, and 
- literature review and experiences from 
previous studies by the study group. 
Feedback questionnaire on incident 
reporting to assess staff attitudes and 
understanding of the incident reporting, 
research design and organisation. 
Response rate 88% (n=116/129). The 
reported incidents were described by 
descriptive statistics.  
A positive attitude and good 
understanding about incident reporting 
was demonstrated by more than 90% of 
participants. 
Errors in communication, technique, 
problem recognition and charting were 
the contributing factors for most 
incidents reported (n=128). 
Incident reporting may be a suitable 
technique for improving patient safety in 
ICUs. 
Cheung et 
al. 2014 
The 
Netherlands, 
National MER 
systems in the 
Netherlands 
(Central 
Medication 
Incidents 
Registration, 
CMR-NL), 
To explore to what 
extent alerts and 
newsletters about 
MEs issued from 
the MER system of 
one country can be 
relevant to other 
countries and to 
describe the 
characteristics of 
An explorative 
retrospective study. 
Disseminated information items (n=90) 
issued by national MER systems 
(Canada, US and UK) from June 2009 
until June 2012 were collected. 
Items compared to CMR-NL according to 
the defined assessment criteria. 
An e-mail survey to national MER 
systems (Canada, US and UK) about their 
characteristics. 
National reporting systems can benefit 
from sharing alerts and newsletters 
between countries. 
There is a broad range of MEs that the 
Dutch national reporting programme 
could learn from reporting systems in 
Canada, US and UK. 
From the 90 items, 88% (n=79) were 
relevant for Dutch healthcare. 
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Canada (ISMP-
Canada), United 
States (ISMP-
US) and United 
Kingdom (UK) 
(National 
Reporting and 
Learning 
Service). 
national MER 
systems. 
Descriptive statistics were used for the 
anlysis. 
For 48% (n=43) of the items the CMR-NL 
had received comparable or identical 
errors but had not disseminated any alert 
or newsletter about these errors. 
The CMR-NL had disseminated an alert or 
newsletter for 14 of the 90 items (16%). 
Daniels et 
al. 2010 
Canada, British 
Columbia 
Children’s 
Hospital (an 
academic 
tertiary care 
facility). 
To develop a web-
based system, the 
Family Reporting 
System (FRS) 
enabling families to 
routinely identify 
adverse events 
(incl. MEs) and near 
misses. 
Evaluation study 
using cross-sectional 
survey and analysis 
of the reported 
adverse events.  
Face validity and usability of FRS were 
measured via standardized survey 
instruments.   
Utility of FRS was measured by the rate, 
typology, degree of harm, likelihood of 
recurrence, quality of information, and 
inter-rater agreement analysis of the 
reported adverse events.  
Descriptive statistics to describe the 
reported adverse events. 
Approx. 18% of the reports (n=103) 
concerned medications. 
The FRS had good face validity, excellent 
usability, and good clinical utility. 
27% of reports could not be evaluated 
for degree of harm due to lack of 
detailed information from reporter, and 
34% of reports were not safety issues, 
indicating an inherent limitation and 
target for improvement in family 
reporting. 
The application of survey and human 
factors methodologies to the design of 
an electronic system is an effective 
means of developing an electronic 
adverse event reporting system for the 
use of families of paediatric patients. 
Elliott et 
al. 2014 
Canada, Eastern 
Health, a large 
healthcare 
organization in 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador, 
involved sites: 
acute care, long 
term care; 
The sites used a 
paper-based 
reporting system 
pre-study. 
Objectives were to 
implement an 
electronic clinical 
safety reporting 
system (CSRS); to 
An evaluation study 
using both 
quantitative and 
qualitative methods. 
Measurement and comparison of the 
reported data for six months prior to the 
implementation of CSRS and six months 
after the implementation.  
A structured post-implementation user 
satisfaction survey to frontline clinical 
staff and managers (response rate 33%, 
n=358 out of 1079). 
There are benefits in moving from a 
paper-based reporting of errors in 
healthcare to an electronic Web-based 
system. 
Several benefits were realised, e.g., 
increases in the number of errors 
reported, in errors reported within 48 
hours of occurrence, in errors reported 
by staff other than registered nurses, in 
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community 
health in an 
urban setting, 
and an 
integrated 
services site in a 
rural setting. 
assess the system 
on achieving its 
stated objectives 
(the benefits 
realised and 
disadvantages/ 
areas of 
improvement), and 
to identify 
contributions to the 
field of electronic 
clinical safety 
reporting. 
Pre- and post-implementation key 
informant interviews with senior 
managers (n=11).  
Pre- and post-implementation focus-
groups to clinical staff (n=13) and 
managers (n=12) using the CSRS and 
senior managers’ interviews. 
 
near misses reported, and improved 
timelines between occurrence and 
notification by the manager. 
There was good user satisfaction with 
the tool e.g., regarding ease of use, 
accessibility, and consistency in 
performance.  
Frontline staff and managers supported 
the CSRS, and identified both benefits of 
the system (e.g., improved 
understanding on what constitutes an 
error and near miss) and areas for 
improvement (e.g., need for better 
feedback from reporting).  
Jones et 
al. 2004 
US, Critical 
access hospitals 
(CAHs) (n=6) in 
Nebraska. 
To describe the 
implementation 
and initial findings 
of a voluntary MER 
system developed 
by the Nebraska 
centre for rural 
Health Research 
(NCRHR); to study 
association 
between hospital 
characteristics (e.g., 
availability of 
pharmacy support) 
and reported MEs 
between the CAH 
MER system and 
MEDMARX. 
Retrospective cross-
sectional study. 
A voluntary MER system was developed 
and implemented. 
NCRHR analysed statistically the errors 
(n=800) reported in 2002-2003. 
Statistical tests to examine association 
between the CAHs and MEDMARX error 
data. 
Statistical comparison of error reports 
from CAHs (limited pharmacy support to 
reporting) and MEDMARX hospitals with 
24/7 pharmacy support. 
Workshops (n=2) for the participating 
CAHs to facilitate learning from the 
reported errors (did not produce any 
research data). 
Similar to MEDMARX, 99% of MEs 
reported by six Nebraska CAHs were not 
harmful, reported errors most often 
originated in the administration phase, 
and the most common error type was 
omission.  
The CAHs reported smaller proportions 
of near misses and errors originating in 
the prescribing phase than in MEDMARX. 
The higher likelihood of reporting errors 
and near misses was associated with 
more pharmacy support. 
Limited presence of pharmacists in CAHs 
is a barrier to implementing double 
checks and learning from system failures 
in the medication use system. 
Küng et al. 
2013 
Switzerland, 
Cardiovascular 
Surgery 
To determine: 
frequency and type 
of MEs; to assess 
A cross-sectional 
study design to 
assess MEs and 
MEs (n=987) were reported by nurses 
(n=119) using an investigator-developed 
288 (29%) MERT reports indicated that 
there had been a ME.  
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Department of 
the University 
Hospital.  
the number of MEs 
prevented by 
registered nurses; 
to assess the 
consequences of 
MEs for patients, 
and to compare the 
number of MEs 
reported by a 
newly developed 
MER tool to the 
number reported 
by the hospital’s 
critical incident 
reporting system 
(CIRS) for adverse 
events. 
feasibility of a novel 
MER system. 
ME self-reporting tool (MESRT) for a one 
month period. 
Data analysis employed descriptive 
statistics. 
More MEs were reported with the 
MESRT (n=288) than with traditional CIRS 
(n=7).  
The finding suggests it is important to 
use simple reporting tools which 
facilitate ME reporting (see the MERST 
description in Appendix 2b). 
Nurses reported preventing 49 MEs (5%).  
Overall, eight MEs (2.8%) had patient 
consequences.  
The high reporting rate suggests that this 
new method may be a very effective 
approach to detect, report, and describe 
MEs. 
Nordén-
Hägg et al. 
2012 
Sweden, all 
Swedish 
pharmacies 
(approx. 880 
community and 
80 hospital 
pharmacies). 
To design and 
evaluate a national 
web-based 
dispensing error 
reporting system 
for Swedish 
pharmacies, 
replacing the 
currently used 
paper-based 
system. 
Descriptive cross-
sectional study using 
both quantitative and 
qualitative research 
methods.  
A working group designed the new 
system. The number of reports before 
(1999–2003) and after (2004–2005) 
introduction were analysed. The 
completeness of reports was evaluated 
through the study of 100 randomly 
selected reports from each system. 
Analysis was completed by statistical 
tests. 
Perceptions on introduction were 
collected in semi-structured interviews 
to the members of working group (n=4) 
and one assistant and subjected to 
descriptive analysis.  
Introducing a web-based system for 
reporting dispensing errors had an 
impact on quantity of reports and their 
completeness.  
Information (e.g., seriousness of the 
error and outcomes to patient) was more 
comprehensively reported in the new 
system. 
A significant difference existed to the 
extent to which incidents were described 
as well as details provided of the 
medicine and the patient. 
Time and patience was needed to 
implement the changes; users initially 
found the web-based system difficult to 
handle, taking more than six months to 
change this perception.  
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Pierson et 
al. 2007 
US, 25 nursing 
homes in North 
Carolina. 
To describe the 
implementation 
and evaluation of a 
web-based MER 
system. 
Evaluation study. A total of 25 nursing homes tested the 
new system over a 4- month period, 
entering all errors (n=631) occurring at 
their facility during that time. 
Participants were also asked to 
complete an evaluation survey of the 
new system (response rate 86% of the 
facilities, n=20). Descriptive statistics 
employed for the data analysis.  
It was feasible to implement a large-scale 
web-based MER system in long-term care 
facilities. 
Such a system can collect detailed 
information on the characteristics of ME. 
The participants felt that the system was 
easy to use will help them identify areas 
for training and improvement, improve 
patient safety and reduce MEs. 
Tuttle 
2004 
US, an university 
affiliated 
teaching 
hospital, Strong 
Memorial 
Hospital. 
Development and 
implementation of 
educational 
initiatives to 
facilitate the use of 
an electronic 
reporting system 
(ERS) in an 
academic medical 
centre to measure 
the impact on 
knowledge of the 
ERS on reporting 
behaviour and 
safety attitudes and 
to evaluate the 
accuracy of the 
information being 
reported. 
Retrospective study 
analysing incident 
data (incl. MEs) 
reported before and 
after implementation 
of an electronic ERS, 
and safety culture of 
the study setting. 
An internal ERS for safety events was 
implemented.  
A multifaceted educational program was 
developed to promote safety awareness 
and use of the ERS. The safety events 
reported in 2002 (n=2843) were 
analysed by statistical tests and 
compared to events (n=1542) reported 
by previous paper based system. 
A survey was administered to assess 
safety knowledge and attitudes of 
patient care personnel (response rate 
10%, n=733 out of 7095). 
Using of complementary educational 
efforts and the new electronic system 
were able to increase reporting 
significantly and to improve employees’ 
knowledge and use of the ERS.  
More work is needed to involve 
physicians in reporting, to improve the 
accuracy of submitted information, and 
to better prioritize, organize, and 
streamline event analysis. 
*The key findings in the Table are selected from the presented studies in relation to the focus of the systematic literature search.   
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Table 9.   Studies on utility of medication error reporting (MER) systems (n=10). ME= medication error. Studies are presented in 
alphabetical order. 
Reference Country and 
setting 
Objectives Design Materials and methods Key findings* 
Braithwaite 
et al. 2008 
Australia, 
healthcare 
professionals. 
To evaluate an 
electronic Incident 
(incl. MEs) 
Information 
Management 
System (IIMS) 
implemented 
system-wide by the 
Department of 
Health, New South 
Wales, Australia. 
Cross-sectional 
anonymous on-line 
survey. 
A structured questionnaire to 
healthcare professionals using 
IIMS (available for healthcare 
professionals on a website for 
one month). Acquired 
information: demographic 
information of respondents; 
training in and using of the 
system, and attitudes towards 
the system. 
Descriptive statistics and 
statistical tests to analyse the 
responses.   
The majority of respondents (n=2185) had 
undertaken training on using IIMS and rated it 
highly. Most had reported incidents and 
maintained their previous reporting levels before 
IIMS implementation. Most attitudes regarding 
using the system and its security were favourable. 
There were mixed attitudes about workplace 
safety cultures and the value of the system.  
Deficiencies in quality of reporting, feedback on 
incident reports and lack of resources to analyse 
incident data were problems identified.  
Nurses were most, and doctors least, likely to 
undertake training, report incidents and express 
favourable attitudes towards the system.  
Boyle et al. 
2012 
Canada, 
community 
pharmacies. 
To determine how 
staff assessment of 
key quality related 
event (QRE) (i.e., 
MEs and near 
misses) reporting 
process 
characteristics (e.g. 
ease of use, time to 
use) and QRE 
learning differ in 
community 
pharmacies 
in which the QRE 
reporting process is 
manual 
A cross-sectional 
survey. 
Mail-based survey on pharmacy 
staff perceptions on a number 
of key areas relevant to QRE 
reporting (e.g., pharmacy 
culture). 
Participants: 121 respondents 
(response rate 49%) in 
pharmacies with a formal QRE 
reporting system. Statistical 
tests employed for the data 
analysis. 
QRE reporting systems appeared to be cost 
effective, easy to complete and involve low risk of 
operations. 
System characteristics and learning were 
different in pharmacies with manual vs. 
computerized systems. 
Advantages of computerised systems were 
enhanced QRE reporting and analysis capabilities, 
integration to day-to-day practices and 
encouragement to staff to make continuous 
improvements and is not time consuming. 
Common QRE learning activities in pharmacies 
with computerized systems were effectiveness of 
changes made following an error; following an 
error, there is usually commitment to improve 
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versus 
computerized. 
safety throughout pharmacy, and the culture is 
one of continuous improvement. 
Chua et al. 
2003 
United Kingdom 
(UK), four 
community 
pharmacies. 
To investigate the 
feasibility of a self-
reporting system 
for dispensing 
errors and near 
misses in primary 
care (community) 
pharmacies, and to 
identify the types 
of errors or near 
misses commonly 
encountered. 
A feasibility study 
employing 
retrospective analysis 
of reported 
dispensing errors and 
qualitative focus 
group discussions. 
The dispensing error data 
collection was conducted in 
two phases, each of 4 weeks’ 
duration. Dispensing errors 
(n=39 accounting for 0,08% of 
51 357 dispensed items) and 
near misses (n=247 accounting 
for 0,48%) were recorded by 
the pharmacy staff in a 
standard data collection form. 
A focus group discussion was 
held with the dispensing staff 
(number not reported) of 
participating pharmacies to 
identify and evaluate the 
feasibility of the reporting 
system. Descriptive statistics 
and statistical tests to analyse 
the quantitative data. 
The results show that near misses occurred six 
times more often than actual dispensing errors, 
indicating the importance of final checking in 
pharmacies.  
The focus group discussion indicated that the 
outcome of the self-reporting scheme was more 
important than the incidence of errors or near 
misses.  
Participating pharmacies also agreed that the 
self-reporting scheme used was feasible and they 
would continue using the scheme although some 
incentives would be helpful. 
 
Coley et al. 
2006 
United States 
(US), Pittsburgh 
Regional 
Healthcare 
Initiative (PRHI) 
hospitals in the 
region of 
Pennsylvania. 
To evaluate the 
perceived barriers 
to using a region-
wide MER system, 
MEDMARX. 
A qualitative study 
using a series of 
focus groups of key 
informants from 
different types of 
hospitals in the study 
region.  
A qualitative analysis of 
representatives (n=8) from 8 
hospitals: 2 urban, 4 
community, 1 long-term care, 
and 1 paediatric using 
MEDMARX. Participants were 
involved with at least one 
aspect of error reporting (i.e., 
data collection, report 
utilisation) at their institution. 
Information was obtained on 
barriers to MER and use of a 
regional quarterly error report. 
The study identified obstacles to reporting and 
data sharing that must be addressed to improve 
patient safety across the region of Pennsylvania.  
Few hospitals had sufficient dedicated staff for 
identification, verification, and reporting of 
errors.  
Efforts to promote reporting were compromised 
by other demands on staff time.  
Information systems in most hospitals were 
fragmented, leading to duplication of efforts and 
inefficiency in reporting of errors.  
Healthcare staff are concerned about 
benchmarking by hospital administrators and 
reactions to increases in error reporting. 
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Qualitative content analysis of 
the data.  
Hospitals can generate internal error reports for 
analyses faster than they would receive the 
quarterly reports from MEDMARX. 
Evans et al. 
2006 
Australia, 
diverse clinical 
settings in six 
Australian 
hospitals. 
To assess 
awareness and use 
of the current 
incident (incl. MEs) 
reporting system 
and to identify 
factors inhibiting 
reporting of 
incidents in 
hospitals. 
A cross-sectional 
survey. 
 
A structured survey on 
knowledge and use of the 
current reporting system, and 
barriers to incident reporting. 
Respondents: doctors (n=186) 
and nurses (n=587) (response 
rate 73%, n=773 out of 1062). 
Statistical tests used for data 
analysis. 
Most nurses and doctors (98%) were aware of the 
reporting system. 
Both doctors and nurses believe they should 
report most incidents, but nurses do so more 
frequently than doctors. 
To improve incident reporting, especially among 
doctors, clarification is needed of which incidents 
should be reported, the process needs to be 
simplified, and feedback given to reporters. 
Hirose et 
al. 2007 
Japan, Kyoto 
University 
hospital. 
To explore factors 
associated with 
delays in incident 
(incl. MEs) 
reporting after 
adverse events and 
near misses. 
A prospective and 
descriptive study 
exploring the 
reported incidents. 
Incident reports (n=6880) 
reported by physicians and 
nurses in 2002-2005. 
Statistical analysis of the 
incidents and their lag time 
(time between occurrence and 
reporting). 
Although physicians and nurses reported nearly 
equal numbers of events resulting in major injury, 
physicians reported far fewer minor incidents and 
far fewer incidents overall.  
Lag time was longer for physicians than nurses.  
Lag time for major injuries was 18% shorter than 
for minor injuries. 
Quantitative evaluation of lag time may facilitate 
improvements in incident reporting systems by 
distinguishing institutional obstacles to physician 
reporting from physicians’ lesser willingness to 
report. 
Kennedy & 
Littenberg 
2004 
US, community 
pharmacies in 
Vermont. 
To study 
community 
pharmacists’ 
awareness and use 
of the national 
Medication Errors 
Reporting Program 
(MERP).  
Telephone survey. A pharmacist was contacted in 
98% (n=122 out of 124) of all 
operating community 
pharmacies in Vermont 
between June 2002 and 
February 2003. Pharmacists 
were asked about awareness 
and use of MERP. The 
telephone surveys were 
conducted using a standard 
The majority of Vermont community pharmacists 
were aware of MERP. However, use was low. 
Pharmacists employed by independent 
pharmacies were more often aware of and used 
the MERP more than pharmacists employed by 
other pharmacy types (e.g., chain or 
supermarket) indicating that barriers to reporting 
to a common system such as MERP may differ 
depending on pharmacy type. Additionally, many 
non-independent community pharmacies 
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script. Data were analysed by 
descriptive statistics and 
statistical tests.  
reported errors to a corporate program instead of 
MERP.  Evidence of an education deficit related to 
MERP and to reporting in general was identified.  
Kuo et al. 
2012 
Taiwan, a 
teaching 
hospital in 
southern 
Taiwan. 
To evaluate the use 
of a Web-based 
incident (incl. MEs) 
reporting system by 
investigating 
factors influencing 
nurses’ use of the 
system and 
evaluating changes 
in reporting 
behaviour after 
implementation of 
a web-based 
system.  
Mixed-methods 
design including a 
cross-sectional 
survey and a 
retrospective record 
review of incidents. 
A structured questionnaire to 
study nurses’ satisfaction with 
the Web-based reporting 
system and factors impeding 
their reporting willingness by 
four-point Likert scale answers, 
and recommendations for 
system improvements by open-
ended questions (response rate 
83%, n=249 out of 300). Data 
on nurse demographics were 
collected. Incidents were 
collected, classified, and 
compared between the paper-
based and web-based system. 
Descriptive statistics and 
statistical tests were employed 
to analyse the data. 
The Web-based reporting system was used more 
often than the paper-based system.  
Senior nurses were less willing to report events, 
nurses on internal medicine units had higher 
satisfaction and reporting rates than others 
possibly attributed to increased familiarity with 
the system. The lowest satisfaction was related to 
the time it took to file a report.  
The study recommends that the data entry 
process should be simplified and the network 
system improved to increase user satisfaction and 
reporting rates (e.g. provision of clear incident 
classifications). 
Savage et 
al. 2005 
US, a national 
electronic MER 
system, 
MEDMARX.  
To evaluate the 
utility of the 
MEDMARX. 
A prospective cross-
sectional survey. 
A survey regarding the utility of 
MEDMARX was developed and 
responded to by identified 
contact persons in 200 
hospitals (response rate 38%, 
n=200 out of 525) using 
MEDMARX. Statistical tests and 
descriptive statistics were used 
to analyse the responses. 
Implementation of the MEDMARX led to an 
increase in the number of reported MEs and 
improvements in the medication use-process.  
Pharmacy departments were most often reported 
as responsible for medication safety activities 
after MEDMARX implementation. Most facilities 
(94%) generated reports from the error database 
and 75% used this information to identify 
opportunities to improve their medication use 
system. Many users (66%) were satisfied with the 
impact of MEDMARX on improving their 
medication use system, and believed that 
MEDMARX provided a tool for root-cause analysis 
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of MEs (71%) and helped to identify problems in 
medication use process (85%).  
Williams & 
Ashcroft 
2009 
UK, an acute 
university 
teaching 
hospital in the 
North West of 
England. 
To examine: 
the reliability of the 
severity rating scale 
used by the 
National Reporting 
and Learning 
System (NRLS) in 
England and Wales 
for MEs; and the 
likelihood of 
reporting MEs 
among healthcare 
professionals. 
A descriptive cross-
sectional study. 
Participants (n=40, doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists, 
technicians) completed a 
questionnaire containing nine 
ME scenarios on two separate 
occasions; participants rated 
the severity of each incident 
using the NRLS severity rating 
scale and indicated the 
likelihood of reporting the 
incident via the hospital 
incident reporting system.  
Test–retest reliability of the 
severity ratings was also 
examined within and between 
professional groups.  
Statistical tests employed for 
the data analysis. 
Pharmacists and nurses were significantly more 
likely to report the errors if they had witnessed 
them. 
There was a wide variation in the assignment of 
ME severity ratings within and between 
healthcare professional groups.  
Doctors and pharmacists reported MEs as being 
less severe than nurses and pharmacy 
technicians. Pharmacists and nurses were most 
likely to report and doctors the least likely to 
report MEs in this study.  
Consequently, there may be marked differences 
in the severity ratings for MEs reported via the 
NRLS between different healthcare professional 
groups and at different time points rated by the 
same individuals. 
 
Zwart et al. 
2011 
The 
Netherlands, 
three general 
practices’ (GP) 
out-of-hours 
services (OHSs). 
To compare the 
number and nature 
of incident reports 
(incl. MEs) 
collected in a local 
incident-reporting 
procedure (LIRP) 
and the currently 
used centralised 
incident-reporting 
procedure (CIRP) 
for OHSs. 
A non-equivalent 
controlled, quasi 
experimental field 
study. 
A local incident-reporting 
system (intervention) was 
implemented in OHS1. A local 
committee analysed the 
reported incidents. In OHS2 and 
OHS3 serving as controls, the 
current centralised incident 
reporting system was 
continued, where incidents 
were reported to an advisory 
committee of the board of 
directors of the OHSs 
collaboration. Statistical tests to 
compare the data before and 
after the intervention 
The study suggests that a local incident-reporting 
system is likely to increase the willingness to 
report and facilitates faster implementation of 
improvements.  
In contrast, the central system, by collating 
reports from many settings, seems better at 
addressing generic and recurring safety issues.  
The advantages of both approaches should be 
combined. 
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implementation. Qualitative 
interviews with the managers 
at the study OHSs and members 
of CIRP and LIRP committees 
about their opinions on the 
reporting procedures.  
*The key findings in the Table are selected from the presented studies in relation to the focus of the systematic literature search.   
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Table 10.   Studies on medication error reporting (MER) system innovations (n=3). ME=medication error. Studies are presented in 
alphabetical order. 
Reference Country & 
setting 
Objectives Design Materials and methods Key findings* 
Dollarhide 
et al. 2008 
United States 
(US), four 
university 
affiliated 
teaching 
hospitals. 
To determine the 
feasibility of 
capturing self-
reported 
medication events 
by a handheld 
computer-based 
Medication Event 
Reporting Tool 
(MERT). 
Handheld computers 
operating the MERT 
software application 
were deployed and 
evaluated among 
study participants on 
the medical wards.  
Participants: volunteer nurses 
(n=119) and physicians (n=185). 
Participants were encouraged 
to complete confidential 
reports on the handheld 
computers for medication 
events observed during the 
study period. Participants 
carried a handheld computer 
for 1-week intervals. 
The data was collected by the 
developed MERT software 
application (see Appendix 2b 
for details). 
Data on daily work load; work 
activity, stress and perceived 
work demands were collected 
by additional surveys. Statistical 
tests and descriptive statistics 
employed for data analysis.  
A handheld-based reporting tool is a feasible 
method to record medication events in inpatient 
hospital care units.  
Handheld reporting tools may hold promise to 
augment existing hospital reporting systems. 
Over the course of 2,311 days of clinician 
participation, 76 medication events were 
reported; the median time for report completion 
was 231 seconds.  
The average event reporting rate for all 
participants was 0.033 reports per clinician shift. 
Nurses and attending physicians had the highest 
reporting rates. 
 
Kennedy & 
Littenberg 
2004 
US, community 
pharmacies 
(n=7) in north-
To pilot and 
evaluate dictation 
as a novel method 
of reporting 
A crossover study. A reporting form was 
developed and implemented. 
Pharmacists (n=9) reported 
errors (n=72) by dictation 
There were no differences in completeness of 
reports between paper and dictation.  
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western 
Vermont. 
prescribing errors 
in community 
pharmacies; to 
determine if 
dictation 
stimulated more 
prescribing error 
reports than a 
paper-based 
reporting method, 
and to assess the 
reporting system. 
(n=33) and paper (n=39) 
methods for six weeks each. 
Assessment of dictation 
feasibility, pharmacist 
satisfaction with reporting, 
pharmacist preference for a 
dictation or paper reporting 
method (a pharmacist survey), 
and a content description of the 
prescribing errors reported 
were conducted. 
Dictation does not appear to increase prescribing 
error reporting as compared with a paper 
method. 
Implementing dictation in community pharmacies 
proved feasible although most of the pharmacists 
preferred the paper method.  
Further investigation to explore dictation as a 
useful technology in community pharmacies is 
needed. 
Phipps et 
al. 2014 
UK, National 
Reporting and 
Learning System 
(NRLS). 
To explore the 
combined use of a 
critical incident 
database and work 
domain analysis 
(WDA) to 
understand patient 
safety issues in 
community 
pharmacy. 
A retrospective 
quantitative review 
of incidents (incl. 
MEs) reported to 
NRLS and prospective 
qualitative WDA of 
community 
pharmacy. 
Descriptive statistical analysis of 
reported incidents (n=14 709) 
that involved community 
pharmacy between April 2005 
and August 2010.  
A WDA of community pharmacy 
using observational data from 
community pharmacies (n=5), 
technical documentation, and a 
focus group with pharmacists 
(n=6).  
Selected reports (n=30) from 
the NRLS were mapped onto 
the model generated by the 
WDA.  
Incident reporting data can be used to identify 
general patterns of MEs, whereas the WDA can 
generate information about the contextual 
factors that surround a critical task (e.g., demands 
arising from the organisation for pharmacy staff 
to be both maximally efficient and thorough at 
the same time, creating a need to compromise 
between the two and therefore potentially 
impacting medication safety). 
Combining the insights from different analytical 
methods, such as incident reporting and WDA, 
improves understanding of patient safety 
problems.  
 
 
*The key findings in the Table are selected from the presented studies in relation to the focus of the systematic literature search.   
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Table 11.   Reviews on medication error reporting (MER) systems (n=1). ME=medication error. 
Reference 
& country 
Objectives Databases  Inclusion criteria Analysis Key findings* 
Cheng et 
al. 2011, 
China 
To compare 
administration 
of incidence 
(incl. MEs) 
reporting 
systems for 
healthcare risk 
management in 
United Kingdom 
(UK), United 
States (US), 
Canada, 
Australia and 
Taiwan. 
The official 
websites of the 
healthcare risk 
management 
agencies in the four 
countries and one 
district. 
Laws, regulatory 
documents, research 
reports, reviews, and 
evaluation forms 
about healthcare risk 
management in the 
UK, US, Canada, 
Australia, and Taiwan 
(reported in another 
source: Sun et al. 
2011). 
Descriptive comparative 
analysis was performed on 
relevant documents. 
142 documents were included. 
US had the most relevant documents (n=68). 
Incident reporting has expanded from MEs and 
hospital-acquired infections to near-misses and 
other patient safety incidents. 
Reporting systems are either government-led or 
legal/regulatory/non-governmental organization 
collaborative. 
Compared to four countries, the Taiwan system 
emphasised more the public welfare, 
confidentiality and information sharing.  
*The key findings in the Table are selected from the presented studies in relation to the focus of the systematic literature search. 
 57 
5.2.1 Study countries and settings 
Most of the included studies (n=26) originated in English speaking countries, with the 
United States being the country with the highest rate of published studies (n=12) (Tables 6-
11). The other studies were conducted in the United Kingdom (n=7), Australia (n=4), 
Canada (n=3), the Netherlands (n=2), China (n=1), Japan (n=1), Sweden (n=1), Switzerland 
(n=1) and Taiwan (n=1). One of the studies comprised of a literature review of national 
incident reporting systems in Australia, Canada, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States (Table 11). The studies were published between 1993 and 2014, with majority 
of them from 2006-2010 (n=15). Hospitals were the most common settings for the studies 
(n=20) with community pharmacies being the second most common single site of study 
(n=5). 
5.2.2 Study methods 
The majority of the included studies were descriptive in nature. They employed quantitative 
and qualitative research methods. A mixed-methods approach applying both quantitative 
and qualitative methods within one study was also common. The relatively popular use of 
qualitative methods in the included studies may be explained by their usefulness for 
studying phenomena that are complex, contextual and influenced by the interaction between 
physical, psychological and social factors (Runciman 2002). Indeed, MER systems and their 
functionality are such a relatively new phenomenon occurring within the complex system 
of healthcare. A typical study design involved an analysis of reported errors and a survey or 
interview with the reporting healthcare professionals about the user satisfaction of the 
system (Beckmann et al. 1996b; Chua et al. 2003; A. G. Kennedy & Littenberg 2004; Tuttle 
et al. 2004; Pierson et al. 2007; Dollarhide et al. 2008; Armitage et al. 2010; Daniels et al. 
2010; Elliott et al. 2014; Nordén-Hägg et al. 2012).  
During the literature review, it became apparent that much of the available literature on 
MER systems and their functionality is of a non-experimental, descriptive type that reports 
case studies of locally implemented MER systems. These publications often presented the 
development and implementation, and the characteristics of the system without any 
scientific study design to explore their functionality. The same notion has been made by 
others studying patient safety incident reporting (Benn et al. 2009). Although being outside 
the scope of the present literature review, the non-experimental reports of MER systems 
may provide valuable insights for those seeking to establish such systems. 
5.2.3 Key findings 
A summary of the key findings of the literature review of studies on MER systems is 
presented in Table 12. Many studies reported aspects related to the effectiveness of MER 
systems in capturing medication error data (Table 12). Despite of imperfections in the data 
captured (see 5.2.4), some of these studies found MER systems to be effective as a means 
of collecting information on medication errors and for improving patient safety of the 
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reporting organisations (O’Neil et al. 1993; Beckmann et al. 1996b; Miller et al. 2006; 
Pierson et al. 2007; Levtzion-Korach et al. 2009; Kung et al. 2013). In contrast, some studies 
suggested that MER systems considerably underreport the frequency and severity of 
medication errors and other adverse events (Ricci et al. 2004; Olsen et al. 2007; Sari et al. 
2007) suggesting that MER systems need to be supplemented with other more systematic 
forms of data collection (Olsen et al. 2007). However, present studies found that no data 
source alone detected all adverse events, including medication errors, in the same patient 
group (O’Neil et al. 1993; Olsen et al. 2007; Sari et al. 2007). 
Table 12.   Summary of the key findings of the literature review on studies on 
medication error reporting (MER) systems.  
Key Findings References 
MER systems may provide an effective tool to improve 
medication safety, but they need to be supplemented 
with other data collection methods for estimating the 
frequency of medication errors. 
O’Neil et al. 1993; Beckmann et al. 1996b; 
Ricci et al. 2004; Miller et al. 2006; Olsen et 
al. 2007; Pierson et al. 2007; Sari et al. 2007; 
Levtzion-Korach et al. 2009; Kung et al. 2013 
Improving the quality of medication error reports 
represents a key target for improvement for many  
MER systems.  
Tuttle 2004; Braithwaite et al. 2008; Williams 
& Ashcroft 2009; Armitage et al. 2010; 
Daniels et al. 2010; Haw & Cahill 2011 
The users were mostly satisfied with the MER systems in 
their organisations with some areas needing 
improvement (e.g. simplifying the data entry process). 
Beckmann et al. 1996b; Chua et al. 2003; 
Savage 2005; Pierson et al. 2007; Braithwaite 
et al. 2008; Daniels et al. 2010; Kuo et al. 
2012; Elliott et al. 2014 
Reporting of medication errors and other adverse 
events is influenced by the profession of the reporter 
with more work needed to involve physicians in 
reporting.  
Ricci et al. 2004; Tuttle 2004; Savage 2005; 
Dollarhide et al. 2008; Evans et al. 2006; 
Hirose et al. 2007; Braithwaite et al. 2008; 
Williams & Ashcroft 2009; Kung et al. 2013 
Measures to increase medication error reporting:  
Boyle et al. 2012; Kuo et al. 2012; Nordén-
Hägg et al. 2012; Elliott et al. 2014 
Electronic instead of paper-based reporting. 
Staff education on reporting. 
Tuttle 2004; Evans et al. 2007; Braithwaite et 
al. 2008 
Pharmacy support for reporting. Jones et al. 2004 
Hand-held computer based reporting. Dollarhide et al. 2008 
MER systems have several advantages, such as cost-
effectiveness, and as medication safety promotion tools. 
O’Neil et al. 1993; Levtzion-Korach et al. 
2009; Boyle et al. 2012 
Lack of feedback on reporting and resources to analyse 
the data are barriers to effective use of MER systems. 
Braithwaite et al. 2008; Armitage et al. 2010 
The need for increasing the quality of the reported data in the MER systems was 
identified by many studies (Table 12), representing a potential key area of improvement for 
many MER systems. The identified problem areas that need to be targeted by actions were: 
varying quality of the reports, error reports focusing on individuals and lack of contributing 
factors in the reports (Armitage et al. 2010). Other problems were lack of information on 
the degree of patient harm, reporting other than safety issues (Daniels et al. 2010) and wide 
variation of medication error severity ratings reported by different healthcare groups 
(Williams & Ashcroft 2009).  
An important aspect of evaluation of electronic health information systems, such as 
MER systems, is the end users’ acceptance of the system (Elliott et al. 2014). In general, the 
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MER systems included in the present literature review showed a good user satisfaction 
(Table 12). However, there was some mixed user attitudes about the safety culture of the 
reporting units, the unclear value of the reporting system for the reporting staff (Braithwaite 
et al. 2008), the time it took to file a report and the need to simplify the data entry process 
(Kuo et al. 2012). One study concluded that time and patience was needed to successfully 
implement a new MER system in Swedish community pharmacies (Nordén-Hägg et al. 
2012). 
Many studies noted that MER is heavily influenced by the profession of the reporters 
with nurses being the professional group most likely to report (Table 12). When adverse 
event reporting is based predominantly on the observation of a single professional group, 
the data are grossly inaccurate (Ricci et al. 2004). Therefore, work is needed to involve all 
healthcare professionals in medication error reporting activities with special emphasis in 
physicians, which was found to be the profession less likely to report (Tuttle et al. 2004; 
Evans et al. 2006; Hirose et al. 2007; Braithwaite et al. 2008; Williams & Ashcroft 2009).  
Several benefits, such as increased number of reports, were realised when moving from 
paper-based MER system to an electronic system (Boyle et al. 2012; Kuo et al. 2012; 
Nordén-Hägg et al. 2012; Elliott et al. 2014). Other interventions found to improve 
medication error reporting and staff knowledge of the MER system were educational efforts 
(Tuttle et al. 2004; Evans et al. 2007; Braithwaite et al. 2008) and pharmacy support for 
medication error reporting (Jones et al. 2004). A handheld-computer based reporting tool 
studied by Dollahide et al (2008) represented a promising innovation to augment recording 
medication errors instantly after their occurrence at hospital units. Phipps et al (2014) found 
that combining different analytical methods, such as incident reporting and work domain 
analysis, improves the understanding of patient safety problems in the workplace.  
Several advantages of MER systems as tools to improve medication safety were 
identified; MER systems appeared to be cost-effective (O’Neil et al. 1993; Boyle et al. 
2012), involve low risk of operations (Boyle et al. 2012) and detected more preventable 
errors than medical record reviews (O’Neil et al. 1993). Levtzion-Korach and colleagues 
(2009) concluded that the main strengths of electronic reporting are the ability to use 
branching logic, analysis of errors and the feasibility of incorporating the collection of 
information about actions and follow-up steps after the error in the database. A feasibility 
study for recording dispensing errors in United Kingdom primary care pharmacies found 
that the outcome of the reporting system was more important for the staff than the incidence 
of errors (Chua et al. 2003). However, others found the lack of feedback on incident reports 
and resources to analyse the data as barriers to overcoming effective use of MER systems 
(Braithwaite et al. 2008; Armitage et al. 2010).  
5.2.4 Quality of the studies 
The quality of the studies was not systematically evaluated in the present literature review. 
However, a considerable variety in the quality of reporting the studies was identified 
especially in relation to reporting the study methods. In some sources the description of 
study methods was detailed (e.g., Armitage et al. 2010). However, some sources lacked 
relevant information to evaluate the rigour of methods used for data collection or analysis 
(e.g., Beckmann et al. 1996b; Cheung et al. 2014; Elliott et al. 2014) and to make 
 60 
conclusions about the quality of the study. Some of these articles comprised of distinguished 
descriptions about the development and evaluation of MER systems, but lacked a scientific 
description of the selected methods for data collection and analysis (Pierson et al. 2007; 
Hickner et al. 2010). 
5.2.5 Limitations and future research  
The described literature review is limited by the extent to which is has been able to detect 
all the relevant published research on functionality of MER systems. As the literature search 
proceeded it came apparent that some publications may have gone unidentified as the search 
terms did not involve terms such as “medical error”, “patient safety incident” or “adverse 
event”. Exclusion of these terms was a strategic decision at the time of the search strategy 
formulation as the focus was specifically in MER systems. However, MER systems are 
integrated to wider patient safety incident reporting systems in many countries (Doupi 2009; 
Cheng et al. 2011). Therefore, research on these systems may not be comprehensively found 
by search terms comprising medication error related terms only. However, it is believed that 
the present literature review represents the key publications on the area, supported by the 
included publications’ repeated occurrence on each others’ reference lists. For similar future 
reviews on MER systems it is still recommended to also include other patient safety related 
terms and to narrow to the focus of the search on studies with some certain scope (e.g., 
studies on the quality of data produced by MER systems).  
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6 Summary of the key findings of the literature 
(Chapters 2-5) 
 Incident reporting systems are one of the most widely used healthcare risk 
management tools across countries. Healthcare providers use these systems to 
systematically collect, aggregate and analyse medication errors and other patient 
safety data to learn from the failures of healthcare system. 
 The systems approach to medication error management is pivotal in enabling 
functional medication error reporting and learning from errors in healthcare 
organisations. 
 Studies on MER systems’ functionality, development and implementation originate 
mostly in English speaking countries. Studies are mainly descriptive, and use a blend 
of approaches to examine MER systems in different countries and healthcare 
domains, with hospitals being the most common study setting. However, there is a 
need to promote the quality of reporting of the studies on MER systems. 
 MER systems may provide an effective and a low-cost tool to improve medication 
safety, but they may need to be supplemented with other data collection methods 
especially for estimating the frequency of medication errors. 
 Although users of MER systems are generally satisfied with their systems, several 
areas of improvement exist, e.g.: 
 Improving the quality of medication error reports represents a key target 
for improvement for many MER systems. 
 Reporting of medication errors and other adverse events is influenced by 
the profession of the reporter with more work needed to involve physicians 
in reporting. 
 Lack of feedback on reporting and resources to analyse the data are 
barriers to effective use of MER systems. 
 Measures to increase medication error reporting include: electronic instead of paper-
based reporting, staff education on reporting, pharmacy support for reporting, and 
hand-held computer based reporting. 
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7 Aims of the study 
This study aimed to explore national and local medication error reporting (MER) systems 
in different countries and how to make them work for learning from medication errors. The 
study also aimed to explore how education on medication safety could be organised for 
practicing healthcare professionals. 
 
The specific objectives were (number of the original publication is provided in brackets): 
 
1. to explore the existence and characteristics of medication error reporting (MER) 
systems in different countries (I);  
2. to explore what makes a MER system work and what are the factors associated with 
the successful development and implementation of MER systems (II); 
3. to assess the inter-rater reliability of medication error classifications in a voluntary 
Reporting System for Safety Incidents in Health Care Organizations (HaiPro) (III),  
4. to describe medication errors and their contributing factors reported to HaiPro in 
2006-2009 (III); and 
5. to develop educational approaches for introducing medication safety principles in an 
interdisciplinary three-day short course for continuing education of healthcare 
professionals (IV). 
 
These objectives were addressed in three empirical studies of the thesis, resulting in four 
international peer reviewed scientific publications (Appendices I-IV).  
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8 Materials and methods 
8.1 Study design 
This was a descriptive cross-sectional study (Smith 2002). The study outline is presented in 
Figure 5. The study applied both qualitative and quantitative research methods and utilized 
various data sources (Table 13). This approach, known as mixed methods was used to 
achieve a comprehensive understanding of medication error reporting systems and how to 
make them work in different health systems (Tashakkori & Teddlie 2010). 
 
 
Figure 5.   Study outline. MER = medication error reporting. 
Exploring National and Local MER Systems in Different Countries (I, II) 
(2007) 
An international survey to explore the 
 existence and characteristics of MER systems (I) 
 expert perceptions of a good and effective MER system (I) 
 barriers to reporting (I) 
 development and implementation of MER systems (II) 
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Exploring Medication Error Classification and Medication Errors in  
a Finnish Reporting System for Safety Incidents in  
Health Care Organizations, HaiPro (III) 
(2012) 
A database/register based study  
 to assess the inter-rater reliability of classification of medication errors 
reported in 2007-2009 
 to explore reported medication errors and their contributing factors 
Development of a 3-day short Course for Healthcare Professionals  
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The study comprised three phases: the first phase covered a wider international 
perspective on MER systems in different countries and what makes them work in learning 
from medication errors (Phase I, Figure 5). This phase dated back to the time when 
international recommendations were published on MER systems (World Health 
Organization 2005; Council of Europe 2006a). The contents of this phase were influenced 
by the knowledge on MER systems at that time and the international recommendations for 
their use and establishment (U 2000; Lawton & Parker 2002; Leape 2002; Anderson et al. 
2006; Council of Europe 2006a). In the second phase of the study a national perspective on 
medication error reporting was provided by studying the reliability of medication error 
classification of a Reporting System for Safety Incidents in Health Care Organizations, 
HaiPro, widely used in Finland (Phase II).  
The final phase of the study focused on the educational perspective on management of 
medication safety from the systems approach (Phase III). In this phase teaching and 
assessment methods for facilitating learning in medication safety were studied and a 
syllabus for a short course on the topic was developed. 
The study design in Phase I was developed at the University of Helsinki. The data 
collection and main parts of the data analysis in the Phase I studies were conducted at the 
University of Bath in the United Kingdom in collaboration with the University of Helsinki. 
The following phases II and III were conducted at the University of Helsinki, Finland.  
 
  
6
5
 
Table 13.   Materials and methods of the studies I-IV. MER = medication error reporting. 
Study Methods Material/Subjects Analysis 
I A cross-sectional on-line survey on MER systems 
and practices in different countries administered in 
2007. Structured and open-ended questions on 
multiple areas, i.e., on the characteristics and 
development and implementation of MER systems. 
Collection of statistics for describing the stage of 
development and quality and capacity of 
healthcare system in the participating countries. 
Medication safety experts (n=32) identified 
through 120 member organisations of the 
International Pharmaceutical Federation in 88 
countries and other professional organizations in 
3 additional countries, response rate to the 
questionnaire 50% (16 experts out of 32). 
Statistics for describing the stage of development 
and quality and capacity of healthcare systems in 
the participating countries. 
Quantitative analysis in the theoretical 
framework of the study (Chapter 3); 
descriptive statistics (frequencies, 
percentages) for the data from the structured 
questions in the questionnaire. 
T-test, chi-square, Mann Whitney U tests for 
the collected healthcare related statistics. 
II Same as in Study I. Same as in Study I. Qualitative analysis in the theoretical 
framework of the study (Chapter 3); 
qualitative content analysis for the data from 
the open-ended questions. 
III A study on medication errors voluntarily reported 
to a Reporting System for Safety Incidents in 
Health Care Organizations, HaiPro. 
Inter-rater reliability of medication error 
classification in HaiPro. 
Medication incidents (n=32 592) reported to the 
HaiPro system by 36 Finnish healthcare 
organisations in 2007-2009; a random sample of 
1% (n=288) of medication errors to test the inter-
rater reliability of medication error classification. 
Quantitative analysis;  
descriptive statistics (frequencies, 
percentages) for the reported medication 
errors.  
Cohen’s kappa statistics for testing the 
reliability of the original classifications in a 
random sample of 1% (n=288). 
IV A brainstorming workshop during the international 
Life Long Learning in the Pharmacy Conference in 
Helsinki in 2009. 
International higher education and adult learning 
experts in pharmacy (n=19) who brainstormed 4 
syllabi in groups for a 3-day short course in 
medication safety for the continuing education of 
healthcare professionals. 
Qualitative analysis in the theoretical 
framework of the study (Chapter 3); 
qualitative content analysis of the 
brainstormed syllabi. 
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8.2 Exploring national and local medication error reporting systems in 
different countries (I, II) 
8.2.1 Subjects and setting 
The study was a descriptive, cross-sectional, on-line survey targeted to national medication 
safety experts knowledgeable about MER systems in their countries. To identify the experts, 
the network of the International Pharmaceutical Federation (FIP) was used (International 
Pharmaceutical Federation 2015a; International Pharmaceutical Federation 2015b) An 
ethical approval was obtained through the University of Bath (United Kingdom) ethical 
review process. 
In total, 120 FIP member organisations in 88 countries were asked to facilitate 
identifying medication safety experts in their respective countries. Additionally, 20 
informants in the Council of Europe and the Nordic Patient Safety Research Network were 
contacted, giving a total of 140 informants in 91 contacted countries. The identified 
medication safety experts then received a recruitment email from the researchers in Spring 
2007. The 91 countries were divided into developed and developing countries based on the 
United Nations’ (2007) Human Development Index (HDI).  
8.2.2 Questionnaire 
An on-line questionnaire was developed through a multi-staged process informed by the 
Human Error Theory and a systems approach to patient and medication safety (Reason 
1990; Reason 2000). The key content of the questionnaire was derived from the international 
literature on the recommended characteristics of a MER system at that time, as well as the 
challenges encountered in MER and recommendations for setting up MER systems (U 2000; 
Lawton & Parker 2002; Leape 2002; Anderson et al. 2006; Council of Europe 2006a). A 
detailed description of the development and piloting of the questionnaire is provided in the 
original publication I. 
The questionnaire comprised both structured and open-ended questions. The key 
structured questions of the study explored: background information on individual 
respondents and their countries; existence and type of MER systems in the respondents’ 
countries; characteristics of MER systems, and barriers to reporting. Through the open-
ended questions we aimed to gain information on the national contexts where the national 
and local MER systems operated in the experts’ countries or would operate if developed and 
implemented.  We also acquired information on whether this national context, i.e., the 
operational environment, comprising of organisations (e.g. national authorities), systems 
(e.g. medical liability systems), and individuals participating in reporting (e.g., healthcare 
professionals) and governing reporting (e.g., policy makers) and using the information 
produced on medication errors, supported the functioning of MER from a systems approach. 
For a more comprehensive description of the questionnaire structure and contents of the 
questions, please see the original publications I, II and Appendix 3. 
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After piloting the questionnaire and questionnaire revisions, the final questionnaire was 
emailed to 32 identified medication safety experts in 26 countries in spring 2007. Two 
reminders were sent to non-respondents at two-week intervals.  
8.2.3 Analysis of the quantitative data (I) 
The quantitative part of the Phase I study concentrated on exploring the existence and 
characteristics of national and local MER systems, and described national medication safety 
experts’ perceptions on a good and effective MER system and barriers to reporting.  
The data were received in a Microsoft Excel file and entered, and analysed using an 
SPSS 15.0 database. All data were managed confidentially and anonymised. The quality of 
data entries was audited to ensure accuracy. The results were reported as frequencies (Smith 
2002; Howell 2013). 
8.2.4 Analysis of the qualitative data (II) 
The expert narratives from 20 open-ended questions described the factors for successful 
development and implementation of MER systems. Conventional qualitative content 
analysis with an inductive approach was applied to the data (Hsieh & Shannon 2005; Elo & 
Kyngäs 2008). The analysis was performed in a theoretical framework of the Human error 
theory and systems approach (Reason 1990; Reason 2000). The data from all open-ended 
questions was combined to obtain a comprehensive understanding about the issues under 
exploration. Some of the quantitative data was used to support the interpretation of the 
qualitative data. 
The analysis was performed in Microsoft Word by the first author (ARH). All data were 
managed confidentially and anonymized. The credibility of the coding was checked by 
another researcher (RL) to ensure analytical rigour. The study group reflected the findings 
of the analysis in relation to the theoretical framework to encapsulate the key findings.  In 
2010, the data was reanalysed to confirm the accuracy of the coding. Consequently, some 
codes, themes and clusters were subjected to minor changes. For the contents of the open-
ended questions, please see Section 8.2.2. Based on the findings, a model to assist in the 
development and implementation of MER systems was constructed and presented in the 
form of a diagram (see Figure 9). 
8.3 Exploring medication error classification and medication errors in a 
Finnish Reporting System for Safety Incidents in Health Care 
Organizations (HaiPro) (III) 
8.3.1 Medication error data 
This study comprised 32 592 medication errors within the pool of all patient safety incidents 
(n=64 405) reported by healthcare organisations (n=36) using HaiPro during the pilot phase 
of the system in 2007-2009. More information on the reporting HaiPro organisation is 
provided in the manuscript III submitted for publication. 
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The HaiPro reporting process utilises an online data collection form in which structured 
and narrative information on a patient safety incident are reported by a healthcare 
professional (Appendix 4) (Awanic Ltd 2015a; Awanic Ltd 2015b). After the incident has 
been reported a local data classifier, usually a hospital unit nurse, classifies the narrative 
information by using a separate structured data classification form (Appendix 4).  
The approval for using the data for research was sought from the reporting organisations 
by the HaiPro Steering Committee which then granted permission for the use of the 
medication error data for the present study. An ethical approval was obtained through the 
ethical review process of the Vaasa Hospital District, Finland. 
8.3.2 Analysis of the data 
The original data of reported patient safety incidents (n=64 405) were stored in the databases 
of the reporting organisations (n=36). With their permission the data on these databases 
were pooled to form a single Excel-database. For the analysis the data was transferred to 
PASW 18.0. statistical software. 
The stages of the data handling and analysis are shown in Figures 6 & 7. The narrative 
parts of the medication error reports (Awanic Ltd 2015a) had been classified by different 
data classifiers in their respective organisations using HaiPro. The inter-rater reliability of 
the medication error classifications was evaluated to indicate which elements of the 
narrative information could be pooled to form a larger data set for analysing medication 
errors at the level of all reporting organisations. For this purpose, a random sample of 1% 
(n=302) of errors was drawn from the data on medication errors (n=32 592) by using the 
PASW 18.0 software (Figure 6). After removing errors not related to medications (n=14), 
an independent researcher (RJ) re-classified the narrative parts of the medication error 
reports, the nature of the error and the error type (n=288) (Figure 7).  
The re-classification process of the narratives in the random sample (n=288) was two-
staged (Figure 7); in the first stage the classification system used by the researcher (RJ) was 
standardised by using another independent researcher (ARH). For this purpose, a systematic 
random sample of every third error (n=96) was drawn from the random sample (n=288) and 
was re-classified by the two researchers (RJ and ARH) (Figure 7). Following this, the inter-
rater reliability of agreement between the researchers was measured using the PASW 18.0. 
statistical software. The researchers and the original data classifiers used the same 
classification form comprising 96 variables with different values (e.g. variable “nature of 
the error” had values: 1=near miss, 2=actual error); each of the values was a yes/no selection 
in the classification process. Before classifying the systematic random sample of medication 
errors (n=96), the researchers reviewed the classification instructions provided to the 
original data classifiers. Some additional instructions and standard principles for the 
classification process were made for the study researchers to complete the original 
instructions.  
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Figure 6.   The phases related to handling of the data from the HaiPro Incident 
Reporting System.  
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In the second stage of the re-classification process, the first researcher (RJ) 
independently classified the remaining medication error narratives (n=192) in the random 
sample (n=288) (Figure 7). Following this, classifications made by the first researcher (RJ) 
were compared to the classifications of the original data classifiers to test the reliability of 
the data on medication errors (n= 32 592). 
The inter-rater reliability was measured using Cohen’s kappa (κ) to describe the degree 
of conformity between the two researchers (RJ and ARH), as well as between the study 
researcher (RJ) and the original data classifiers (Howell 2013). Cohen’s kappa is the most 
commonly used statistic for categorical items to measure the agreement between two 
reviewers in studies of patient safety incidents (Kunac et al. 2006; Howell 2013). In the 
present study, the degree of agreement was considered acceptable when resulting in kappa 
values of 0.41 or above (Fleiss et al. 2003; Gisev et al. 2013). Interpretation of the kappa-
values is presented in the Table 14. 
Table 14.   Interpretation of Cohen’s kappa (Gisev et al. 2013). 
Value of kappa Level of agreement 
<0.00 Poor agreement or less than agreement by chance 
0.00–0.20 Slight agreement 
0.21–0.40 Fair agreement 
0.41–0.60 Moderate agreement 
0.61–0.80 Substantial agreement 
0.81–1.00 Almost perfect agreement 
1.00 Complete agreement 
The kappa values for some of the variables in the systematic random sample of 96 
medication errors were low (see Table 17 at page 76; κ I) when calculating inter-rater 
reliability between the study researchers (Figure 7). Consequently, the classification 
instructions were revised to better standardise the classification process. Following this, 
both researchers independently reviewed their own classifications by using the revised 
classification instructions (Figure 7). 
The analyses were performed through the use of Microsoft Excel and PASW 18.0. 
statistical software. Descriptive statistics were used for describing the reported medication 
errors. The variables with a high enough agreement rate (κ≥0.41) were described at the level 
of the entire data (n=32 592) (Smith 2002; Howell 2013). The variables with κ<0.41 were 
described at the level of the random sample (n=288) based on classifications made by the 
study researcher (RJ).  
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Figure 7.   The process of assessment of inter-rater reliability of classifications in a 
random sample of medication errors (1%, n=288 out of 32 592) reported to HaiPro, 
and exploring the reported medication errors at the level of all reported medication 
errors (n=32 592) and a random sample of medication errors (n=288). 
Standardising the classification system used by the researchers 
 Re-classification of a systematic random sample of medication errors 
(n=96) drawn from the random sample of errors (1%, n=288 out of 32 592) 
by two researchers (RJ & ARH). 
 Assessing the inter-rater reliability of agreement on classifications by 
Cohen’s kappa (κ) indicating the reliability of the classification system 
used by the researchers by interpreting the κ value. 
Some κ values found low (κ<0.41)  Need for improving the reliability of the 
classification system used by the researchers 
 Revising classification guidelines for the researchers (RJ & ARH) and 
reviewing their own classifications by both researchers. 
 Re-assessing the inter-rater reliability of agreement on classifications of the 
systematic random sample of medication errors (n=96) by Cohen’s kappa. 
   Measuring agreement between the researcher and the original data classifiers 
 Classifying the rest of the random sample of medication errors (1%, 
n=288 out of 32 592) by the independent researcher (RJ). 
 Assessing the inter-rater reliability of agreement on classifications by 
Cohen’s kappa. 
 Interpreting the reliability of the original classifications and the validity of 
the data. 
  
   Describing the medication errors by descriptive statistics 
 Describing the medication errors that had an acceptable level of 
agreement (κ≥0.41) at the level of all medication error data (n= 32 592). 
 Describing the medication errors that had a low level of agreement 
(κ<0.41) at the level of the random sample of medication errors (1%,  
n=288 out of 32 592) based on classifications by the researcher (RJ). 
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8.4 Development of a 3-day short course for healthcare professionals in 
medication safety (IV) 
8.4.1 Setting and participants 
A brainstorming workshop was used to consult international higher education and adult 
learning experts in pharmacy in order to develop a syllabus for a 3-day interdisciplinary 
course in medication safety. The workshop was conducted during the International Life 
Long Learning in Pharmacy Conference in 2009 in Helsinki, Finland. Overall, 124 
participants participated in the conference from Africa (n=11), Australasia (n=15), Europe 
(n=73), and North America (n=25).  
8.4.2 Data collection 
During the workshop, participants were asked to brainstorm a syllabus comprising teaching 
and assessment methods for a three-day interdisciplinary course in medication safety in four 
groups. To support brainstorming, sample contents for such a course were provided in the 
form of a leaflet (Appendix 5) based on one of the leading handbooks in the field (Cohen 
2007). The brainstorming was facilitated by the researchers (ARH and RL). The data were 
collected in the form of proposals for teaching and assessment methods by each group (n=4).  
8.4.3 Qualitative analysis of the data 
After the workshop the data was transferred to a Word-document for a conventional 
qualitative content analysis to explore their contents by the first researcher (ARH) (Hsieh & 
Shannon 2005). The credibility of the coding was checked by another researcher (RJ) (Pope 
et al. 2000).  
Finally, the identified teaching and assessment methods, and the core contents of the 
course suggested in the four syllabi, and sample contents of the course (Appendix 6) were 
synthetized by the researchers (ARH, RL and MA) to form a combined syllabus (Appendix 
6). The synthesis was based on the teaching and assessment methods occurring most 
frequently in the plans, i.e., the agreement between the groups. The current literature, as 
well as innovativeness and applicability of the methods from the medication safety 
education perspective were also considered when forming the combined syllabus.   
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9 Results 
This chapter describes the key findings of the original publications I-IV. The key findings 
are also summarized in Figure 13. 
9.1 Exploring national and local medication error reporting systems in 
different countries (I, II) 
Contact details for 32 medication safety experts in 26 countries were received from the 
informants in the FIP and other sources (8.2.1). Overall, 16 experts representing different 
countries in Africa (n=3), Australasia (n=3), Europe (n=9) and North-America (n=1) 
responded to the questionnaire, giving a response rate of 50% (Table 15). For other 
demographics of the respondents, please see the original publication I.  
Table 15.   Existence and type of medication error reporting (MER) systems in the 
participating countries (n=16). 
MER system Country 
National system 
Stand-alone MER system Canada* 
Japan* 
Sweden* 
MER system integrated in an 
adverse event reporting system 
Norway* 
Zambia† 
Local system 
Within a community setting Australia* 
In community and hospital setting Czech Republic* 
A shared system between several 
hospitals 
Finland* 
Within a hospital setting Hungary* 
Setting not known Austria* 
Rwanda† 
No system 
 Ghana† 
India* 
Kosovo* 
Latvia* 
Serbia* 
*Developed country; †Developing country according to the United Nations Human Development Index 
(HDI) (United Nations 2007). 
9.1.1 Existence and characteristics (I) 
At the time of the study in 2007, a MER system existed in 11 countries: nine in developed 
and two in developing countries (Table 15). The respondents provided further information 
on five national and three local MER systems (Table 16). The most common characteristic 
of a MER system was the confidentiality of reported information (n/N=6/8) (Table 16). 
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National MER systems were commonly provided and maintained by one national 
organization (4/5); they were an integral part of a patient safety reporting system (4/5); 
provided confidentiality of reported information (4/5); and allowed all healthcare 
professionals to report errors (4/5). All three of the local systems were reported to be easy 
to use, available electronically, allowed reporting both of potential and of actual errors, and 
provided feedback on the error analysis results to those involved in reporting.  
9.1.2 Characteristics of a good and effective medication error reporting 
system and barriers to reporting (I) 
Common perceived characteristics of a good and effective MER system were: the MER 
system should provide an opportunity for evaluating the causes of errors (n/N=9/16); have 
a non-punitive approach to reporting (8/16); provide feedback of error analysis results to 
those involved in reporting (8/16), and be easy to use (8/16). The most commonly perceived 
barrier to reporting was fear of consequences (13/16). Other common barriers were a culture 
of blame (8/16), a lack of training needed for reporting (8/16), a lack of time for reporting 
(8/16), and a lack of organisational leadership and support (7/16). 
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Table 16.   Characteristics of the national and local medication error reporting (MER) 
systems in participating countries providing further information on their MER system 
(n/N=8/16) (structured questions with alternatives given were used). The 
characteristics are presented in descending order. 
 
Characteristic 
Type of MER system 
National system Local system 
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Provides confidentiality of reported information x x  x x x  x 
Provides feedback of results of error analysis for 
those involved in reporting 
x x  x  x x x 
Provided and maintained by one national 
organization 
x x x x  x   
An integral part of a patient safety reporting system  x x x x   x 
Allows all healthcare professionals to report errors x  x x x   x 
Paper based   x x x x x  
Provides opportunity for error data analysis x x  x  x x  
Provides an opportunity for evaluating causes of 
errors (e.g. root cause analysis) 
x x  x  x x  
Available in electronically  x x    x x x 
Includes reporting of both potential and actual 
errors 
x  x   x x x 
Reporting of errors is mandatory  x x x  x   
Reporting of errors is voluntary x    x  x x 
Uses a non-punitive approach to reporting x x    x  x 
Provides a choice of reporting anonymously x x     x x 
Produces recommendations and guidelines for 
improving medication safety 
x   x  x x  
Easy to use x     x x x 
Quick to use x      x x 
An independent reporting system dedicated for 
medication error reporting 
x x    x   
Provides patients/consumers an opportunity to 
report errors 
x    x    
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9.2 Factors influencing successful development and implementation of 
medication error reporting systems (II) 
The qualitative analysis of received responses to the open-ended questions of the 
questionnaire by the 16 experts revealed several factors that were perceived to influence 
successful development and implementation of MER systems (Figure 8). These factors were 
related to the national context of MER systems, i.e., their operational environment, and are 
presented as steps towards development and implementation of MER systems in the Figure 
9. Moreover, the operational environments of the MER systems were identified as 
inadequate to support functional MER in the experts’ countries. 
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Figure 8.   Proposed factors for successful development and implementation of 
medication error reporting (MER) systems (based on qualitative analysis of responses 
from 16 medication safety experts). 
All experts (n=16) 
 Information on the national context of MER systems in experts’ countries 
o Legislation and regulations related to patient and medication 
safety, MER and HCPs’ practice 
o Roles of different authorities in MER; quality and safety of 
healthcare, and patient and medication safety 
 Ideas on how to best develop and implement MER systems 
Experts in countries with a national or local MER system (n=11) 
 Application for collected data on medication errors 
 Changes or improvements made to the MER system following the 
implementation 
Experts in countries with no current MER system (n=5) 
 Plans and actions to develop national or local MER systems 
 Awareness of the need to pay attention in medication safety issues 
 The needed organisational support to develop and implement national 
MER system 
 The needed organisational or cultural changes to enable MER 
 Capacity of the country to develop and implement a MER system 
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9.2.1 Summary of the factors 
General awareness of deficiencies in medication safety was lacking in some of the countries, 
influencing the perceived necessity of MER systems. Consequently, creating such 
awareness among healthcare professionals, decision makers and the public was 
recommended as a preliminary mission to initiate the development and implementation 
process of a MER system (Figures 7 & 8). Engaging policy makers was proposed as key to 
gaining political will for these actions. 
The lack of financial and human resources hampered the development and 
implementation of MER systems in some countries. Therefore, strong expectations for 
governmental and international support and collaboration in these actions were expressed 
by the experts (Figures 7 & 8). 
The need to establish a national organisation or centre for MER was emphasised by the 
experts (Figures 7 & 8). Such an organisation was needed to create leadership and 
coordination in reporting, and for the utilisation of the reported data in order to promote a 
medication safety and systems approach to error prevention. While in general the findings 
were found applicable to both national and local MER systems, establishment of a national 
organisation or centre for MER was thought especially crucial for national systems. 
The existence of a safety culture for those involved in error reporting was reported by 
the experts to be essential in developing and implementing functional MER systems 
(Figures 7 & 8), and was seen to be affected mainly by the legislation and regulations on 
adverse events. A need to reform the current legislation on dealing with adverse events 
towards a non-punitive approach appeared to be essential for an operational environment 
that supports MER. 
The experts perceived learning from reported medication errors as the most valuable 
outcome of MER systems (Figures 7 & 8). The experts emphasised exploring the 
mechanisms and causes of errors from a systems approach with less focus on solely 
quantitative approaches on counting errors. A climate fostering learning from medication 
errors was perceived to promote change in the culture and enable reporting (Figures 7 & 8). 
Please see the original publication II for a more detailed description of the experts’ proposals 
for the factors for successful development and implementation of MER systems. 
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Figure 9.   The steps towards development and implementation of medication error 
reporting (MER) systems and learning from errors (based on qualitative analysis of 
responses from 16 medication safety experts). 
  
Gaining political will to establish MER 
systems 
Creating national and local awareness of 
deficiencies in medication safety 
 
International and governmental support 
Creating/reforming legislation, 
regulations, guidelines and strategies 
to support MER 
Allocating adequate financial and 
human resources 
Implementation of systems approach in 
the operational environment 
 
Development and implementation of a 
local or national MER system 
Learning from reported medication 
errors to improve healthcare system 
Creation of safety culture in the 
operational environment 
Establishment of an organisation or 
centre for MER 
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9.3 Inter-rater reliability of medication error classification in HaiPro (III) 
The agreement rate between the two researchers (RJ and ARH) was acceptable (κ≥0.41) for 
40 out of 41 variables for which the kappa value was possible to be calculated in the random 
sample of medication errors (n=288) (for the variable “prolonged care of the patient”, the 
kappa was not able to be calculated as only one of the researcher used the classification, see 
Table 17).  
 
Table 17 Inter-rater reliability of medication error classifications in the random sample 
of medication errors (n=288) for which the kappa (κ) was able to be calculated.* 
Acceptable agreement rates (κ≥0.41) are in bold. Each classification is a yes/no 
selection in the used classification system. 
Classification 
Agreement between two 
independent researchers 
Agreement between the 
researcher and the original 
data classifiers 
κ (95% Cl)  
n=96 
κ (95% Cl) 
n=x* 
Nature and type of the medication error 
Nature of the error (near miss or actual 
error) 
0.81 (0.71 to 0.92) 
0.83 (0.76 to 0.90) 
n=242 
Type of the error known 0.49 (-0.12 to 1.10) 
0.21 (0.06 to 0.35) 
n=288 
Type of the error 0.81 (0.72 to 0.91) 
0.63 (0.56 to 0.69) 
n=284 
Type of dispensing error (at the unit) 
known 
0.86 (0.76 to 0.97) 
0.67 (0.58 to 0.75)  
n=288 
Type of the dispensing error 0.82 (0.70 to 0.93) 
0.67 (0.58 to 0.74) 
n=280 
Type of administration error known 0.85 (0.74 to 0.97) 
0.67 (0.56 to 0.77) 
n=287 
Type of the administration error 0.83 (0.72 to 0.94) 
0.57 (0.47 to 0.68) 
n=286 
Type of medication documentation error 
known 
0.85 (0.74 to 0.97) 
0.65 (0.54 to 0.76) 
n=280 
Type of the medication documentation 
error 
0.85 (0.74 to 0.96) 
0.59 (0.49 to 0.69)  
n=288 
Type of storage error known 0.66 (0,04 to 1.28) 
0.57 (0.125 to 1.00) 
n=288 
Type of the storage error (e.g. wrong 
storage conditions) 
0.66 (0,04 to 1.28) 
0.66 (0.22 to 1.10) 
n=287 
Type of prescription error known 0.66 (0.22 to 1.10) 
0.65 (0.43 to 0.88) 
n=288 
Outcome for the patient 
Outcome for the patient known 0.66 (0.50 to 0.82) 
0.08 (-0.02 to 0.17) 
n=288 
Patient harmed 0.68 (0.56 to 0.81) 
0.21 (0.13 to 0.29) 
n=288 
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Severity of the outcome to the patient 0.36 (0.17 to 0.56) 
0.18 (0.08 to 0.29) 
n=286 
Outcome for the hospital unit 
Outcome for the unit known 0.59 (0.43 to 0.75) 
0.06 (-0.03 to 0.15)  
n=288 
The error caused harm to the unit 0.60 (0.46 to 0.73) 
0.10 (0.03 to 0.19) 
n=288 
Image harm to the unit 0.54 (0.37 to 0.70) 
0.07 (-0.01 to 0.14) 
n=288 
Material loss  0.52 (0.36 to 0.69) 
0.07 (-0.02 to 0.15) 
n=288 
Extra financial costs 0.53 (0.36 to 0.70) 
0.07 (-0.02 to 0.16)  
n=288 
Additional work or minor care for the 
patient 
0.56 (0.43 to 0.70) 
0.08 (0.00 to 0.15)  
n=288 
Prolonged care for the patient e** 
0.08 (-0.01 to 0.17)  
n=288) 
Long-term care for the patient  0.51 (0.34 to 0.68) 
0.07 (-0.02 to 0.16)  
n=288 
Personnel harmed 0.53 (0.36 to 0.70) 
0.07 (-0.02 to 0.16) 
n=288 
Other individuals harmed 0.53 (0.36 to 0.70) 
0.07 (-0.02 to 0.16)  
n=288 
Management of the error situation 
Management of the error known 0.83 (0.72 to 0.94) 
0.14 (0.05 to 0.24) 
n=288 
Error managed by those involved in the 
situation 
0.83 (0.72 to 0.94) 
0.13 (0.04 to 0.23) 
n=288 
Extra personnel called out 0.83 (0.72 to 0.94) 
0.13 (0.05 to 0.22) 
n=288 
Immediate actions 
Immediate actions known 0.79 (0.66 to 0.91) 
0.15 (0.05 to 0.25) 
n=288 
Actions taken to correct the error 0.76 (0.65 to 0.87) 
0.24 (0.16 to 0.47)  
n=288 
Patient observed and/or informed  0.75 (0.63 to 0.87) 
0.22 (0.13 to 0.30) 
n=288 
Actions taken to mitigate the effects of 
and additional harm caused by the error 
0.60 (0.46 to 0.74) 
0.16 (0.08 to 0.24) 
n=288 
Working conditions and other contributing factors 
Conditions and other contributing factors 
known 
0.79 (0.67 to 0.91) 
0.22 (0.11 to 0.43) 
n=288 
Communication and flow of information 0.72 (0.60 to 0.84) 
0.21 (0.15 to 0.30) 
n=288 
Working patterns 0.68 (0.56 to 0.80) 
0.15 (0.06 to 0.24) 
n=288 
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Work environment and tools, resources 0.77 (0.66 to 0.88) 
0.22 (0.13 to 0.32) 
n=288 
Patient and his/her carer  0.74 (0.62 to 0.86) 
0.23 (0.13 to 0.33) 
n=288 
Education and orientation, competence of 
personnel 
0.76 (0.63 to 0.88) 
0.23 (0.13 to 0.33) 
n=288 
Medicines 0.75 (0.63 to 0.87) 
0.20 (0.09 to 0.30) 
n=288 
Team or group work 0.74 (0.61 to 0.87) 
0.19 (0.08 to 0.30) 
n=288 
Devices or instruments 0.80 (0.68 to 0.92) 
0.20 (0.09 to 0.31) 
n=288 
Organisation and leadership 0.79 (0.67 to 0.91) 
0.21 (0.09 to 0.32) 
n=288 
* Some classifications which prevented the calculation of the kappa were removed as only one of the 
reviewers had used some specific value related to the classification, resulting in a varying number (n) of 
classifications  
**Calculation not possible as only one of the reviewers has used the classification 
Between the researcher (RJ) and the original data classifiers the acceptable rate of 
agreement was achieved for 11 out of 42 (26%) variables. Thus, these variables were 
classified in such a consistency by the classifiers in different reporting healthcare 
organisations that they could be analysed descriptively in the whole data set (n=32 592). 
These 11 variables were related to: the nature of the error; the type of the error; medication 
documentation errors; dispensing errors; administration errors, and storage errors. However, 
for storage errors confidence intervals resulted in poor values. Figure 10 shows the types of 
the reported medication errors. 
The degree of conformity between the study researcher (RJ) and the original classifiers 
did not reach the agreed acceptable level for the majority of the variables on medication 
errors (Table 17). The researchers were also able to identify more circumstances and 
contributing factors in the medication error narratives than the original data classifiers had 
classified. A more comprehensive description of the results is provided in the manuscript 
III submitted for publication. 
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Figure 10.   The reported medication errors as percentages in the data set (n=32 592) 
from the different healthcare organisations (n=36) using the Reporting System for 
Safety Incidents in Health Care Organizations, HaiPro, between 2007-2009 in Finland. 
9.4 Development of a 3-day short course for healthcare professionals in 
medication safety (IV) 
Nineteen higher education and adult learning experts from Africa (n=2), Europe (n=16) and 
North America (n=1) participated in the workshop. All the developed syllabi (n=4) for a 
three-day interdisciplinary course in medication safety applied a constructive, problem-
based learning approach.  
The teaching and assessment methods ranged from the pre-course to post-course period 
(Figures 11 & 12; Table 18) and involved sharing the learning of the course participants 
with their colleagues at the workplace in addition to peer support of the course participants 
(Figure 12). The syllabi comprised methods for developing personal learning objectives and 
reflection (Figure 11), methods for facilitating interactive learning (Table 18) and learning 
at the workplace (Figure 12). While the management of medication safety from the systems 
approach represented the core content of the course in the syllabi, the workshop participants 
also identified other aspects in medication safety to be covered (Table18). 
9.4.1 Personal learning objectives and reflection 
The workshop participants suggested that the course should begin with self-reflection on 
the learner’s personal learning needs (Figure 11) in order to identify the learner’s pre-course 
skills in medication safety and to set goals for competency following the course. The self-
reflection would then be followed by development of personal learning objectives to guide 
and assess learning during and after the course. 
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Figure 11.    Outline of the learning process for a three-day interdisciplinary course in 
medication safety and the role of self-reflection in developing personal learning 
objectives and re-focusing them throughout the course, including the pre- and post-
course phases. 
9.4.2 Methods for facilitating interactive learning in medication safety 
All the four groups based the three training days on interactive learning and proposed a 
variety of methods (Table 18). The goal was to assist the learners in creating a knowledge 
base on medication safety and to support their reflective learning at the workplace between 
the training days and after the course. Also some self-directed learning methods, such as 
reading, were suggested to support forming the knowledge base on medication safety. 
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Table 18.   A summary of the methods for facilitating interactive learning during the 
three training days of an interdisciplinary course in medication safety, including 
proposed stages of the course when to apply the methods and the purpose of their use. 
Method Stage of the course when applied Purpose for using the method 
Pre-reading  
Before the first training day;  
discussion on the contents of the 
reading material on the first training 
day. 
To demonstrate, and familiarize the 
learners with the topic, and 
to share and deepen the learning 
experiences with the peer learners. 
Audio-visual 
recordings 
Before the first training day; 
discussion on the contents of the 
videos on the first training day  
(suggested contents for the videos: 
management of medication errors 
and aviation accidents). 
To demonstrate, and familiarize the 
learners with the topic; 
to demonstrate how high risk industries 
have used a systems approach to 
successfully learn from errors, and 
to share and deepen the learning 
experiences with the peer learners. 
Case studies 
As orientation pre-course 
assignments before the first training 
day (Figure 12); 
the analysis of the incidents with the 
peers on the first training day. 
To identify a medication error or a near 
miss occurring at the learner’s own 
workplace, and 
to practice analysis of medication-related 
incidents. 
On the second training day (short 
case studies). 
To assess and reflect learning. 
Between the training days at the 
learners’ workplaces and in a web-
based learning environment (Figure 
12). 
To guide learning between the training 
days. 
Real life 
examples 
On the first training day  
(e.g., inviting a healthcare 
professional who has made an error 
to share his/her experiences, or 
other examples of unfortunate 
incidents, their root causes and 
management). 
To demonstrate the needs for and 
importance of medication safety promotion 
in healthcare organisations;  
to motivate the learners and stimulate their 
interest towards the topic; 
to demonstrate the role of human error in 
medication incidents, and 
to assist the learners in gaining an 
understanding of the differences between 
the person and systems approaches to 
managing medication safety. 
Networking of 
the learners 
(facilitated or 
self-directed) 
On the first training day. 
For learners to get to know each other; 
to promote interaction between 
professions, and  
to create good group dynamics and a 
positive atmosphere for learning. 
On the last training day 
To foster collaboration and experience 
sharing after the course. 
Experience 
sharing 
At multiple stages of the course.  
To share the learners’ work based 
experiences and knowledge on medication 
safety and the existing good practices for 
promoting medication safety. 
Group 
discussions 
At multiple stages of the course in 
varying group size and discussion 
platform (e.g., face-to-face training 
days, or a web-based learning 
E.g., to create deeper understanding of 
complex issues, such as how to make 
medication processes safer in healthcare 
organizations. 
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environment between the training 
days and post-course). 
Role plays 
On the first and second training days 
(suggested scenarios: a healthcare 
professional and a patient or a 
healthcare team). 
To foster development of essential skills in 
medication safety, and 
to assess, and provide feedback on, the 
learners’ team performance and 
interaction. 
Interactive 
presentations 
By the learners on the second and 
third training days  
(e.g., based on self-directed reading 
material supporting the learners 
learning process and reflection of the 
material with colleagues at the 
workplace between the training 
days). 
To assess and reflect learning, and 
to give feedback for the learners about 
their own learning. 
9.4.3 Learning at the workplace 
The workshop participants proposed course assignments integrated in the learners’ daily 
work. This was suggested to create competence in applying knowledge in practice (Figure 
12).  Involvement of the learner’s colleagues in working on the assignments was suggested 
for knowledge sharing at the workplace.  
Three different workplace-based learning processes were suggested by the workshop 
participants (Figure 12). Web-based tools (e.g., Moodle) were proposed for learners’ 
communication between the training days and maintaining the created networks after the 
course. One group suggested that the learners attended the three training days one month 
apart, allowing time for processing the learning experiences and working on the assignments 
at the workplace. 
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Figure 12.   Integration of learning at the workplace in a 3-day interdisciplinary course 
in medication safety. The activities cover the pre- and post-course phases, and learning 
between the training days. 
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9.4.4 Core contents of the course  
The workshop participants proposed management of medication safety using the systems 
approach as the key content of the course. They prioritised it from the leaflet on the sample 
content of the course (Appendix 5) and prioritised it in their syllabi. A more detailed 
description of the key contents of the course is provided in the original publication IV. 
9.4.5 The combined syllabus 
The combined syllabus of a three-day interdisciplinary course in medication safety 
(Appendix 6) resulted in a combination of methods facilitating interactive learning and 
workplace-based learning with personal learning objectives and reflection to assess and 
guide learning. The combined syllabus provides options for pedagogic methods to be 
applied, e.g. depending on the resources allocated for the course and the learners’ learning 
needs. 
9.5 Key findings of the study 
Summary of the key findings are presented in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.   Summary of the key findings of the study. MER = medication error 
reporting 
National and Local MER Systems and Their Establishment (I, II) 
 There is a need for international networking of medication safety experts. 
 The MER systems were most commonly confidential and provided 
feedback to those involved in reporting. 
 Good and effective MER systems: 
o provide an opportunity to learn from errors; 
o have a non-punitive approach to reporting, and 
o are easy to use. 
 Main barriers to reporting were blame culture, and a lack of time, training 
and coordination of reporting. 
 Several factors in the operational environment of MER systems impact 
their successful establishment, and need to be addressed.  
Inter-rater Reliability of Medication Error Classification in HaiPro (III) 
 The nature and type of medication errors, and the sub-types of medication 
documentation, dispensing and administration errors could be described 
at the level of all organisations using HaiPro in Finland. 
 A key target for improvement in HaiPro is obtaining comprehensive 
medication error narratives with enough information on contributing 
factors to errors. 
 Dispensing-, administration-, and documentation errors were the most 
commonly reported medication errors in 2007-2009. 
A 3-day Course for Healthcare Professionals in Medication Safety (IV) 
 Constructive problem-based learning linked to learners' practice is a key 
approach to learning on the course. 
 Learning is guided by a process of identifying own learning needs, 
creation of learning objectives, constant self-reflection of learning, and 
re-focusing of learning objectives throughout the course. 
 Learning should be based on interactive teaching and assessment 
methods instead of conventional lectures. 
 Large amount of learning occurs outside the training days through 
assignments at the learners’ workplaces. 
 Management of medication safety from the systems approach may 
represent a key content of the course. 
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10 Discussion 
This study focused on exploring national and local MER systems in different countries and 
the factors which make them work for learning from medication errors in healthcare. The 
study also explored how education on medication safety could be organised for practicing 
healthcare professionals. The work consisted of two parts: a literature review and the 
empirical part. In this chapter 1) the key findings from the original publications (I-IV) are 
summarised and compared with the previous literature; and 2) the methodological aspects 
of the research are discussed.   
Although MER systems have been widely studied in different healthcare settings 
internationally, several targets for improvement, such as need to improve the quality of 
medication error reports, still exist in relation to the functionality of MER systems (please 
see Chapters 4 and 5). The current study adds to the existing knowledge by outlining the 
factors that enable successful development, implementation and use of MER systems as 
medication safety risk management tools in healthcare. To our knowledge no previous 
research has studied these factors in such extent in such many countries with different stage 
of development. The current study also sought for a perspective to the wider operational 
environments of MER systems and how these operational environments (incl. e.g., state 
regulatory systems) support functionality of MER systems. Hence, the study differs from 
the existing literature which has primarily focused on describing the functionality of 
individual MER systems in their own organisations (e.g., Haw & Cahill 2011; Elliott et al. 
2014). 
This study also provides information on the inter-rater reliability of medication error 
classifications in a Finnish Reporting System for Safety Incidents in Health Care 
Organizations, HaiPro, during its pilot phase in 2007-2009. The quality of the reported data 
in a MER systems is a timely issue both in Finland and internationally as many countries 
are developing and implementing new systems, or improving their existing systems. 
Effective learning from medication errors requires reliable reporting (Williams & Ashcroft 
2009). The reported information on medication errors should inform medication safety 
development activities in healthcare organisations (European Commission 2014). 
Therefore, the accuracy and completeness of the reported information needs to be ensured 
in MER systems (Armitage et al. 2010). In this part of the study, medication errors and their 
contributing factors reported to the HaiPro were explored. These findings provide an 
overview of medication errors reported in Finland in comparison to findings from other 
international studies (e.g., James et al. 2009; Cousins et al. 2012).    
Creating competence in medication safety among healthcare professionals is a current 
issue for healthcare systems internationally (World Health Organization 2011). The present 
study introduces one solution for how medication safety education could be provided for 
practicing HCPs in a format that is easy for a learner to adopt. As not many studies exist on 
continuing education of HCPs in medication safety, the current work provides a practical 
tool for introducing the basic principles of medication safety as a three-day continuing 
education course for HCPs. The key findings of the thesis will be discussed in the following 
sections.  
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10.1 National and local medication error reporting systems in different 
countries (I) 
The current study was based on the international recommendations for developing MER 
systems and sharing experiences with existing systems (Kohn et al. 2000; World Health 
Organization 2005; Council of Europe 2006a; European Commission 2014). In our study, 
16 medication safety experts in different countries provided information on their local and 
national MER systems. Our findings support the previous literature suggesting the fear of 
consequences to be a major barrier to reporting medication errors (e.g., Evans 2006; Hartnell 
et al. 2012). Our findings also indicate that the blame culture is resilient despite efforts to 
change it, and would need to be targeted by more effective actions.  
The study suggests interesting differences between national and local MER systems.  
National systems seem to require a national focal point: an organisation that will provide 
and maintain the MER system. Indeed, the WHO has emphasized the supporting role of 
national agencies in effective error reporting by healthcare organisations (World Health 
Organization 2005). National MER systems also appeared likely to be integrated in patient 
safety reporting systems and allowed all healthcare professionals to report. On the contrary, 
local systems seemed to have focused more on learning from errors and providing feedback 
to those involved in reporting than the national systems. Indeed, the differing characteristics 
of national and local schemes are central in terms of their utility and promoting learning 
from errors (Zwart et al. 2011). While the local systems may facilitate faster implementation 
of safety improvements and more effective feedback (Benn et al. 2009; Armitage et al. 
2010), the central schemes, by collating reports from many settings, seem better at 
addressing generic and recurring safety issues (Zwart et al. 2011). 
Access to medication safety experts knowledgeable about the MER systems in their 
representative countries proved challenging despite using the wide FIP network, contacts in 
the Council of Europe and the Nordic Patient Safety Research Network in search of such 
experts. These difficulties may arise from a lack of medication safety experts’ “visibility” 
among the contacted organisations and a possible lack of national and international 
coordination of patient and medication safety affairs as is recommended (Council of Europe 
2006a). If this is the case, then there is a need for more effective national and international 
networking of medication safety experts. This would be especially crucial for those 
countries which do not necessarily have much experience in promoting medication safety, 
such as many developing countries.  Such a network is essential for facilitating effective 
sharing of experiences on safe medication practices. For similar future studies it is 
recommended to use also other sources of medication safety experts, such as the 
International Medication Safety Network (IMSN) (International Medication Safety 
Network 2016). 
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10.2 Factors associated with successful development and implementation 
of medication error reporting systems (II) 
This study outlines the factors associated with successful development and implementation 
of MER systems. The study suggests that the lack of focus in operational environments may 
explain why many current MER systems are dysfunctional (Mahajan 2010). In many of the 
countries of the experts’ who participated in the study, the environment did not support 
MER systems or appeared “not ready” for their development and implementation. This was 
the case even in countries where a MER system already existed. This represents a key 
finding as even the most technically sophisticated systems will not work if the context does 
not support their use. The greatest gaps between the current situation and the needs for 
improvement were in the legislation and leadership structures related to MER.  
10.2.1 The culture of the operational environment is the corner stone 
Our findings strengthen the position of safety culture as the key for a functional reporting 
system and are in line with the findings of previous studies (Kohn et al. 2000; Snijders et al. 
2009; Halligan & Zecevic 2011). According to our study, implementing safety culture 
should not be limited to the organisations involved in reporting but should extend to other 
parts of the operational environment, such as medical liability systems or federal regulations 
guiding reporting practices. In the experts’ countries, there also appeared to be a perceived 
lack of a systems approach as a theoretical foundation in organisational and national 
medication error prevention strategies and activities. To support safety culture and MER, 
the strategies and activities should express the systems approach as recommended for 
reporting organisations (World Health Organization 2005; Council of Europe 2006a; 
Weiner et al. 2008; Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2009). Moreover, the systems 
approach should become the theoretical foundation on which the structures of the 
operational environment are built, employing the same principles for the reporting system 
and its context.  
10.2.2 Raising awareness of deficiencies in medication safety 
The experts called for action to draw attention to the need for safety improvements at local 
and national levels when developing MER systems. Although deficiencies in medication 
safety are well recognised by international academic research (Pham et al. 2012), the gap 
between what has been scientifically shown and its implementation in practice still remains 
a challenge. Indeed, the experts’ emphasis on the need to raise awareness of deficiencies in 
medication safety related to the identified low overall perception of medication safety by 
healthcare professionals, policy makers and the public (Fajardo-Dolci et al. 2010). 
Awareness creation may require targeted actions, such as the national and local surveys 
suggested by the experts, on the current state of medication safety to provide information 
on how best to develop a MER system. Carefully planned public information campaigns 
(Limb 2012) aimed at patients and healthcare professionals may represent an additional 
strategy. Public campaigns may also provide the means to attract the attention of 
stakeholders in the government, policy makers, professional organisation leaders and 
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regulatory bodies. For instance, in Finland, such a national programme operated in 2011-
2014 to support healthcare organisations in the promotion of patient and medication safety 
(Airaksinen et al. 2012).  
10.2.3 Need for political will to introduce medication error reporting systems 
The study indicates a need for stronger political will in the form of, e.g., policies or 
legislation on introducing viable MER systems. Despite the extensive evidence of the 
incidence of medication errors and the need for functional reporting schemes, incident 
reporting still needs to be addressed with more explicit plans of action in national health 
policies (Noble et al. 2011). Indeed, national and local medication safety strategies should 
support the establishment of MER systems (World Health Organization 2005). This might 
enable the creation of more politically recognised MER systems to advance health policy 
concerning medication safety and raise national or local commitment to safety 
improvements.  
10.2.4 National coordination and leadership on medication error reporting 
The need for an authority or organisation to coordinate reporting and provide a link between 
the actors in the operational environment appeared to be a prerequisite for the successful 
implementation of a MER system. This may be even more crucial for national systems as 
discussed before (please see 10.1.). While some sophisticated national coordination and 
leadership structures existed in some countries, in other countries such structures were 
lacking or poorly organised.  
Healthcare quality organisations seemed to exist in many countries; however, their 
support and contribution to incident reporting was not what the experts called for. These 
experiences indicate a strong need to establish the current structures of these organisations, 
their areas of responsibility and their capacity to coordinate reporting.  
10.2.5 Legislation as a driving force of non-punitive reporting 
According to our findings, dysfunctional medical liability systems, also criticised previously 
(Kohn et al. 2000; Cohen 2007), continue to represent a challenge for the operational 
environments of MER systems. Overall, legislation did not seem to support the feasible use 
of MER systems in the experts’ countries. Many experts reported that medication errors are 
considered criminal acts followed by disciplinary or legal action depending on the 
seriousness of the incident. To enable the implementation of MER systems and their use, a 
reform of legislation in all these regards remains a target for improving the operational 
environments. 
 94 
10.2.6 Need for adequate resources to introduce medication error reporting 
systems 
Many experts in countries without a MER system claimed that a lack of adequate resources 
prevented the development and implementation of a system. The requirements for 
establishing MER systems are documented by the WHO (2005). If resources are scarce, 
alternative methods for identifying problem areas in medication safety may need to be 
considered. The suggested small-scale local pilot systems may be a cost-effective way to 
explore the resources and to strengthen local safety culture. It should be noted that 
implementing a reporting system without adequate resources for analysis of and feedback 
on reported data will not support learning (Benn et al. 2009; European Commission 2014). 
10.2.7 Learning as the objective of the operational environment 
In the present study, learning from the reported medication errors was seen as the foundation 
of MER systems. However, the translation of lessons into action was perceived not only as 
the objective of a reporting system but the objective of the entire operational environment 
involving those drawing up policy and practice guidelines. The need for a comprehensive 
feedback system was strongly expressed, and has also been described in previous research 
and recommendations (Lawton & Parker 2002; World Health Organization 2005; Council 
of Europe 2006a; Benn et al. 2009; Kiekkas 2011; European Commission 2014). 
Healthcare professionals’ lack of competence in medication safety and reporting was 
often reported by the experts. Indeed, only few errors are reported by the current MER 
systems, perhaps due to differing views about medication errors, risks and reporting by 
different professionals and professional groups (Dixon-Woods 2010). Healthcare staff may 
not be fully aware of what should be reported and how (Hartnell et al. 2012). Some experts 
also felt that a lack of motivation hindered reporting, and education in medication safety has 
an essential role in tackling the described cultural and motivational challenges. Thus, 
interdisciplinary education may represent an important intervention in creating good 
practices in medication safety and reporting (World Health Organization 2011). 
10.3 Inter-rater reliability of medication error classification in HaiPro (III) 
HaiPro is a unique reporting system and a comprehensive tool for healthcare organisations 
to improve their patient safety and medication processes (Keistinen & Kinnunen 2008; 
Ruuhilehto et al. 2011). This study indicates that information on the nature and type of 
medication errors, and the sub-types of medication documentation, dispensing and 
administration could be pooled from different healthcare units for their exploration at the 
level of all healthcare organisations using HaiPro.  
Many variables, e.g., outcomes of medication errors to a patient and hospital 
organisation, had low inter-rater reliability between the researcher and the original data 
classifier. The study indicates the need to improve the quality and conformity of medication 
error reports and their classification. The need for improving the quality of medication error 
reports has also been confirmed by other studies (Tuttle 2004; Braithwaite et al. 2008; 
Williams & Ashcroft 2009; Armitage et al. 2010; Daniels et al. 2010; Haw & Cahill 2011). 
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It was found out in this study that especially reporting and classification of error 
circumstances and contributing factors need to be improved to provide more detailed 
system-based information for medication safety promotion activities in the reporting 
healthcare organisations. In this task, obtaining comprehensive narratives on reported 
medication errors is key; many narratives in the current data did not have enough 
information to enable complete classification of the error or to identify contributing factors.  
These findings call for educational actions to ensure that all healthcare personnel 
understand why reporting of errors is necessary and what information needs to be reported 
to identify unsafe medication processes and to plan safety improvements. Similar findings 
have been reported for other incident reporting systems with a large number of reporting 
fields left empty, resulting in the loss of necessary information (Doupi 2009; Armitage et 
al. 2010).  
According to this study, the data classifiers could benefit from additional guidance or 
training especially concerning the classification of medication error circumstances and 
contributing factors. Classification of these variables did not reach an acceptable level of 
conformity between the researcher and the original data classifiers. The researchers were 
also able to identify and classify more circumstances and contributing factors from the same 
narratives than the original data classifiers. This may reflect the researchers’ more 
comprehensive understanding about systems approach as a theoretical framework for error 
prevention and, therefore, enable them to explore the contributing factors in the medication 
error narratives in more detail. Furthermore, understanding the systems approach enables 
the identification of the possible contributing factors in the healthcare organisation as a 
system instead of solely focusing on individual personnel members, e.g., their lack of 
competence (Waterson 2009). Consequently, it must be ensured that the reporting personnel 
and the data classifiers have sufficient understanding of the systems approach, in order to 
provide the needed information for healthcare organisations to plan system based actions 
for medication error prevention. These findings may also contribute to underuse of the 
HaiPro system and possibly similar systems in other countries in detecting circumstances 
and contributing factors to incidents (Cousins et al. 2012). 
The achieved conformity of classifications between the two study researchers indicates 
that it is possible to classify the medication errors in a uniform way by developing and using 
a detailed standard guideline for classifications and by basing the classification on systems 
approach (Reason 1990; Reason 2000).  
10.4 Medication errors in the data of HaiPro (III) 
Our findings support the need for improving the dispensing, administration and medication 
documentation stages of the medication process in hospitals (James et al. 2009; Cousins et 
al. 2012). In approximately a quarter of the reported errors the medication was “not 
documented”, “not dispensed” or “not administered” to a patient. These all represent an 
error of omission, increasing the risk of the patient being left without the prescribed 
medication (Cohen 2007). Consequently, our findings show the need to decrease this type 
of risk which has been identified as the most common medication process-related risk in 
healthcare organisations (Lisby et al. 2005). These notions, however, represent only an 
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illustrative touching on some of the key findings from the reported medication errors to 
HaiPro in years 2007-2009. 
10.5 Development of a 3-day short course for healthcare professionals in 
medication safety (IV) 
The goal of the current work was to develop a syllabus for a compact three-day 
interdisciplinary course in medication safety for HCPs. Regardless of the short duration of 
the planned course, all the expert groups based their syllabi on non-didactic teaching and 
assessment methods. No conventional lectures were included in any of the syllabi. Instead, 
the chosen methods activated the learners to acquire core skills in ensuring medication 
safety through constructive, problem-based learning. With this learner-centred approach, 
better learning outcomes and changes in professional practice are more likely to occur if 
compared to three days of lectures alone (Cantillon & Jones 1999; Davis et al. 1999). This 
represents a key finding as the majority of the current methods in continuing education of 
HCPs, are based  on lectures and traditional behaviouristic, instructor-centred approaches 
(Leach & Fletcher 2008). 
The reflective assignments before, during and after the course expand the course far 
beyond what could be reached by three days of contact learning alone. This is a key finding 
as a multiplicity of learning takes place outside the training days, providing the course with 
more content. From the practitioner’s perspective as a learner this gives an opportunity to 
deepen the learning without attending too many contact learning sessions. Continuing 
education of HCPs has also been criticized for not being sufficiently  based on learner’s 
needs (Davis et al. 1995; Davis et al. 1999; Mazmanian et al. 2002; Murad & Varkey 2008). 
In this study, founding the learning process on learner’s personal learning needs was the 
basis for the learning. This has been suggested to increase motivation and course satisfaction 
of participating HCPs (Grant 2002).  
Learning in continuing education should be relevant to the daily practice of HCPs (Leach 
& Fletcher 2008). In the present syllabi, learning was very practice focused and hands-on. 
The course work to be conducted at the learner’s workplace was the key for bringing into 
practice the learner’s knowledge and experiences acquired during the training days. 
Moreover, involving the learner’s colleagues in the course work provides possibilities for 
the whole unit or organisation to participate in learning. Especially the support by 
management is vital in creating and sustaining practice changes (Dennison 2007). The 
support by work community and management may represent the key enabling factors for a 
successful course in terms of actual changes in the medication safety practices at the 
workplaces of the learners, and therefore, should be carefully considered when developing 
such a course.  
The management of medication safety through a systems approach was found to be the 
most important content of the course. Indeed, adopting systems based thinking is essential 
to being able to analyse medication errors and create system safeguards (Aboumatar et al. 
2012): the central role of systems approach in medication safety promotion has not changed 
during the past years and needs to be educated for practicing HCPs (World Health 
Organization 2011). More information on the application of the findings are presented in 
the original publication III. 
 97 
10.6 Methodological considerations 
10.6.1 Exploring national and local MER systems in different countries and 
establishment of MER systems (I, II) 
The low number of participating countries limits the generalizability of the findings (Smith 
2002). The response rate may have been influenced by the small number of countries which 
actually have a MER system. This may also explain why the developed countries were 
dominating the sample. Nevertheless, many of those who did respond provided detailed 
information on MER systems. Conversely, pioneering countries in MER systems, such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom, were missing from the data. Given these features 
of the realised sample, the current study’s findings were consistent with what is reported in 
the published literature on MER systems in the United Kingdom and the United States 
(Kohn et al. 2000; Doupi 2009; Noble et al. 2011). This consistency suggests that the 
experiences and lessons learnt from MER may be transferable to other countries.  
In relation to exploring the factors associated with successful development and 
implementation of MER systems (the original publication II), a qualitative content analysis 
was applied to explore the expert narratives obtained from open-ended questions. The 
chosen research method placed some restrictions on interpreting the data as probing 
questions could not be presented to explore further aspects raised by the experts (Hsieh & 
Shannon 2005). However, the experts were able to provide detailed narrative information 
on the research questions. Similar issues were presented by experts from different countries, 
indicating that the issues related to MER systems may be universal to some extent. Thus, 
the findings presented by the study can be valuable at the international level. However, there 
may be other factors affecting development and implementation of MER systems which our 
study did not explore.  
The studies I and II were conducted some years ago, representing a potential limitation. 
However, we described problems in wide societal structures supporting healthcare quality 
and safety and provided solutions to these challenges: improvements in these structures tend 
to progress slowly. Therefore, we consider the information presented still valuable for 
healthcare planners, regulators and providers in high and low income countries planning to 
develop and implement a MER system, or willing to improve their current systems. 
10.6.2  Assessing the inter-rater reliability of medication error classification 
in HaiPro (III) 
In this study, the inter-rater reliability of medication error classification was assessed by re-
classifying a random sample of medication errors from the data set on medication errors 
reported to the HaiPro system. The random sample of incidents included only a few less 
reported medication error types (e.g., errors in prescribing and preparing medications for 
administration), so influencing on the validity of the reliability testing. Hence, it was not 
possible to calculate the kappa-value for these error types. Additional research is needed to 
draw final conclusions about the quality of medication error classifications in HaiPro.  
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The data set was not drawn from all healthcare organisations in Finland; only a part of 
healthcare organisations participated in the HaiPro pilot programme in 2006-2009 with the 
majority of them being special healthcare units. However, our study provides preliminary 
results of the reliability of the medication error classifications in the HaiPro and 
recommendations for designing and improving similar systems in other countries. 
The methods employed in this study proved to be rather time-consuming. Plenty of 
standardisation was required between the researchers to gain the required level of 
conformity when classifying the medication errors. Thus, trained data classifiers familiar 
with the operational environments of the reporting hospital units are recommended to be 
used in future studies instead of researchers who may tend to be “neutral” or “academic” in 
relation to the actual everyday practice in healthcare where the errors occur, and are 
classified. 
10.6.3 Development of a 3-day short course for healthcare professionals in 
medication safety (IV) 
The workshop used for data collection of the study was relatively short. Despite this 
potential limitation, the workshop participants were able to suggest a large amount of 
varying teaching and assessment methods in the given time. According to these experiences, 
the applied brainstorming approach can be used when new innovative ways of learning are 
developed.  
The workshop participants represented international expertise in higher education and 
adult learning in pharmacy; although they were not specially experts in medication safety. 
However, the methods suggested by the participants were identified as suitable for education 
in medication safety. This and the similarities between the developed syllabi indicate that 
the findings could be adopted by different educational institutions in different countries.  
The syllabus has not yet been piloted and evaluated for its impact on improving 
medication safety, and therefore, represents a vision for such a course. The implementation 
of the course will be the next step. However, the syllabus contains a variety of tried-and-
tested active learning methodologies that have the potential to drive a successful continuing 
education course; e.g., the current evidence suggests that interactive learning in continuing 
education can change professional practice and achieve large and sustainable improvements 
in knowledge and skills (Davis et al. 1999; Sanci et al. 2000; Dennison 2007). Our findings 
are also consistent with the literature suggesting experiential learning as the most effective 
method to teach and assess competence in patient and medication safety (World Health 
Organization 2011; Varkey et al. 2009). While not many studies exist on continuing 
education of HCPs in medication safety, the existing evidence with undergraduates indicate 
that it is possible to influence safety knowledge, skills and systems thinking by short courses 
in patient safety (Halbach & Sullivan 2005; Madigosky et al. 2006; Moskowitz et al. 2007; 
Patey et al. 2007; Thompson et al. 2008; Aboumatar et al. 2012). Therefore, it is reasonable 
to assume that the presented syllabus has potential to produce positive learning outcomes 
and to reduce the risk for patient harm caused by medication errors. There may also be need 
to developing additional details about the content of the course, such as the role of 
information technology and clinical decision support systems in medication safety (Radley 
et al. 2013; Marasinghe 2015). 
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Since the syllabus has not yet been tested, the course organizers should be aware of the 
potential barriers to successful implementation of the course. Despite their pedagogical 
strengths, the relatively time-consuming out-of-class activities may limit feasibility of 
participation for practitioners. Additionally, guaranteeing interdisciplinary participation 
should be addressed with special plans on how to recruit course participants from different 
healthcare professions. 
10.7 Further research 
Further research will be needed to confirm whether local MER systems better serve as 
learning tools for the reporting organisation, than do the more massive national systems. For 
the development of future policies, it is important to have evidence on which of these MER 
approaches is more cost-effective, especially considering the resources of the developing 
countries. So far, the international trend has been directed towards national reporting 
systems (Kohn et al. 2000; Council of Europe 2006a; European Commission 2014). 
However, both schemes have their strengths  (Zwart et al. 2011). Combining the advantages 
of both schemes should be examined. Having a safety culture embedded in healthcare 
systems is a prerequisite for using an MER systems for learning purposes in host 
organisations as well as in national levels. Systematic efforts are still needed for the 
implementation of a safety culture in practice. It would be useful also to conduct a follow-
up study to evaluate progress in these aspects in different countries. 
For the purpose of developing and implementing MER systems, as well as for improving 
the existing systems, a follow-up study would be needed to explore the current stage of 
development, and trends and experiences in the use of these systems in different countries. 
Especially studies exploring how information produced by MER systems has been used for 
improving medication processes from the systems approach would be imperative. More 
information is also needed on other possible factors affecting successful development and 
implementation of MER systems which our study did not explore. When designing these 
studies, special consideration should be placed on the proper sources for information and 
how to best reach these sources. These sources could include e.g., the previously mentioned 
International Medication Safety Network (International Medication Safety Network 2016). 
Based on the experiences from this study, qualitative data would be recommended to 
supplement quantitative research to ensure the depth of the acquired information.   
Learning from medication errors requires reliable reporting (Williams & Ashcroft 2009). 
Therefore, it is recommended to conduct similar evaluations, as described in our study 
(manuscript for original publication III), on other patient and medication safety incident 
reporting systems as a part of quality assurance of the produced data. Data reliability testing 
is crucial, especially for systems collecting reports from different healthcare organisations, 
to avoid biases in data interpretation and misleading findings informing patient safety 
improvement actions. Data reliability testing and standard guidelines for incident 
classification might also benefit the local reporting in healthcare organisations, especially 
when multiple data classifiers exist. For future studies, some additional methods, such as 
consensus panels for those classifying the incidents (Van Doormaal et al. 2008), is 
recommended to be included to complete the reliability testing. Observational studies may 
also be needed to determine the actual occurrence of medication errors and near misses, and 
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their contributing factors (Flynn et al. 2002; Montesi & Lechi 2009). As the free text 
narratives of error reports are highly informative in regards, e.g., contributing factors to 
errors, further research is also needed to determine whether filing incomplete reports is 
primarily a competence issue of reporting healthcare professionals or the result of a lack of 
time or motivation for reporting.  
As this study focused on developing a three-day short course for healthcare professionals 
in medication safety, the syllabus of the course has not yet been evaluated for its impact on 
improving medication safety. This represents a target for future research. The existing 
literature on patient safety education provides examples for such evaluation methods 
(Thompson et al. 2008; Aboumatar et al. 2012). 
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11 Conclusions 
In order to provide a functional tool for medication safety promotion, MER systems need to 
be improved in many countries together with their operational environments. Moreover, the 
operational environments of MER systems must support functionality of these systems. The 
key factor for successful MER systems and learning from medication errors is having a 
systems approach as a theoretical context in all reporting and learning processes throughout 
the operational environments of MER systems. 
Regardless of the differing quality and capacity of the healthcare systems of countries, 
as well as their stage of development, the obstacles and enabling factors for successful 
establishment and functioning of MER systems seem to be quite similar. This supports the 
transferability of the experiences between countries and healthcare settings in establishment 
of functional MER systems. The following more detailed conclusions can be drawn based 
on this study:  
 
 There is a need for promoting international networking of medication safety experts 
and bodies for sharing information and learning from others to develop, implement 
and improve MER systems in different countries. 
 Blame culture, a lack of time, training and coordination of reporting continue to be 
the major barriers to reporting. Learning from errors and having a non-punitive 
approach to reporting represent the most critical features of a functional MER 
system. 
 Several factors at the national and local levels impact on the functionality of MER 
systems and should be considered in relation to their development and 
implementation. A lack of resources may inhibit establishing MER systems in some 
countries, representing a target for international collaboration. The safety culture 
should be extended to all parts of the operational environment to facilitate openness 
on, and learning from, medication errors. 
 Consistency of classification and the quality of narratives are central areas of 
improvement for the Finnish Reporting System for Safety Incidents in Health Care 
Organizations, HaiPro, as well as reporting and classification of contributing factors 
to provide high quality information on medication errors. Improving the quality of 
MER reports represents also a key target for improvement for many MER systems 
in other countries.  
 At least the nature of a medication error; the type of the error; medication 
documentation errors; dispensing errors, and administration errors can be pooled 
from different healthcare units for exploration of medication errors at the level of all 
organisations using HaiPro in Finland. Additional research is needed to draw final 
conclusions about the quality of medication error data produced by HaiPro. 
Moreover, reporting of contributing factors to medication errors and the quality of 
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narratives in medication error reports are central, and need to be improved in HaiPro 
for better medication safety promotion.  
 The current work suggests that constructive problem-based learning linked to 
learners’ practice through assignments is key when developing a continuing 
education course on medication safety for healthcare professionals. A large amount 
of learning occurs outside the training days through assignments at the learners’ 
workplaces. However, commitment of the learners and their work communities to 
the course are needed to create and sustain improvements in medication safety as a 
potential outcome of the course. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Literature search strategy for using international search databases.  
 
Ovid MEDLINE in Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations (October 09, 2015)  
EMB Reviews – Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2005 to August 2015 
EMB Reviews – Cochrane Methodology Register 3rd Quarter 2012 
EMB Reviews – Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects 2nd Quarter 2015 
EMB Reviews – Health Technology assessment 3rd Quarter 2015 
 
1. exp Medication Errors or (medication* adj3 error*).mp. 
2. (medicines adj3 error*).mp. 
3. (medication* adj3 mishap*).mp. 
4. (medication* adj3 incident*).mp. 
5. (adverse drug adj3 event*).mp. 
6. (medication* adj3 mistake*).mp. 
7. (drug* adj3 error*).mp. 
8. (medication* adj3 event*).mp. 
9. (medication safety adj3 event*).mp. 
10. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 
11. (reporting adj3 system*).mp. 
12. database*.mp. 
13. (reporting adj3 program*).mp. 
14. (reporting adj3 scheme*).mp. 
15. 11 or 12 or 13 or 14  
16. 10 and 15 
18. limit 16 to English language 
 
 
SCOPUS  
 
 ( ( (TITLE-ABS-KEY ( medication*  W/3  error* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( medicines  
W/3  error* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( medication*  W/3  mishap* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-
ABS-KEY ( medication*  W/3  incident* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "adverse drug"  W/3  
event* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( medication*  W/3  mistake* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-
KEY ( drug*  W/3  error* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( medication*  W/3  event* ) ) )  OR  
( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "medication safety"  W/3  event* ) ) )  AND  ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( 
reporting  W/3  system* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( database* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-
KEY ( reporting  W/3  program* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( reporting  W/3  scheme* ) ) 
)  AND  ( LIMIT-TO ( LANGUAGE ,  "English" ) ) 
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CINAHL 
International Pharmaceutical Abstracts (IPA) 
 
(((MH Medication Errors)) OR (medication* N3 error*) OR (medicines N3 error*) OR 
(medication* N3 mishap*) OR (medication* N3 incident*) OR (adverse drug N3 event*) 
OR (medication* N3 mistake*) OR (drug* N3 error*) OR (medication* N3 event*) OR 
(medication safety N3 event*)) AND ((reporting N3 system*) OR database* OR (reporting 
N3 program*) OR (reporting N3 scheme*)) 
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Appendix 2a: Description of the national medication error reporting (MER) systems (n=6) included in the literature review (Chapter 5). 
ME=medication error. 
Reference, reporting system 
& country 
Description of the reporting system 
Cheung et al (2014); Medication 
Incidents Registration (CMR), 
Netherlands.  
 
(description of the CMR is based 
on Cheung et al. 2011). 
 
Information reported into the system:  
Date of the incident and the organisation identification number; patient information (gender and year of birth); open 
description about the medication incident; risk of recurrence; educational potential of the incident for other healthcare 
providers, and perceived need for a national alert. The structured questions with drop down menus concern the type of the 
medication incident, the underlying causes and the harm for the patient.  
Other information on the reporting system: 
A nationwide voluntary CMR was developed in 2006 and is maintained by a national CMR organisation.  
The system consists of a website, a database, a web-based reporting form, an application to import generated error reports to 
other reporting systems (incl. a real-time interface), an application to generate an overview of reported medication incidents 
(incl. trend analyses), and a national warning system for healthcare providers (alerts and newsletters by email, which are also 
available through the website).  
Types of organisations able to report: community pharmacies, hospitals, mental healthcare organisations and primary 
healthcare organisations who all are able to report either directly through the website reporting form, upload internally 
reported medication error reports of the organisation to CMR, or through the organisations’ internal reporting systems which 
have a direct interface to the CMR. 
The data is analysed by the CMR team who then generates the feedback to the system users. CMR users are able to analyse 
their own reports and compare them with all the reported incidents within the sector (e.g., hospital or community pharmacies) 
Cheung et al (2014);  
Canadian Medication Incident 
Reporting and Prevention System 
(CMIRPS), Canada. 
 
(description of the CMIRPS is 
based on Cheng et al. 2011 and 
Information reported into the system:  
Date and time of the incident; open description of the incident; medication process stages involved (e.g., prescribing or 
dispensing); type of the incident (e.g. incorrect medication); discovering healthcare professional and place of occurrence (e.g., 
community pharmacy); severity outcome of the incident; error intervention; involved medication (strength, administration 
number, manufacturer, lot number, a potentially involved confusing drug name, label or packaging); additional picture material 
on the incident; follow-up actions conducted; recommendations for prevention; system improvement strategies implemented; 
patient information; reporter information, and contributing factors. 
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Institute for Safe Medication 
Practices Canada 2015). 
 
 
Other information on the reporting system: 
A voluntary and confidential web-based medication incident reporting system started in 2002. The system is maintained by the 
Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP Canada), Health Canada, Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI) and Canadian 
Institute for Health Information (CHIH).  
Aims of the system are to coordinate the capture, analysis and dissemination of information on medication incidents, and to 
enhance the safety of the medication use system for Canadians. 
Expert review, analysis and trend identification are conducted based on the data. Feedback is provided through 
recommendations for risk mitigation activities which are made available via safety bulletins and alerts to stakeholders, such as 
the reporting healthcare organisations. 
Kennedy et al (2004) and Cheung 
et al (2014); 
ISMP Medication Error Reporting 
Program (MERP), United States. 
See Table 3 
Nordén-Hägg et al (2012);  
Swedish Dispensing Error 
Reporting System, Sweden. 
Information reported into the system:  
Description of the event (free-text field); details of the medicine involved (name, strength, free-text field), gender and age of 
patient (drop-down menus); information on type and cause of error (tick-boxes and drop-down menus), and outcome to the 
patient (free-text field). 
Other information on the reporting system: 
A mandatory, electronic web-based system established in 2002 for reporting dispensing errors in Swedish pharmacies.  
No training provided for the reporting staff as the system is designed to be self-explanatory with written instructions available. 
Phipps et al (2014) and Williams et 
al (2009); 
National Reporting and Learning 
system (NRLS), United Kingdom. 
See Table 3 
Savage et al (2005), Coley et al 
(2006) and Cheung et al (2014); 
national electronic MER system, 
Medmarx, United States. 
See Table 3 
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Appendix 2b: Description of local medication error reporting (MER) systems included in the literature review (Chapter 5). The MER system 
descriptions are based on the information provided in the research papers and for those systems (n=20) for which the information was available. 
ME=medication error. 
Reference, reporting system, 
country & setting 
Description of the reporting system 
Armitage et al (2010);  
Patient safety incident 
reporting system. 
 
United Kingdom (UK), an acute 
hospital, reports submitted to 
the Trust Risk Management 
Department. 
Information reported into the system:  
Incident reporting form consists of three free text boxes: “incident circumstances”, “underlying causes” and “action to prevent 
recurrence”. The reported information is the same for all incidents, including MEs.  
Other information on the reporting system:  
MEs are reported as a part of other patient safety incidents. 
Paper based system (at the time of the study) introduced in 2000. 
Severity of the incident outcome and likelihood of recurrence graded by the Central Risk Management Department. 
Causation of and action taken based on the incident are documented into the reporting system by the unit manager. 
Beckmann et al (1996);  
Intensive care unit (ICU) 
incident reporting system. 
 
Australia, three intensive care 
units (ICUs). 
Information reported into the system:  
An open description of the incident and suggestions for measures to prevent future incidents. Structured part of the form 
comprised information on: patient; patient outcome; staff involved in the incident; when and where the incident occurred; factors 
contributing to the incident (human and system factors), and factors limiting the effect of incident (e.g., re-checking the patient). 
Other information on the reporting system:  
Paper-based reporting system (at the time of the study) for staff members for reporting patient safety incidents, including MEs, in 
ICUs. 
The follow-up of the incident completed by the local coordinator to the incident reporting form. 
The local coordinator reviewed the reports regularly and discussed local patient safety concerns at regular staff review sessions. 
After reviewing the incident and follow-up information was added to the form by the local coordinator, prior to forwarding the 
information to the national coordinator who then analysed the aggregate data by descriptive statistics to show the types and 
frequencies of errors. 
Chua et al (2003); Dispensing 
error reporting system. 
 
UK, Four community 
pharmacies. 
Information reported into the system:  
Date and time of the error; whether the error was an actual error or near miss; type of the error; description of the error; the 
information of the person who made the error, and description of training or organisational changes introduced as a result of the 
error identified.  
Other information on the reporting system:  
A paper-based reporting system used by community pharmacy staff to report dispensing errors, including near misses. 
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Daniels et al (2010); Family 
Reporting System (FRS). 
 
Canada, British Columbia 
Children’s Hospital (an 
academic tertiary care facility). 
Information reported into the system:  
The respondents choose the occurred incident from a category of six incidents: medication problems; miscommunication between 
staff; complication of care; equipment problem; other concerns, and miscommunication between the family and staff. 
After selecting the category, follow up questions are provided as a series of drop-down lists and pop-up boxes with structured and 
open-ended questions about the incident. 
Other information on the reporting system:  
MEs are reported as a part of other patient safety incidents.  
Electronic system integrated into a web-based patient safety learning system (Datix Corporation, London, UK) deployed for 
provider-based reporting in the hospital. 
Design of FRS is based on systems perspective of adverse events and near misses. 
Reporters are able to include identifying information for contact for further information about the incident and for the recruitment 
of a parent liaison committee to represent families during hospital efforts to prevent future adverse events. 
Dollarhide et al (2006); 
Medication Error Reporting 
Tool (MERT), a customized 
software application. 
 
United States (US), four 
university affiliated teaching 
hospitals. 
Information reported into the system:  
Reporter information; event date and time; location; type; severity; stage of the medication process, and contributing factors.  
Other information on the reporting system:  
Used via handheld computers. 
Designed to be consistent with the standard reporting systems used by participating institutions of the study to facilitate 
interpretation and classification of data.  
A forced-choice, menu-driven response format that directed respondents to provide detailed descriptions on MEs was used. 
Time for completing the report recorded and medication formularies specific to each hospital were constructed on the reporting 
tool. 
Collected data transferred each week to a central server database. 
Elliott et al (2014);  
Clinical safety reporting system 
(CSRS). 
 
Canada, Eastern Health (a large 
healthcare organisation in 
Newfoundland and Labrador). 
Information reported into the system:  
The name of the patient; patient record number; diagnosis; location of the incident; type of occurrence; time of occurrence; impact 
on patient; notification information; assessment information; physician assessment, and follow-up actions required. 
Incidents reported: falls; safety/security issues for patients; MEs; treatment and procedural mishaps, and medical equipment 
malfunctions. 
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Other information on the reporting system:  
Incident report is completed by an individual involved in or witnessing an error, and forwarded to a manager. 
The manager forwards the communication to the appropriate levels of authority and ensures follow-up action.  
The organisation can customize some parts of the CSRS (e.g. drop-down menus) and terminology used in the incidence reporting.  
Enables timely notification of the managers, improved communications between the different personnel involved, trending, and 
tracking of incidents. 
Haw et al (2010); Medication 
event reporting system.  
 
UK, a specialist psychiatric 
hospital. 
 
Information reported into the system:  
Event date; time and location; whether the event is a near miss, a ME or an adverse drug event; the type of incident (e.g. wrong 
drug, extra dose, missing signature); severity rating; name(s) of the drug(s) involved; a description of the incident including whether 
any action was needed as a result of the error, and any contributory factors and recommendations for preventing similar incidents. 
Other information on the reporting system:  
An internal reporting system for medication events (MEs, near misses and adverse drug reactions). 
Reporting form accessible via patients’ individual records in the Hospital intranet. 
Reporting form is designed to be easy to complete and consists of a number of drop-down menus as well as free text boxes with 
the aim of producing a standardized data set. 
After reporting a Head Pharmacist, the Registered Manager and the Clinical Services Manager of the Hospital are notified by email. 
For more serious incidents or where repeated minor errors are made by the same individual the Senior Nurse Manager carries out 
a detailed investigation of the event(s) and formulates an action plan. 
A senior pharmacist collates the Medication Event forms each month and reports the findings to the organisation’s Medication 
Management Group. 
The staff receives feedback on reporting in the form of e-newsletters and training days on reporting. 
Hirose et al (2007); KUH 
Incident reporting system. 
  
Japan, Kyoto University 
hospital. 
Information reported into the system:  
The reported information: occurrence date; reception date by the PSD; clinical department; ward and unit of the reporter, and 
severity of the injury. 
Other information on the reporting system:  
MEs are reported as a part of a wider patient safety incident reporting system. 
The reporting process is voluntary, confidential and non-punitive. 
The professional witnessing the incident submits a report to a Patient Safety Division (PSD) at the hospital. 
Reports received primarily by fax (at the time of the study). 
PSD staff screen the reports and classify them by standardised guidelines. 
  
1
22
 
More incident details are requested from the reporters, if needed. 
The reporting system contributes to patient safety especially by learning from near misses with heightened potential for harm and 
serious accidents. 
Jones et al (2004);  
MER system 
 
US, Critical access hospitals 
(CAHs) (n=6) in Nebraska. 
Information reported into the system:  
Severity and harm of error (based on the NCC MERP Index: Snyder et al. 2007); causes and contributing factors; additional 
interventions, and actions to avoid future errors. 
Other information on the reporting system:  
A voluntary system for reporting MEs only. 
Developed by Nebraska Center for Rural Health Research (NCRHR) in collaboration with the participating CAHs. 
Statistical analyses on reported errors performed by NCRHR. 
Education to the reporting staff and workshops to facilitate learning from errors. 
Kennedy et al (2004); 
Prescribing error reporting 
system. 
 
US, Community pharmacies 
(n=7) in north-western 
Vermont. 
Information reported into the system:  
The reporting form involves structured text with minimal free text about the error. 
Other information on the reporting system:  
A voluntary MER system for reporting prescribing errors in community pharmacies. 
Opportunities for dictation by a cassette recorder or reporting by a paper-based reporting form. 
A verbal description of the event was required when reporting by dictation. 
Dictation instructions were provided for the reporting pharmacists. 
Kuo et al (2012); 
Web-based incident reporting 
system. 
 
Taiwan, a teaching hospital in 
southern Taiwan. 
Information on the reporting system:  
A Web-based reporting tool for reporting patient safety incidents, including MEs, by nurses. 
Developed by the nursing department of the hospital with the assistance of the information systems department.  
Nurses were required to take a 2-hour training on patient safety and were educated about the incident reporting system. 
Incidents were required to be reported within 24-hours of occurrence by an electronic reporting form.  
After being reported, the report was sent to nurse manager for verification and subsequently to the nurse superintendent. 
The system sent e-mails automatically to the nurse administrators (nurse manager and superintendent) to remind about a new 
report. 
Küng et al (2013);  
Medication error self-reporting 
tool (MESRT). 
Information reported into the system:  
The reporting form collects data on ME frequency and type (e.g., ordering, transcribing and preparing errors); information whether 
the incident was a near miss and the nurse who prevented the error, and patient consequences attributable to MEs.  
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Switzerland, Cardiovascular 
Surgery Department of the 
University Hospital in Bern. 
Other information on the reporting system:  
A voluntary and anonymous system for reporting MEs only instead of addressing all adverse events occurring. 
A pocket size leaflet with 50 sheets were provided for participants for reporting occurred MEs right away after occurrence (or if 
there were none, this information was documented on the leaflet at the end of the nurse’s shift). Nurses were provided with 
instructions for reporting MEs. 
Levtzion-Korach et al (2009); 
Risk Monitor Pro. 
 
US, a tertiary care academic 
medical centre affiliated with 
Harvard Medical School. 
Information reported into the system:  
The incident reporting form includes sections divided into reporter’s and manager’s parts. The reporter provides: general 
information on the incident, personal information; incident details including level of harm to the patient; clinical findings; 
equipment involved, and other notification.  
Other information on the reporting system:  
An electronic, confidential reporting tool enabling reporting of patient safety incidents by the hospital personnel. 
Patient safety officers, risk managers, and subject matter experts review the incident reports and determine which incidents (e.g., 
sentinel events, near misses that carry a significant risk of injury and systemic issues) require further investigation such as root 
cause analysis and proactive assessment for some events to just asking caregivers some additional questions regarding the 
incident. 
Trends identification is carried out from the reports. Summary reports of the data are generated monthly for use by management. 
All reporters receive feedback and a safety newsletter on actions taken after reports. Feedback is sent monthly to reporters, 
nursing and department managers and the senior leadership. 
The manager reviews the report (within 72 hours), identifies, and assigns at least one contributing factor from a drop down list, 
outcome of action taken, likelihood rating, level of risk, and root cause. The management level can be alerted to a report and can 
review it immediately after the incident has been reported. 
Miller et al (2006);  
MER system 
 
US, the Johns Hopkins 
Children’s Center. 
Information reported into the system:  
Structured information of the error type (prescribing, dispensing, administering or medication administration record error); free 
text description of the event; outcome scale of the event (0-4, with 0=event did not reach patient and 4=event reached patient and 
life threatening or serious morbidity or death occurred), and indication whether the incident was a near miss. 
Other information on the reporting system:  
A voluntary online system for reporting MEs at a children’s institution in place from July 2001 to July 2004 (from 2004 the system 
has included reporting of all types of adverse events). 
Developed internally at the Johns Hopkins Children’s Center and was accessible via all public workstation computers. 
All providers (e.g., nurse, pharmacist, physician, therapist) were able to file reports. 
Olsen et al (2007);  
Adverse event reporting 
system. 
Information on the reporting system:  
A paper-based (at least at the time of the study) reporting system for adverse events, including MEs. 
Confidential and non-anonymous system. 
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UK, district general hospital, 
NHS. 
The reporting form contained mandatory data fields and space for free text about the incident. 
No additional incentives or encouragements to enhance reporting (at least at the time of the study). 
O’Neil et al (1993);  
Adverse event reporting 
system. 
 
US, Birgham and Women’s 
Hospital. 
Information on the reporting system:  
Confidential e-mail reporting system for physicians for reporting adverse events in patient care. 
Enabled also paper based reporting of events. 
Enabled uploading case-patient summaries and other relevant elements for the event analysis as a part of the report. 
Physicians reminded every week about the opportunity for reporting events. 
Rapid reporting of the incidents within 24 hours of occurrence and analysis of the incidents within 48 hours of occurrence. 
Pierson et al (2007);  
MER system. 
 
US, 25 nursing homes in North 
Carolina. 
Information reported into the system:  
Information reported in the structured reporting form: level of harm to the patient; patient information; date, shift, and number of 
time the error was repeated; type of the error (e.g., overdose, wrong medication or wrong patient); phase of medication care 
process where error first occurred; personnel involved in the error; medical effects of the error on the patient (e.g., respiratory 
distress, headache or excessive side effects); causes of the error (e.g. medication name confusion or poor communication), and 
medication involved in the error.  
Other information on the reporting system:  
A confidential MER system for long-term care setting in North Carolina.  
The data are reviewed in internal medication management advisory committees in the settings using the system. The committee 
also recommends changes to improve the safety of medication care.  
The web-based MER system was designed to be able to be used with minimal training; the user is guided step by step to enter 
correct information needed (e.g., if the error is overdose, the system prompts for both intended dose and dose administered).  
The system uses a drug identification tool that enables users to quickly search and select the medication involved in the error, 
including drug strength, route and dosage form.  
The system provides on-demand summary reports as feedback and quality improvement material of the reported information for 
the reporting nursing homes. Users can create and print summaries of all errors entered, categorize them by time period, patient 
impact, type of the error and other relevant variables. 
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Ricci et al (2004);  
Two different adverse event 
reporting databases. 
 
US, paediatric cardiac intensive 
care unit (CICU). 
Information on the reporting systems:  
Reports submitted to two different databases, which collect information from the same cardiac intensive care unit (CICU). 
ME reported as a part of other adverse events. 
Both databases classify adverse events into incident type (drug errors, ventilation, cannula/indwelling lines, chest drains, blood 
transfusion, equipment, operational) and severity (0=no, 1=minor, 2=major, 3=life threatening consequences). 
Database A (DA) 
 Non-anonymous, hospital’s official adverse event reporting system; 
 Predominantly used by nurses, only occasionally by doctors; 
 Incident forms filled in immediately after an adverse event is detected, and 
 Forms submitted to the hospital’s Risk Management Team for analysis, and result of the analyses are summarized in quarterly 
reports describing the frequency and severity of adverse events per ward/department. 
Database B (DB) 
 Anonymous, and all reports are filled in at the end of the morning ward round by a consultant intensivist (a doctor); 
 Data collection is based on the consultant’s direct experience of adverse event or on information provided by members of the 
CICU team (other consultants, junior doctors, nurses etc.), and 
 No detailed analysis of the information entered in the database was carried out at the time of the study. 
Tuttle et al (2004);  
Electronic Reporting System 
(ERS). 
 
US, an university affiliated 
teaching hospital, Strong 
Memorial Hospital. 
Information reported into the system:  
Data collection form collects structured information by drop-down menus on: demographic/background information for each 
event; event classification; event subtype; level of impact, and contributing factors. Additional details can to be given on falls, 
medication, transfusion and medical device related events. An optional open text field available for event description. For type two 
users additional fields are available for additional event information and follow up actions taken or planned. 
Other information on the reporting system:  
Voluntary and confidential (non-anonymous) electronic reporting system for adverse events, including MEs, in patients and visitors. 
Implemented throughout all clinical care areas (e.g., inpatient, outpatient, same day surgical areas), all staff able to report. 
Levels one (reporting healthcare staff) and two (accountable managers/quality assurance liaisons) user types. Type two users have 
additional access to the database functions of event notification, editing, follow up and closure, data enquires and analysis. 
Employs four major event classifications: falls, medication, adverse clinical events and administrative. 
Zwart et al (2011);  
Two patient safety incident 
reporting systems. 
 
Information on the reporting systems:  
Local incident reporting procedure (LIRP) (used by OHS 1 in the study) 
  
1
26
 
Netherlands, three general 
practices’ (GP) out-of-hours 
services (OHSs). 
 Reported information on the incident: narrative about what happened; date, time and place of the incident; involved 
individuals, and harm for the patient; 
 All healthcare professionals report all incidents in patient care by a paper based form in out-of-hours services; 
 A local, trained and multidisciplinary incident reporting procedure committee (physicians, nurses and professionals working on 
the OHS location of the incident) screened and analysed the incident reports. Incidents selected for analysis by first assigning a 
risk score (0 to 4) based on an estimate of potential harm and frequency of occurrence. Incidents with a risk score of 2 or 
higher were analysed based on PRISMA (Prevention and Recovery Information System for Monitoring Analysis) and root cause 
analysis techniques; 
 The incident reporting procedure committee was responsible for feedback to reporters and to the organisation, as well as for 
development of improvement measures when appropriate, and 
 Processing of the incident reports in feedback loop: 2-3 weeks. 
Central incident reporting procedure (CIRP) (used by OHS 2 and 3 in the study) 
 Electronic system in which incident reports are sent by email to an advisory committee of the boards of directors of the GP 
OHSs collaboration who then analyses the reports and provides feedback to reporting organisations, and 
 Processing or the incident reports in feedback loop: 8-12 weeks. 
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Appendix 3: The final questionnaire on medication error reporting systems conducted in the study 
phase I. 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON MEDICATION ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 
 
This questionnaire comprises three sections. Please answer all the relevant questions in section 1, and 
thereafter follow the instructions that will lead you to either section 2 or 3. 
 Please answer the questions by ticking the relevant boxes, or by writing your answers in the relevant 
answer fields as appropriate. 
For clarity, the following definitions of medication safety and medication errors are used in this study (Council 
of Europe 2005).  
 
Medication Safety : freedom from accidental injury during the course of medication 
use; activities to avoid, prevent, or correct adverse drug events which may result 
from the use of medications.  
Adverse Event : an unintended injury caused by medical management rather than 
by a disease process  
Medication Error : any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate 
medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health 
care professional, patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to professional 
practice, healthcare products, procedures, and systems, including prescribing; order 
communication; product labelling, packaging, and nomenclature; compounding; 
dispensing; distribution; administration; education; monitoring; and use.  
Adverse Drug Reaction: a response to a medicinal product which is noxious 
and unintended and which occurs at doses normally used in the main for the prophylaxis, 
diagnosis or therapy of disease or for the restoration, correction or modification of 
physiological function. 
 
Reference: 
Council of Europe: Committee of Experts on Management of Safety and Quality in Healthcare (SP-SQS) Expert 
Group on Safe Medication Practices. Glossary of terms related to patient and medication safety, 2005 
 
 
SECTION 1 
Background information on respondent countries 
This section will provide us with some background information on your organisation and country to help us 
classify your answers.  
Q 1.1  Organisation name:       
 Organisation country:       
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Q 1.2 Please provide us with your contact details in case we need to contact you later for further information. 
Name:       
 Email:       
 Work telephone number:       
 Work address:       
 
Q 1.3 Please tick all options that apply of the following alternatives to describe your organisation. 
 Government (e.g. Ministry of Health)  Regulatory body (e.g. National Agency for Medicines)  
 Professional body (e.g. National Medical Association) 
 Hospital setting   Community setting 
 Another organisation. Please specify                             
 
Legislation and regulations 
Q 1.4 In your country, does a national authority for  
a) patient safety exist? 
 Yes  
 No (Please go to Q 1.4 b) 
 Do not know 
If yes,                                  
Please provide the name of the authority        
What is their area of responsibility in patient safety issues?       
 
b) medication safety exist? 
 Yes   
 No (Please go to Q 1.5) 
 Do not know 
If yes,                                  
Please provide the name of the authority        
What is their area of responsibility in medication safety issues?       
 
If you answered yes in both Q 1.4 a) and b), 
Are the national authorities for patient safety and medication safety integrated? 
 Yes     No 
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Q.1.5 In your country, does an authority for medication error reporting exist? 
 Yes   No (Please go to Q 1.6)  Do not know 
If yes,                                  
a) Please provide the name of the authority        
b) What is their area of responsibility in medication error reporting issues?       
 
Q 1.6 In your country, do national authorities and/or systems exist that govern and regulate the quality of 
healthcare services, for example standards of care? 
  Yes  No (Please go to Q 1.7)  Do not know 
If yes, 
a) Please provide the name of the authorities and/or systems        
b) What is their area of responsibility in patient and medication safety issues, if any?       
 
Q 1.7 In your country, do national legislation and/or regulations exist regarding healthcare professionals’ 
practice (e.g. maintaining professional competence)? 
 Yes   No     Do not know 
If yes, please specify       
 
Q 1.8 In your country, are healthcare professionals required to register with an authority before they are 
allowed to practise their profession? Please tick all options that apply. 
 Yes, a requirement for doctors  Yes, a requirement for nurses  
 Yes, a requirement for pharmacists  Yes, a requirement for other professionals  
Please, specify       
 
Q 1.9 In your country, do national legislation and/or regulations exist regarding 
a) Adverse events 
 Yes   No   Do not know 
b) Medication errors  
 Yes  No    Do not know 
c) Adverse drug reactions 
 Yes   No    Do not know 
 
Q 1.10 In your country, would these or other legislations encourage the healthcare professionals to report 
medication errors? Please describe in detail.        
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Q 1.11 What type of actions may be taken within the legislative framework of your country when a healthcare 
professional is reported to have made a medication error (e.g. prescribing, transcribing, dispensing or 
administration error), if any?       
 
Q 1.12 Are these actions different for different healthcare professionals (doctors, nurses, pharmacists)? 
 Yes   No   Do not know 
If yes, please specify       
 
Characteristics and existence of medication error reporting systems 
Q 2.13 Please provide us your comments or ideas how to best develop and implement a medication error 
reporting system.       
 
Q 1.14 Please provide us information on which characteristics describe a good and effective medication error 
reporting system (MERS) in your opinion. Please choose the top five (5) options that apply. 
 
 Reporting of errors through the MERS is 
voluntary 
 The MERS provides a choice of reporting 
anonymously 
 Reporting of errors through the MERS is 
mandatory 
 The MERS allows all healthcare professionals to 
report errors 
 The MERS is easy to use  The MERS is quick to use 
 The MERS is an integral part of a patient safety 
reporting system 
 The MERS is an independent reporting system 
dedicated to medication error reporting 
 The MERS uses a non-punitive approach to 
reporting 
 The MERS is available in electronic form 
 The MERS is paper based 
 The MERS provides confidentiality of reported 
information 
 The MERS provides an opportunity for error 
data analysis 
 The MERS provides patients/consumers an 
opportunity to report errors 
 The MERS includes reporting of both potential 
and actual errors 
 The MERS is provided and maintained by one 
national organisation 
 The MERS produces recommendations and 
guidelines for improving the medication safety 
 The MERS provides feedback of results of error 
analysis for those involved in reporting 
 The MERS provides an opportunity for 
evaluating causes of errors (e.g. root cause 
analysis) 
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Q 1.15 Which of following, if any, could be regarded as barriers to reporting medication errors in your opinion? 
Please choose top five (5) options that apply. 
 
 Non-anonymous reporting  Fear of consequences 
 Lack of time for reporting  Lack of healthcare staff 
 Lack of financial resources  Lack of training in medication error reporting 
for healthcare professionals 
 Perceived to be bureaucratic 
 Concern that no beneficial action will follow 
 Lack of understanding why it is needed 
 Lack of relevant guidelines and policies on 
medication error reporting 
 Lack of organisational leadership and support 
 Culture of blame (blaming the individuals e.g. 
doctors, nurses and pharmacists for making errors 
instead of the system) 
 Lack of legal protection for individual 
healthcare professionals who have made an error 
 Other barriers. Please, specify       
 
Q 1.16 In your country does an adverse drug reaction reporting system (i.e. pharmacovigilance system) exist? 
 Yes  No     Do not know 
 
Q 1.17 In your country, does a national medication error reporting system exist?  
 Yes, it is a stand alone system (Go to Section 2) 
 Yes, it is integrated in an Adverse Event Reporting system (Go to Section 2) 
 Yes, it is integrated in an Adverse Drug Reaction reporting system (Go to Section 2) 
 Yes, it is integrated in another system. Please, specify       (Go to Section 2)   
 No (Please go to Q 1.18) 
 
Q 1.18 Are you aware of any local medication error reporting systems in any hospitals or other healthcare 
settings in your country? 
 Yes, they are widespread  
 Yes, there are a few   
 No, there are none (Please go to Section 3) 
 
If yes, where does the most developed medication error reporting system exist? (If you are aware of several 
systems in different settings, please consider the one you are most familiar with) 
 Within a hospital setting  A shared system within several hospitals 
 Within a community setting  Within another setting. Please specify        
Please go to Section 2. 
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SECTION 2 
Countries which have a national system or local systems for reporting medication errors 
 
This section helps us to learn more about your medication error reporting system. 
Please note: If both a national system and local systems exist in your country, please consider the national 
system when answering the questions. 
 
Q 2.1 Please specify which medication error reporting system you are going to give information on. 
 National system  Local system 
 
Q 2.2 When was the reporting system implemented? Please choose the most appropriate alternative from 
drop down menu by clicking the question mark.     ?      
 
Q 2.3 a) Which organisation established the medication error reporting system? Please provide the name of 
the organisation for us.       
b) Which organisation maintains the medication error reporting system?       
c) Which organisation collects the medication error reports?       
d) Which organisation analyses the medication error reports?       
e) Which organisation provides feedback on the analysed data for healthcare professionals?        
 
Q 2.4 For what purpose is the reporting system used? Please, tick all options that apply. 
 Reporting medication errors   Reporting other patient safety adverse events 
 Reporting adverse drug reactions  Other purpose. Please specify       
 
Q 2.5 Please respond to the following statement by clicking the question mark below and choosing the 
appropriate alternative from drop down menu. 
In my opinion the number of errors reported through the current medication error system is a realistic 
representation of the actual number of errors made.     ?     
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Q 2.6 Please indicate which features are included within the medication error reporting system (MERS)?  
Please choose all options that apply. 
 
 Reporting of errors through the MERS is 
voluntary 
 The MERS provides a choice of reporting 
anonymously 
 Reporting of errors through the MERS is 
mandatory 
 The MERS allows all healthcare professionals to 
report errors 
 The MERS is easy to use  The MERS is quick to use 
 The MERS is an integral part of a patient safety 
reporting system 
 The MERS is an independent reporting system 
dedicated for medication error reporting 
 The MERS uses a non-punitive approach to 
reporting 
 The MERS is available in electronic form 
 The MERS is paper based 
 The MERS provides confidentiality of reported 
information 
 The MERS provides an opportunity for error 
data analysis 
 The MERS provides patients/consumers an 
opportunity to report errors 
 The MERS includes reporting of both potential 
and actual errors 
 The MERS is provided and maintained by one 
national organisation 
 The MERS produces recommendations and 
guidelines for improving the medication safety 
 The MERS provides feedback of results of error 
analysis for those involved in reporting 
 The MERS provides an opportunity for 
evaluating causes of errors (e.g. root cause 
analysis) 
 
Q 2.7 If the medication error reporting system is non-anonymous, which personal details have to be reported 
on the person who made the error?       
 
Q 2.8 a) The severity of medication errors may vary. In this system, which potential or actual medication errors 
are mandatory to report? Please tick all options that apply. 
 Near miss  
(an error that was about to happen but was detected before any harm was caused to patient)     
 Mild  
(an error requiring further observation or minor treatment of the patient, and/or causes a minimal harm to 
patient) 
 Moderate  
(an error causing significant but not permanent harm to patient) 
 Severe  
(an error resulting to permanent harm to patient, for example organ damage) 
 Fatal  
(an error resulting in the death of the patient) 
 Another type. Please specify       
 
  
134 
 
Q2.8 b) The severity of medication errors may vary. In this system, which potential or actual medication errors 
are voluntary to report? Please, tick all options that apply. 
 Near miss  
(an error that was about to happen but was detected before any harm was caused to patient)     
 Mild  
(an error requiring further observation or minor treatment of the patient, and/or causes a minimal harm to 
patient) 
 Moderate 
(an error causing significant but not permanent harm to patient) 
 Severe  
(an error resulting to permanent harm to patient, for example organ damage) 
 Fatal  
(an error resulting in the death of the patient) 
 Another type. Please specify       
 
Q 2.9 Please provide us information on the different types of potential and actual medication errors that are 
reported through the system by ticking one of the following boxes for each type of error. The alternatives are 
very likely to be reported; likely to be reported; not likely to be reported; not at all likely to be reported; 
not applicable.  
Please, choose the alternative not applicable if some types of medication errors are not advised to be 
reported. 
 Very likely  Likely Not likely  Not at all likely Not 
 to be reported to be reported to be reported to be reported applicable 
 
Near Miss      
Mild      
Moderate       
Severe       
Fatal       
Another type.      
Please specify       
 
Q 2.10 Medication errors can occur in any step of medication process. Which medication errors types are 
reported through the system? Please tick all options that apply. 
 Prescribing errors (occurring during the prescribing stage of a medicine)  
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 Transcribing errors (occurring during the transcription of a name of the medicine provided by a doctor to 
a prescription by a nurse or pharmacist)      
 Dispensing errors (a deviation from a prescription or a medication order made by a pharmacist, or any 
deviation from references or guidelines affecting dispensing procedures) 
 Administration errors (occurs in the administration stage of medication when medication is given to a 
patient by a nurse, patient themselves or a caregiver)  
 Errors related to poor communication between healthcare professionals and patients  
 Other errors. Please specify       
 
Q 2.11 Which of the following could report medication errors? Please tick all options that apply. 
 Doctors 
 Pharmacists 
 Nurses     
 Patients  
 Others. Please specify       
 
Q 2.12 In which settings are healthcare professionals able to report medication errors? Please tick all options 
that apply. 
 In hospital settings  
 In intensive care units in hospitals 
 In community primary healthcare settings 
 Nursing homes 
 In community pharmacies 
 In other settings. Please specify       
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Q 2.13 Please provide us with information on how often you think the following report medication errors by 
ticking one of the following boxes for each. The alternatives are very often; often; sometimes; never and not 
applicable.  If some do not take part in reporting, please choose the alternative not applicable. 
 Very often Often  Sometimes        Never   Not applicable
   
Doctors       
Nurses       
Pharmacists      
Patients      
Other professionals      
Please specify       
 
Q 2.14 Which applications are there for the data collected through the medication error reporting system? 
Please tick all the alternatives that apply, and describe in more detail.  
 Development of training programmes on patient and medication safety issues. 
 Development of guidelines or standardised operating procedures for patient care.  
 Development or use of system failure (e.g. in patient care) evaluation tools (e.g. root cause analysis). 
 Any other purposes?  
Please describe in more detail here       
 
Q 2.15 Following the implementation of the medication error reporting system, have any changes or 
improvements been made to the medication error reporting system?  
 Yes  No 
If yes, please describe these changes in more detail       
 
Thank you for your contribution to this study! 
 
SECTION 3 
Countries which do not have a medication error reporting system 
 
Q 3.1 Have there been any plans for developing a medication error reporting system 
a) Nationally?  
 Yes  No  Do not know   
If yes, please describe in more detail       
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b) Locally in 
 Hospital setting(s)?  Community setting(s)?  
 Another setting. Please specify        Do not know 
Please describe the local plans in more detail       
 
Q 3.2 Has any action been taken to develop a medication error reporting system 
a) Nationally?  
 Yes  No  Do not know   
If yes, describe in more detail           
 
b) Locally? Please tick all options that apply. 
 Within hospital setting   
 Shared activities within several hospitals 
 Within community setting 
 Within another setting. Please specify.       
 Do not know 
Please describe these local actions in more detail       
 
Q 3.3 In your country, is there awareness of the need for paying attention to medication safety issues? Please 
tick all options that apply.  
 Nationally   
 Locally (e.g. in any hospital) 
 Do not know 
If yes, please describe       
 
Q 3.4 What kind of organisational support should be available to develop and implement a national 
medication error reporting system?       
 
Q 3.5 What kind of organisational or cultural changes (e.g. attitude changes), if any, may be needed to enable 
medication error reporting?       
 
Q 3.6 Please comment on the capacity of your country to develop and implement a medication error reporting 
system.       
Thank you for your contribution to this study! 
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Appendix 4: Information on the patient safety incidents collected by the Reporting System for Safety 
Incidents in Health Care Organizations, HaiPro, in the Pilot Phase of the system in 2007-2009 (1). 
Information provided by the healthcare professional reporting the incident 
Reported through structured drop-down menus in the electronic HaiPro reporting form (2) 
       Date incident occurred 
       Unit of the healthcare professional reporting the incident 
       Unit were the incident occurred 
       Profession of the person reporting the incident 
       Date and time of the incident 
       Place of occurrence (e.g. operating room) 
       Nature of the incident (actual error, near miss or violation directed to personnel) 
       Incident type (e.g. dispensing error of a medicine) 
Reported as open narratives in the HaiPro reporting form (2) 
       Description of the incident 
 What happened and how the incident occurred 
 What were the consequences for the patient and the unit 
 Conditions at the time of the incident and other contributing factors 
 Views of the reporting person on how similar incidents could be avoided in the future 
       Suggestions for action to prevent reoccurrence of the incident 
Information classified by the data classifier (based on reported narratives) by a structured electronic data 
classification form 
       Defined type of the incident (e.g. a wrong medicine dispensed to a patient) 
       Consequences for the patient and the unit 
       Management of the incident situation 
       Instant actions in the incident situation 
       Conditions at the time of the incident and other contributing factors (e.g. lack of information on the 
       medicines the patient is using) 
Information reported by the data classifier as an open narrative in the HaiPro system 
       Actions to prevent the reoccurrence of the incident suggested by the reporter, or 
       explanation of why actions are not needed 
       Description of how the suggested actions were executed 
1. Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Introduction of a reporting system for dangerous situations in 
healthcare. [Abstract in English]. Reports of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2008:16.  
2. Awanic Ltd. HaiPro – Patient safety incident report: http://83.150.87.4/haipro/20/lomake.asp?kieli=ENG. 
Accessed [215 Sep 2].  
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Appendix 5: The sample contents of the course provided for the workshop participants to support the 
brainstorming of teaching and assessment methods for a three-day interdisciplinary course in 
medication safety. 
 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO MEDICATION SAFETY  
A three-day short course for healthcare professionals 
Aims: 
At the end of this course, the learner will be able to: 
 describe medication safety from the systems approach, and its role in patient safety 
 identify causes of medication errors and to develop actions to prevent medication errors 
 use skills of different healthcare professionals to promote medication safety 
Description: 
Training is provided for a group of 20 healthcare professionals involved in medication process of patients (e.g. pharmacists, 
practitioners and nurses). This is a three-day-short course involving different teaching and assessment methods.   
Contents 1: 
Day 1. Understanding the causes of medication errors (7h) 
 Introduction to patient and medication safety (2h) 
 Causes of medication errors (e.g. hectic working environment, too heavy workload, “sound alike” and 
“look alike” medicines) (3h) 
 Analysis of medication errors (what happened and why?) (2h) 
Day 2. Prevention of medication errors (7h) 
 Prevention of medication errors (prescribing, dispensing, administration and counselling errors) (3h) 
 High alert medications – Safeguarding against errors (2h) 
 Role of patient in preventing medication errors (2h)  
Day 3. Safe medication process as a target of interdisciplinary co-operation (7h) 
 Preventive collaborative actions (e.g. medication review) 
 Medication reconciliation 
1 Based on: Cohen M. Medication Errors. 2nd edition. Washington, D.C.: American Pharmacists Association; 2007. 
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Appendix 6: The combined syllabus for a three-day course titled “Interdisciplinary Approach to 
Medication Safety”. HCP = Healthcare professional. 
Interdisciplinary Approach to Medication Safety 
AIMS: 
At the end of this course, the learner will be able to: 
 describe medication safety from the systems approach, and its role in patient safety 
 identify causes of medication errors and to develop actions to prevent medication errors 
 use skills of different healthcare professionals to promote medication safety 
DESCRIPTION: 
Training is provided for a group of 20 healthcare professionals involved in medication process of patients (e.g. 
pharmacists, practitioners and nurses). The course is based on three interactive training days and learning at the 
workplace. The time between the training days is one month. The course comprises three training days (á 7h) and 
out-of-class work (approx. 30 hours). The facilitators/teachers of the course are recommended to be experts in 
medication safety and change management.  
PRE-COURSE 
 Pre-reading material in medication safety (see examples at the end of the syllabus) 
 Audio-visual recordings (e.g. videos of aviation accidents and management of medication errors) 
 Identification of a medication error/near miss occurred at the learner’s workplace 1 
TRAINING DAY 1 
Theme: Understanding medication safety and the causes of medication errors (7h) 
 The learners network and get to know each other 
 Group discussion on  
o what is medication safety and the role of systems approach in it  
o learners’ own experiences in medication safety  
 Group-reflection on pre-course assignments  
 Self-reflection on own learning needs (notes, essays and blogs) (see examples for reflection prompts in 
the end of the syllabus) 
 Development of personal learning objectives (see examples in the end of the syllabus) 
 Real-life examples 
o inviting a HCP who has made an error to share his/her experiences, or 
o other examples of unfortunate accusations of malpractice 
 Analysis of 
o the cases of medication errors and their causes in the pre-course videos, or  
o the identified cases of medication errors/near misses at the learners’ workplaces and  the 
causes of the incidents 
LEARNING AT THE WORKPLACE BETWEEN TRAINING DAYS 1 & 2 (1st month) 
 A presentation for colleagues on medication safety and own learning experiences 
 Searching for reading material to support own learning process, and reflecting the material with the 
colleagues at the workplace 
 Identifying new cases of medication errors/near misses with the assistance of colleagues at the 
workplace 1 
 Presenting the cases and discussing their causes in interdisciplinary small groups of course participants 2 
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TRAINING DAY 2 
Theme: Safe medication practices and prevention of medication errors (7h) 
 Feedback on learning at the workplace between the training days 1 & 2:  
o presenting the identified cases of medication errors/near misses; 
o presenting the contents of e-discussion; and  
o presenting the findings from reading material and reflection with the colleagues 
 Experience sharing on safe medication practices at own workplace 
 Role play (patient-HCP or healthcare team) 
LEARNING AT WORK BETWEEN TRAINING DAYS 2 & 3 (2nd month) 
 Discussion on the identified cases of medication errors/near misses and their prevention 2 
 Defining measures for prevention of the cases 2 
TRAINING DAY 3 
Theme:  Safe medication process as a target of interdisciplinary collaboration and reflecting learning (7h) 
 Feedback on learning at the workplace between the training days 2 & 3:  
o Presenting the contents of e-discussion 
o Presenting the prevention measures of identified medication errors/near misses and discussing 
the implementation of the prevention measures 3 
 Reflection of learning  
o Self-assessment of learning against own objectives and course aims 
o Self-reflection on current learning needs 
o Re-focusing of learning objectives 
o Self-reflection on changes in own attitudes towards medication safety and in behavior at the 
workplace 
o Group reflection 
 Learners form networking groups for post-course communication 
POST-COURSE 
 Development of an action plan to prevent medication errors at own organisation 
o learners use the networks created on the third training day, and in the interdisciplinary small 
groups used for web-based learning between the training days 
 Presenting and discussing the action plan at the workplace 
 Reflection of learning 
o Assessment of own learning against objectives 
o Self-reflection on current learning needs 
o Re-focusing of learning objectives 
EXAMPLES 4 
 Examples of pre-reading material for the course: 
o Cohen M. Medication Errors. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: American Pharmacists Association; 
2007. 
o Institute for Safe Medication Practices: Medication Safety Tools and Resources. Available at: 
https://www.ismp.org/ (Accessed October 6, 2014) 
o World Health Organization. The WHO Patient Safety Curriculum Guide: Multi-professional 
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Edition. 2011. 
 Example prompts for learners to reflect on their learning needs: 
o What would you like to learn about contributing factors to medication errors? 
o What skills to promote medication safety at your workplace would you like to master after the 
course? 
o In what way would you like to improve as a team worker? 
 Examples of learning objectives for the course (some based on the WHO Patient Safety Curriculum 
Guide) 5 
At the end of the course I will be able to: 
o Identify the potential contributing factors of medication errors at my workplace 
o Identify the mechanisms that could minimize medication errors at my workplace, e.g. medication 
reconciliation or checklists, and to develop them as a customized tools to promote medication 
safety at my workplace 
o Describe the principles of good communication with other HCPs and patients 
 
1 The learners can be encouraged to especially identify cases of high-alert medications (References:  
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. ISMP’s List of High-Alert Medications for Acute Care Settings. 2012. 
http://www.ismp.org/tools/highalertmedications.pdf. Accessed April 20, 2015. 
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. ISMP’s List of High-Alert Medications in Community/Ambulatory Healthcare. 2011. 
https://www.ismp.org/communityRx/tools/highAlert-community.pdf. Accessed April 20, 2015. 
2 In inter-disciplinary small groups in a web-based learning environment 
3 Also other measures/tools for medication safety promotion, such as medication review or medication reconciliation, can 
be included in the discussion 
4 Provided by the researchers to assist in the course planning and implementation 
5 Reference: World Health Organization. The WHO Patient Safety Curriculum Guide: Multi-professional Edition. 2011. 
Available at: http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241501958_eng.pdf?ua=1. Accessed April 20, 2015. 
